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ABSTRACT 
 
State Multinationals: The Impact of State Ownership on International Diversification 
and Firm Performance. (August 2010) 
Xiaoming He, B.E., Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications; 
M.M., University of International Business Studies; 
M.A., University of Nottingham 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Lorraine Eden 
 
State multinationals were investigated in the 1980s. Since then, little work on the 
state multinational has been done because of the dramatic changes in the world in terms 
of both politics and economics, such as the waves of liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization. However, in the current global environment, we see the increase in the 
number of state multinationals, and thus initiate research of this study. 
This study investigates two sets of research questions. First, is the state 
multinational the overlap of two organizational forms (the state owned enterprise (SOE) 
and the multinational enterprise (MNE))? If so, what are the key characteristics and 
implications of the state multinational? Second, can the state multinational be considered 
a hybrid organizational form, which is different from that of its parents? Propositions are 
set forth to examine the first set of research questions. After clarifying the unit of 
analysis for this study, the second set of questions asks how state ownership influences 
the state multinational‘s international diversification and firm performance, and what is 
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the impact of institutional ownership on the state ownership—international 
diversification relationship, and how home country institutional environments influence 
the proposed relationships. Hypotheses are proposed to investigate the second set of 
research questions and are tested with a three-year sample (2004-2007) and a seven year 
sample (2000-2007) of the state multinational. 
 Results of hierarchical linear models indicate that the state multinational, first, 
does have characteristics that are different from its parents (i.e., the SOE and the MNE) 
and thus is considered a hybrid organizational form. Second, state ownership may 
improve the level of the state multinational‘s international diversification, but reaches a 
threshold, after which the positive influence diminishes due to the prominent agency 
costs. Third, institutional ownership has been verified as a useful mechanism to improve 
the effectiveness of corporate governance in the case of the state multinational. Fourth, 
home country institutional environments matter in the studied relationships. The state 
multinational in developed countries with an established institutional environment may 
not depend on state ownership as much as those in developing and emerging countries.  
 Results also show the influence of state ownership on the state multinational‘s 
firm performance. The state ownership—performance relationship is also non-linear 
(inverted U-shaped). Moreover, in the case of the state multinational, the higher the level 
of international diversification, the higher the firm performance. In addition, 
international strategies of the state multinational function as a mediator for the 
relationship between state ownership and firm performance.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
Motivation 
State owned enterprises (SOEs), that is, enterprises with at least 50 percent state 
ownership, flourished in the 1970s and 1980s. Some SOEs also engaged in value adding 
activities outside their home country, qualifying them at the same time as multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). The group of state multinationals (SMNEs), that is, multinational 
enterprises with at least 10 percent state ownership, tended to be industry specific; for 
example, state multinationals controlled the majority of world petroleum production and 
a large percentage of international petroleum trade in the 1970s (Aharoni & Seidler, 
1986). 
Little research was conducted on state multinationals until the 1980s (e.g., 
Anastassopoulos, Blanc, & Dusssauge, 1987; Mazzolini, 1980; Negandhi, Thomas, & 
Rao, 1986). In those days, state ownership was widely perceived to lead to inefficient, 
badly managed and excessively large firms with high agency costs (e.g., Aharoni & 
Seidler, 1986).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Academy of Management Journal. 
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State multinationals, in addition, were seen as extensions of their home country 
governments; potential ―Trojan horses‖ viewed suspiciously by host country nationals 
worried about extraterritorial activities being conducted through these firms (Vernon, 
1977). 
Little work on state multinationals has been done since then, perhaps because the 
world has changed dramatically in the last two decades in terms of both economics and 
politics. The waves of liberalization, privatization and deregulation that swept through 
Europe, Asia, Latin America and the former Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s 
significantly reduced the number of state owned enterprises. Markets in these countries 
are now dominated by private MNEs (Toninelli, 2000). As a result, scholars have paid 
little attention to state multinationals over the past 20 years. When conducting research 
on MNE activities, a few scholars have considered the international involvement of 
SOEs (e.g. Luo & Tung, 2007). However, there has been little recent research on the 
development of state multinationals. 
The topic of state multinationals may be ready for a renaissance. More than two 
decades later, MNEs with some degree of state ownership exist as an energetic 
organizational form (Kikeri & Kolo, 2006). Many governments in emerging economies 
have been encouraging their state owned firms to become MNEs, for example, China‘s 
―go global‖ policy (UNCTAD, 2006). Moreover, governments have, once again, used 
state ownership to stabilize their national economies. For instance, starting from 2008, 
many governments in both developed and developing and emerging economies fully or 
partially have nationalized or bailed out firms in the banking, finance and other 
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industries (e.g., automobiles) in an attempt to stave off the current financial crisis (Tabb, 
2008; São, 2010). Thus, the number of state multinationals has been growing in the 
current global environment.   
 
Research Questions 
At the cusp of the second decade of the 21st century, how do state multinationals 
expand into foreign markets? Is the pejorative view of state enterprises, e.g. their 
inefficiencies and suspicions of extraterritorial activities, no longer appropriate? Should 
state multinationals now be viewed in a more positive light?  
Before addressing these questions, I must first clarify the unit of analysis—the 
state multinational, which I argue is a hybrid organizational form drawing its 
characteristics from its ―parents‖: the state owned enterprise and the multinational 
enterprise.  
An MNE with some percent of state ownership is the overlap of two 
organizational forms: SOE and MNE. The overlapping enterprise has specific 
characteristics that come from its SOE and MNE ―parents‖, which make the enterprise 
different from other forms of organizations. Thus, it is meaningful to consider the state 
multinational as a hybrid organizational form that has existed for several decades, which 
has its own unique characteristics, competences and strategies.  
I argue that MNEs with state ownership should be separated into three categories 
depending on their degree of state involvement, as shown in Figure 1.1. The broadest 
category includes all multinational enterprises where at least some positive percent of 
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equity ownership is held by the state (State Ownership>0%). This is the general ―MNEs 
with state ownership‖ category. Within this group is a smaller category of multinationals 
that are controlled by the state. I assume a minimum of 10 percent equity ownership is 
needed to exercise some control; therefore, state controlled multinationals are MNEs 
with at least 10 percent state ownership (State Ownership>10%). Within this group is the 
smallest category of MNEs where the majority of equity ownership is held by the state 
(State Ownership>50%)1. The greater the degree of state ownership, presumably, the 
greater the influence of the state is on the hybrid organization‘s behavior.  
Figure 1.1 
Categories of MNEs with State Ownership 
 
 
I) MNEs with at least some extent of state ownership (State Ownership >0%);  
II) State controlled MNEs (State Ownership >10%);  
III) State- Majority-Owned MNEs (State Ownership >50%). 
 
                                                          
1 The average state ownership in my final sample is 0.29 for 225 SMNEs. 
MNEs 
State-Majority- Owned 
Enterprises 
State Controlled Enterprises 
Enterprises with some state 
ownership 
III 
II 
I 
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In this dissertation, I define a state multinational (SMNE) as a multinational 
enterprise with at least 10 percent state ownership. The 10-percent cutoff is high enough 
that the state should have the ability to affect corporate governance and therefore firm 
performance. When the state equity share is less than 10 percent, I expect the 
government‘s holding to be similar to portfolio investment rather than direct investment; 
that is, the state is assumed to exercise minimal or no control over firm behavior.  
Second, multinationality refers to the extent of a firm‘s business operations 
beyond national borders, that is, the firm‘s value adding activities outside of its home 
country (Vernon, 1971; Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003; Tseng, Tansuhaj, Hallagan, & 
McCullough, 2007).  International diversification is ―a strategy through which a firm 
expands the sales of its goods or services across the borders of global regions and 
countries into different geographic locations or markets‖ (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 
2009: 231). The two concepts used in this dissertation, ―multinationality‖ and 
―international diversification‖, are often used interchangeably in the literature (Hitt, 
Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006; Contractor et al., 2003; Tseng et al., 2007). In 
Chapter II, I adopt the breadth of an SMNE‘s international expansion (the number of 
foreign countries where the firm has subsidiaries) (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Reuer & 
Leiblein, 2000) to describe the degree of multinationality (DOM). My dataset consists of 
firms with a minimum DOM of owning at least 50 percent of at least one foreign 
subsidiary. In Chapter III, I use international diversification to describe the 
implementation of the firm‘s international strategies.  
Using these core concepts, I develop two sets of research questions in my 
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dissertation that apply to my unit of analysis, the state multinational (SMNE). In Figure 
1.2, there are two dimensions reflecting the two ―parents‖ (i.e. SOE and MNE) of the 
SMNE hybrid organizational form: State Ownership and Multinationality. While the 
universe of state multinationals includes all (a) publicly and privately traded firms with 
(b) at least some degree of state ownership and (c) at least one foreign subunit, in my 
dissertation I restrict my study to (a) publicly traded firms with (b) at least 10 percent 
state ownership and (c) at least 50 percent ownership of at least one foreign subsidiary. 
By removing the extreme cases of minimal state ownership and minimal multinationality, 
I can focus my analysis on the bulk of publicly traded firms that are seen as state 
multinationals.      
Figure 1.2  
Research Focus 
 
 
 
There are at least three different research directions that can be pursued in this 
dissertation, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. I focus on two directions and leave the other 
direction to post-dissertation research. My first focus is theoretically analyzing the 
SMNE in Figure 1.2 as a hybrid organizational form based on the comparison of MNEs 
 
Extension 1 
State Ownership Multinationality 
MNE Non-MNE 
 
( >10% )  
 
  
=0 (Private 
Ownership) 
  
 (0, 10%)   
 
Focus of Chapter III  
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with and without state ownership (Chapter II). My second focus is empirically analyzing 
the light gray cell in Figure 1.2, that is, SMNEs, publicly traded firms with at least ten 
percent state ownership and at least one foreign subsidiary with at least 50 percent 
ownership (Chapter III). In later post-dissertation research, I intend to compare state 
controlled MNEs with non-MNEs (extension 1).  
SOEs and MNEs are different organizational forms with different key features. 
For instance, SOEs are typically seen as domestic firms that focus on government 
objectives rather than firm interests (Lamont, 1979). In contrast, MNEs typically seen as 
operating in multiple countries and mainly profit oriented (Caves, 1996). Since SMNEs 
are the overlap of these two types of organizational forms, I expect the hybrid structure 
to have key features that draw from either of the SMNE‘s ―parent‖ organizational forms. 
Given that specificity, I examine the key features of these organizational forms and 
propose the state multinational as a hybrid organizational form. 
Research question 1: What are the key characteristics and implications of the hybrid 
organizational form, the state multinational? 
After I answer the first research question, I present a research framework to 
explore factors that influence the SMNE‘s performance. These subsequent research 
directions are broader than I can address here. In this dissertation, I follow the strategic 
management and international business research streams, narrowing down my research 
topic to these potential research directions.  
In this dissertation, I argue that both State Ownership and the Home Country 
Environment influence International Diversification of the state multinational. The 
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literature tells us that state ownership can affect firm performance (e.g., Luo, 1995; Zou 
& Adams, 2008). We know that state multinationals are generally influenced by the state 
when they make strategic decisions on corporate strategies such as international 
diversification (e.g., Anastassopoulos et al., 1987; Luo & Tung, 2007; Vernon, 1977). 
Depending on control over SMNEs, governments will intervene with SMNEs‘ 
operations and strategic decisions. 
However, in the new global environment, whether and how state ownership 
influence the SMNE‘s performance has seldom been investigated. In this study, I 
investigate how changing the degree of state ownership affects corporate governance 
when firms compete in the global market. Thus, I focus on the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the SMNE‘s international strategies and its performance. 
Research question 2.1: How does the degree of state ownership influence the 
SMNE’s international diversification in the new global environment?  
Research question 2.2: How does the degree of state ownership affect the SMNE’s 
firm performance in the new global environment?  
Home country environmental characteristics, as one type of external environment 
factor, can influence SMNEs‘ strategic decisions and international expansion (Hitt et al., 
2006b). For instance, Wan and Hoskisson (2003) find that munificence of the home 
country environment moderates the relationship between international diversification 
and firm performance.  
Recognizing the importance of nationality (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 
2000), I also investigate the influence of the home country environment on the state 
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ownership- international diversification relationship. 
Research question 2.3: How does the home country environment influence the 
impact of state ownership on international diversification of SMNEs? 
Figure 1.3 offers a summary of the research questions investigated in this 
dissertation. 
Figure 1.4 provides an outline of the research framework for my dissertation. I 
first investigate the characteristics and implications of the SMNE as a hybrid 
organizational form. I then examine the implications of state ownership for the SMNE‘s 
international diversification strategy and performance. Lastly, I examine the effects of 
the home country environment as a moderator of the state ownership-international 
diversification relationship.   
Figure 1.3 
Research Questions 
 
 
Chapter III: The Influence of state ownership on international diversification and firm 
performance 
Research Question 2.1: How does the degree of state ownership influence the SMNE‘s international 
diversification in the new global environment?  
Research Question 2.2: How does the degree of state ownership affect the SMNE‘s firm performance in 
the new global environment?  
Research Question 2.3: How does home country institutional environment influence the impact of state 
ownership on international diversification of SMNEs? 
 
Chapter II: SMNE as a Hybrid Organizational Form 
Research Question 1: What are the key characteristics and implications of the hybrid organizational 
form, the state multinational? 
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Figure 1.4 
Research Framework for the Dissertation 
 
 
Overview of Research Methods 
The hypotheses developed in this study are tested on a sample of state 
multinationals over the 2000-2007 time period, using Bureau van Dijk‘s (BVD) ORBIS 
database. The database contains detailed ownership, financial and subsidiary data for 
more than 57 million firms from 200 countries. My sample includes publicly listed 
multinationals that have a minimum of 10% state ownership and at least one foreign 
majority-owned affiliate (i.e. control in the foreign affiliate > 50%). Thus, my sample 
selection is consistent with my definition of SMNEs and also guarantees that SMNEs in 
my sample have a minimum degree of multinationality. Home and host country-level 
data are collected from the United Nations and Economist Intelligence Unit datasets. 
Because I have cross-section time-series panel data with multilevel variables, the 
Firm 
Characteristics 
1) SOE 
2) MNE 
*Goals 
*Strategies 
(international 
diversification) 
*Structure 
SMNE 
Performance 
1) Parent 
2) Subsidiary 
Home Country 
Environment 
Host Country 
Environment 
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Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) technique is appropriate to test my hypotheses. I 
test my hypotheses on the ―all SMNE‖ sample for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3, 4 and 5 
proposed in Chapter III. Next, to test Hypotheses 1b and 2b proposed in Chapter III, I 
break down my sample into two groups: SMNEs from developing and emerging 
countries and SMNEs from developed countries and examine the differences in 
institutional environments between these country groups. This allows me to investigate 
how home country institutional environment affects the state ownership—international 
diversification relationship. 
 
Contributions of the Study 
This study contributes to our understanding of state multinationals. First, the 
argument that the SMNE is a unique organizational form enriches organization theory. It 
has been argued elsewhere that the MNE is a specific organizational form (Caves, 1996; 
Westney, 1993; Westney & Zaheer, 2009) as is the SOE (Aharoni, 1986; Lamont, 1979; 
Mazzolini, 1979; McMillian, 1987). As the overlap of these two forms, the state 
multinational differs from each ―parent‖ in terms of its key elements, such as 
organizational structure, corporate governance, external environment, and strategies and 
organizational change. Thus, the acknowledgement of this organization form adds new 
content to organization theory. 
Second, the present study contributes to the agency theory literature in several 
ways. Agency theory examines agency problems due to the conflicting interests between 
owners and managers and suggests mechanisms (i.e. independence of board of directors, 
12 
 
equity structure and the market for corporate control) to minimize those agency 
problems (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
study extends agency theory by incorporating a type of ownership: state ownership. One 
of the main weaknesses of agency theory is that the economic roots of simplifying 
assumptions (e.g. self interest of human beings) do not allow the consideration of other 
types of investors. However, strategic management has more practical and more complex 
contexts, such as wide-spread private and family-owned companies (Lubatkin, Lane, & 
Schulze, 2001). By investigating the influence of state ownership, this study enriches 
agency theory by considering the specific ownership structure and makes agency theory 
more generalizable to other types of investors.  
Third, the study extends agency theory by examining the influence of state 
ownership on SMNEs‘ international diversification, which introduces an international 
context to the work on firms with state ownership. State ownership has seldom been 
investigated in studies on MNEs. This study fills this gap in the literature and helps to 
understand the effects of state ownership on international expansion of a firm. 
Fourth, the study enriches agency theory by investigating the mediation effect of 
international diversification on the state ownership--firm performance relationship rather 
than the direct relationships between the two. The mediation effect has seldom been 
investigated in the literature, while the influence of ownership on international 
diversification (e.g., Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003), the influence of 
international diversification on performance (e.g., Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997), the 
influence of ownership on performance (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003) 
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have been well examined in the literature. Thus, this study builds relationships between 
those constructs (i.e., ownership, international diversification, and performance) and 
contributes to the agency theory literature by suggesting an input (state ownership) –
process (international diversification) -output (firm performance) framework. 
Lastly, examination of the home country environment, especially the institutional 
environment, on the state multinational‘s strategy and performance enriches our 
understanding of institutions. Institutional theory is widely used by international 
business scholars and useful for conducting cross-country studies (Hoskisson, et al., 
2000; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). However, researchers have primarily focused on the 
influence of the host country environment (Galan, Gonzalez-Benito, Zuniga-Vincente, 
2007; Hall & Jones, 1999; Khanna & Palepu, 2000). While the home country 
institutional environment clearly matters (OECD, 2002; UNCTAD, 2006), little work 
has been done from the home country perspective (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Thus, this 
study contributes to the literature on institutional analysis. 
 In conclusion, this study contributes to the strategic management literature by 
enriching organization theory that the SMNE is a hybrid organizational form and by 
extending agency theory through the incorporation of state ownership and the 
introduction of an international context for analysis. Moreover, this study contributes to 
the international business studies by investigating the influence of the home country 
institutional environment on the SMNE‘s international expansion. 
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Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, a review 
of MNEs and SOEs as organizational forms is conducted before proposing that the 
SMNE is a hybrid organizational form. Based on a comparison of key features, I outline 
the unique attributes of the state multinational as an organizational form. In Chapter III, 
a theoretical framework explaining the influence of state ownership on the state MNE‘s 
international strategy and firm performance is developed. I also incorporate the 
dimension of nationality and emphasize the importance of the home country‘s 
institutional environment when investigating the state ownership-international 
diversification relationship. Chapter IV describes the research methods, sample selection, 
measures, as well as adopted statistical techniques. Chapter V presents the results of the 
empirical tests for the hypotheses generated in Chapter III. Chapter VI displays 
discussion of the results reported in Chapter V. The dissertation ends with Chapter VII 
on implications of research and practices as well as limitations of this study.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE STATE MULTINATIONAL AS A HYBRID ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews and compares the characteristics of state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and multinational enterprises (MNEs) as organizational forms. I then develop the 
state multinational (SMNE) as a hybrid organizational form derived from the 
characteristics of its parents, the SOE and the MNE. I propose a tentative typology of 
state multinationals and present five examples to illustrate these cases.  
Next, I argue that the international environment facing SMNEs changed 
significantly around the turn of the millennium. I compare the old environment (pre-
2000) and the new environment (post-2000) and then illustrate the change in types of 
SMNEs from the 20th century to the 21st century. Based on the SOE-MNE comparison, I 
further identify the unique features of state multinationals in both time periods and 
suggest propositions to distinguish today‘s state multinationals from MNEs.  
I conclude that my unit of analysis of this dissertation, the state multinational 
(SMNE) exists as a hybrid organizational form.  
 
The SOE as an Organizational Form 
Historical Background 
A state owned enterprise is an enterprise that is established by a government to 
perform economic activities representing the government‘s objectives (Aharoni, 1986). 
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The essential characteristic of an SOE as an organizational form is it is owned by a 
government and undertakes operations and take strategic actions on behalf of the 
government for national objectives (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987). Thus, the state 
strongly influences managerial incentives and resource allocations within state owned 
enterprises (Park, Li, & Tse, 2006). Subsequently, SOEs‘ goals, corporate governance, 
organizational structure and external environment, strategies and outcomes, are different 
from other forms of organizations.  
State owned enterprises have been around for a long time. In continental Europe, 
SOEs came into existence before World War II as a response by governments to 
confronting economic difficulties; SOEs prospered during the rest of 20th century 
because of the post-war industrial reconstruction. After World War II, SOEs grew rapidly 
in terms of size, scope and importance in Canada, Europe and Japan. SOEs continued to 
grow within European countries until the 1980s. In developing countries such as Brazil, 
India and Mexico, SOEs were formed with the goal of catching up to the rich countries 
in economic and social development (Negandhi, Thomas & Emmons, 1986).  
SOEs were dominant in a variety of industries such as natural monopolies, high 
tech industries, declining industries, and strategic industries (Thomas, 1986). Moreover, 
state owned enterprises were often monopolies in key industries such as railways and 
telecommunications where economies of scale were so large relative to the size of the 
market that natural monopolies emerged (Negandhi et al., 1986b).   
The privatization wave, which started under U.K. Prime Minister Thatcher and 
U.S. President Reagan around 1980, represented the first break in the long history of 
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SOE expansion in the 20th century (Aharoni & Seidler, 1986). Privatization is ‗the 
transfer from the public to the private sector of entitlements to residual profits from 
operating an enterprise, coupled with any accompanying changes in regulatory policy‘ 
(Yarrow, 1986: 325).  Privatization was adopted by many nations in Europe, Asia, 
Africa and Latin America to improve their economic development (Zahra, Ireland, 
Gutierrez & Hitt, 2000). Through privatization, government released control on SOEs by 
withdrawing the high stake in SOEs, resulting in organizational transformations (Zahra 
et al., 2000a).  
After two decades of privatization, only a few industries now exist that are still 
mainly state owned or controlled such as aerospace for national security, infrastructure, 
finance, and energy and state ownership has been substantially reduced in national 
economies (Kikeri & Kolo, 2006). However, the contribution of SOEs to national 
economies is still large, particularly in strategic sectors, such as raw materials, 
petrochemical, telecommunications, and banking (Ralston Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, Wang 
& Egri, 2006).  
Below, I reviewed the key features of SOEs as an organizational form. The 
characteristics of individual SOEs, of course, are likely to differ from those described 
below. However, these characteristics are reasonable descriptions of the key features of 
the MNE as an organizational form. 
Goals  
The state owned enterprise is an instrument of national objectives. SOEs were 
created typically as the result of government goals rather than the economic goals (profit 
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maximization) that motivate private enterprises (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987). Negandhi 
& Ganguly (1986) argued that, over the years, the state has had several different 
motivations for creating an SOE: ―a political rationale, a desire to control a strategic 
industry vital to national security or independence, a desire to redistribute income, a 
desire to rescue troubled industries, a desire to promote exports, a desire to promote 
industrialization‖ (p14), and an ideological commitment.  
There are several typical reasons why governments create state owned 
enterprises. First, SOEs are adopted to control certain key sectors that are too important 
to be left in the hands of private sector (e.g. for the national security). Second, SOEs are 
adopted to fill gaps left open by the private sector (e.g. collective consumer goods and 
high-technology or research activities). Third, SOEs are adopted to rescue operations 
that involve many employees, or that may significantly affect the stability of a national 
economy, such as high technology firms and banks (Mazzolini, 1979). Thus, 
governments have used SOEs to stimulate economic growth and innovative activities, 
leading to more employment and more social welfare when resources were limited and 
needed reconstruction (Toninelli, 2000).  
Therefore, state owned enterprise is a socioeconomic organization that is not 
profit oriented, but organized for government objectives, e.g. more employment and 
output (Rao & Tagat, 1986) as well as more taxes and additional investment (Lamont, 
1979).  
Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is ―the set of mechanisms used to manage the relationship 
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among stakeholders and to determine and control the strategic direction and performance 
of organizations‖ (Hitt et al., 2009: 276). When I review corporate governance of the 
SOE, I analyze the internal conflict of interests, the level of management autonomy, the 
commitment of the SOE and the key personnel appointment within the SOE. 
The relationship between the state and SOEs manifests the conflict of interests 
due to divided loyalties. Divided loyalties are caused when SOEs‘ interests are not 
consistent with the state‘s interests (You, 1998). Conflict of interests between the state 
and SOEs leads to an opposition of objectives, a low level of power, and autonomy (in 
pricing, investment, and human resource management), supervision and control 
(McMillan, 1987). In SOEs, because managers lack incentives and are poorly monitored, 
subsequent agency conflict generally leads to inefficiency (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). 
The literature suggests that there are three major means for governments to 
control SOEs‘ management: 1) noninterference, e.g., in Britain and Germany (the 
government nominates all the directors but has no role in decision making in the 
Netherlands and Germany); 2) direct and continuous intervention, e.g., in the Third 
World; or 3) commercial decisions to support national economic development, e.g., in 
France (Lamont, 1979; Hafsi & Koenig, 1988). Thus, there is a tradeoff between 
performance and government control of SOEs—―whether, when, and how to intervene‖ 
(Lamont, 1979: 77).  
SOEs offer strong commitment to national objectives in the exchange of 
preferential policies or support such as financial aid from the state. For instance, in 
Western countries such as France, Spain and Portugal, there were contracts between 
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SOEs and governments to identify organizational objectives, national goals, and SOE-
state financial relationships in 1980s (McMillan, 1987). Moreover, in many SOEs, 
managers are responsible mainly to the state rather than other types of stakeholders (Tan 
& Tan, 2005).   
For SOEs, the government generally plays an important role in terms of 
leadership. First, the top management team is generally determined by the government 
(Zou & Adams, 2008). Second, the enterprise is committed to inform the government of 
the SOE‘s strategies for approval and back-up (Mazzolini, 1979). Thus, human resource 
management in SOEs is highly influenced by the state. For instance, directors of SOEs 
are largely appointed by the government through supervising agencies and employees 
(Lin, 2004; Zou & Adams, 2008). 
Organizational Structure  
Key elements of organizational structure include formal structure, locus of 
decision making, and control mechanisms (Hodge, Anthony, & Gales, 1996). SOEs have 
specific organizational structures, which are highly influenced by their decision making 
processes.  
Hierarchy in authority is dominant in the SOE as a formal structure (Lin, 2004). 
The SOE is mainly managed by the hierarchy in authority through personal and political 
power (Lin & Germain, 2003). Within the SOE, there are standardized procedures and 
regulations with multiple managerial levels while the promotion is based on the 
―knowledge of and obedience to these procedures and policies‖ (Ralston et al., 2006: 
832), showing some typical characteristics of a bureaucracy as an organizational form 
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(Weber, 1968). Thus, organizational structure of the SOE has been typically 
characterized as hierarchy, resulting in problems in coordination and control (Lin & 
Germain, 2003).  
In terms of the locus of decision making, SOEs typically have a high degree of 
centralization (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987).  When the SOE do not need to operate for 
profit, but output and satisfy state objectives, the SOE is generally highly centralized 
under the state control without formal control mechanisms within the firm for 
performance (Lin & Germain, 2003). 
External Environment 
When I review on the external environment of the SOE, I analyze the expectation 
on external environment, the level of uncertainty confronted by the SOE, the relationship 
between government and SOEs as well as the industry distribution of the SOE. 
Considering the external environment, stability is generally preferred by SOEs 
through standardized procedures (Lin, 2004; Mazzolini, 1979; Uhlenbruck, Meyer, & 
Hitt, 2003; Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000). Under the protection of 
governments, SOEs confront limited competition (Uhlenbruck et al., 2003), face less 
pressure to generate profits and are compensated for operational losses (Luo, 1995; Tan 
& Litschert, 1994); instead, they focus on output and production (Ralston et al., 2006). 
Thus, SOEs may not experience a high level of uncertainty in the external environment 
(Tan & Tan, 2005) and not confront the typical types of risks (macroeconomic, policy, 
competitive, and resources) faced by MNEs inside the organization and in the external 
environment (Ghoshal, 1987). 
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The relationship between government and SOEs is generally strong because of 
the high stake of the state in SOEs. SOEs are economic actors, but they have to agree on 
corporate objectives with the government. The government controls SOEs through the 
determination on key managers and important strategic decisions (Tan & Litschert, 
1994). But the controlling power is restrained by the decision process to actually monitor 
SOEs (Massolini, 1979).  
Privatization and market liberalization in 1990s have greatly reduced state shares 
in national economies (OECD, 2005) and the relationship between government and 
SOEs is not as tight as before. Managers of SOEs have more autonomy in management 
and operations (Tan & Tan, 2005). But compared to private firms, SOEs are still 
constrained by government restrictions on major decision issues in terms of resource 
allocation, distribution of power, liabilities and regulations (Lin, 2004). 
The range of involvement of SOEs in European countries varied enormously 
until the 1980s in industries such as in natural resources, high technology industries, 
declining industries, strategic industries (Thomas, 1986). SOEs were dominant in 
various industries in developing countries before the trend of privatization in 1990s 
(Kikeri & Kolo, 2006). After two decades of privatization, there are industries that are 
still mainly state owned or controlled such as aerospace for national security, 
infrastructure, finance, and energy (Kikeri & Kolo, 2006). SOEs‘ contribution to national 
economies is still large, particularly in strategic sectors, such as raw materials, 
petrochemical, telecommunications, and banking (Ralston et al., 2006).  
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Strategies and Change 
When I review strategies and organizational change of the SOE, I analyze how 
the SOE makes strategic decisions, its attitude to risk taking and innovation, its degree of 
flexibility and organizational inertia confronted by the SOE. 
In general, strategic decisions of SOEs need approval from the government 
(Mazzolini, 1979). When they make strategic decisions, they may have to follow 
government requirements that may be integrated with government goals (Lin, 2004). 
Moreover, due to the bureaucracy in SOEs, there is lack of coordination and necessary 
actions, and the strategic plans may not be well implemented in practice (Mazzolini, 
1980). Further, managers are not mainly under pressure for profitability, but under 
pressure for achieving state objectives (Tan & Litschet, 1994). Because of the lack of 
management incentives, managers are generally risk averse and not proactive in 
innovative activities (Tan & Tan, 2005). Thus, SOEs are not adaptable to exceptional or 
risky circumstances in terms of their operations and strategies (Anastassopoulos et al., 
1987). 
SOEs are typically characterized with a high level of structural inertia, which 
happens when the firm resists changing (Tan & Tan, 2005).  Strategic change comes 
slowly due to the organizational inertia (bureaucracy in procedures with sluggishness, 
multiple levels of management, decision making involves a variety of organizational 
units, coordination system is not efficient) (Mazzolini, 1979). SOE goals set by the 
government represent constraints on their actions due to the natural objective conflict, 
and so organizational inertia of SOEs is high (Tan & Tan, 2005; Mazzolini, 1979).  
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For similar reasons, organizational flexibility in strategic implementation is 
unlikely to occur. Organizational flexibility is ―the capability of the firm to proact or 
respond quickly to changing competitive conditions and thereby develop and/or maintain 
competitive advantage‖ (Hitt, Keats, & DeMarie, 1998: 9) and always a problem to 
SOEs due to the relationships within the SOE and outside (e.g. government and other 
SOEs) (Mazzolini, 1979). For instance, even for a change in operational procedures, the 
process of change will be slow because of the involvement of government. Under the 
supervision of government agents, planned strategic change is hard to achieve (Lin, 
2004).  
Outcomes  
As explained above, SOEs are not profit-oriented. In terms of corporate 
governance, the agency costs in SOEs are generally high and managers lack of 
incentives for profitability. In organizational structure of SOEs, the typical hierarchical 
structure within SOEs comes along with multiple levels of management (Ralston et al., 
2006), and the locus of decision making is centralized.  Because of the lack of 
managerial incentives, effective managerial monitoring and accountability, and the 
government subsidization for poor firm performance (Aharoni, 1986; Zou & Adams, 
2008), the productivity of SOEs is typically much lower than private firms by a third or 
even more (Kikeri & Kolo, 2006). Prior empirical studies provide support to the 
significant differences in firm performance between SOEs and private firms (Goldeng, 
Grunfeld & Benito, 2008; Luo, 1995; Parker & Hartley, 1991; Ramaswamy, 2001). 
Consequently, SOEs are generally not efficient because of the intervention of 
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government policies both in profitability and operations (e.g. Mazzolini, 1979; Luo, 
1995; Anastassopoulos et al., 1987; Goldeng et al., 2008; White, 2000).  
  
The MNE as an Organizational Form 
Historical Background 
―A multinational or transnational enterprise is an enterprise that engages in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and owns or controls value-added activities in more than 
one country‖ (Dunning, 1993: 3). The essential characteristic of an MNE as an 
organizational form is that it operates multiple value-added activities in multiple 
countries (Westney & Zaheer, 2009). Due to the challenges of managing business 
activities in multiple environments, the MNE has unique characteristics as an 
organization that affect its organizational structure, external and internal conflicts 
confronted, and the ability to change (Westney & Zaheer, 2009). 
Multinational enterprises have been with us for a very long time. MNEs are 
typically located in industries that are internationalized and where product differentiation 
is high, such as auto, oil and semiconductor industries (Caves, 1996). The first modern 
multinationals arose in Europe in 1600s, and it is generally acknowledged that the Dutch 
East India Company (established in 1602) in the Netherlands was the first multinational 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008). In 1641, the firm built a plant in Bengal, India and a print 
works to conduct foreign value-added activities.  
The industrial revolution in early 19th century greatly improved firms‘ ability and 
stimulated them to participate in foreign investment for larger markets, efficiency and 
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resources, but mainly as the extension of domestic operations (Dunning, 1993). In the 
second half of the 19th century, organizational and technological advances, together with 
the improvement in infrastructure both in home and host countries, provided ownership 
specific advantages to firms and the need for the internalization of the market, which 
fostered the emergence of the modern multinational enterprises (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). 
From 1918 on, foreign production entered a new era of maturation. U.S. 
companies dominated the multinational activities such as capital supply, innovation and 
entrepreneurship till 1960s. The second half of the 20 th century saw the increasing 
participation in international markets of firms in continental Europe, Japan and some 
developing countries (Dunning, 2001). During this period, multinationals were mainly 
seeking new markets, resources and looking for low-cost production sites from their 
foreign operations (Dunning, 1993). 
From the late 20th century to the early 21st century, there has been a trend of 
production globalization as the result of global environmental changes. Multinationals 
are more involved in strategic asset-seeking investment, and thus the choice of the 
location of multinational activity has changed accordingly. This period has witnessed a 
growing number of countries, in which firms are proactively involved in outward 
investment and international activities (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
Below, I reviewed the key features of MNEs as an organizational form, ―one of 
the most influential modern organizational forms‖ (Scott, 1992: 138). These are 
―pictures that have been painted with a broad brush‖ in that the characteristics of 
27 
 
individual MNEs, of course, are likely to differ from those described below. However, 
these characteristics are reasonable descriptions of the key features of the MNE as an 
organizational form. 
Goals 
The best-known theories for why multinationals exist as an organizational form 
are internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976) and the eclectic (or OLI) paradigm 
(Dunning, 1981, 1993).  
When involved in business activities across national boundaries, MNEs face 
costs of doing business abroad, including both economic and social costs (Eden & Miller, 
2004). To make profits, MNEs have to offset these additional costs that domestic firms 
do not incur (Hymer, 1960/76). Thus, MNEs must have firm specific (ownership) 
advantages that increase their revenue or lower their costs so as to compete with local 
firms in the host country (Dunning, 1993). These ownership advantages can include 
production intangibles (e.g., process and product technologies), marketing intangibles 
(brand names), monopoly control over resources, and economies of scale and scope from 
large firm size.  
The firm goes abroad to exploit its ownership advantages in foreign markets, 
earning additional rents over and above the profits it receives at home. The more 
ownership advantages a firm has, the more likely is the firm to internalize its investment 
in foreign markets, setting up foreign subsidiaries (creating an internal market or 
hierarchy) rather than exporting or licensing through external markets (Dunning, 1993). 
Similarly, the greater the market imperfections (e.g. transaction costs, government-
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imposed market distortions) affecting cross-border transactions, the more likely is the 
firm to internalize its transactions.  
Moreover, these firms may prefer to establish their foreign affiliates in countries 
or regions, which can provide endowments to ―augment or exploit‖ their existing 
ownership advantages (Dunning, 2000: 164). Thus, the goal of the MNE is to maximize 
global profits from its worldwide operations.  
Corporate Governance  
MNEs operate in multiple environments for profits. They have to adapt to those 
external environments and coordinate within internal environments, imposing additional 
demands on their corporate governance (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Involved in 
international operations, MNEs face complexity deriving from different cultural and 
institutional environments and internal coordination (Roth & O‘Donnell, 1996). Thus, 
the MNE confronts the central management challenge. When I review corporate 
governance of the MNE, I analyze the internal conflict of interests within the MNE, the 
level of management autonomy, the commitment of the MNE and the key personnel 
appointment within the MNE.  
Ownership structure and board structure mainly influence the monitoring of the 
MNE‘s management team for effective corporate governance (Hitt et al., 2006b). For 
instance, Sanders and Carpenter (1998) found that the separation of chairperson and 
CEO in the board can mitigate agency issues in managing the complexity confronted by 
multinational enterprises. Due to the infusion of more power and authorities in the 
organization, the level of managerial discretion in the MNE is reduced, resulting in a 
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reduction in agency costs (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Moreover, different types of 
owners may execute their control over the MNE due to different motivations.  Tihanyi et 
al. (2003) find that although professional investment funds and pension funds have their 
own rationale to invest in MNEs, both types of institutional investors favor international 
expansion through the monitoring of the MNE‘s management team and increased 
activism in the MNE‘s strategic decisions. Further, different structures in the board of 
directors also influence the MNE‘s corporate governance (Tihanyi et al., 2003). 
In addition, for the MNE, corporate governance problems are not only located in 
the parent firm, because there are always tensions between headquarters and foreign 
subsidiaries that result in internal conflict within an MNE (Holm & Pedersen, 2000). The 
management autonomy of a foreign subsidiary is critical when examining the role of the 
foreign subsidiary (Roth & O‘Donnell, 1996). Research has found an increasing degree 
of foreign subsidiary autonomy. The results of those studies show that the management 
autonomy of foreign subsidiaries in MNEs is generally high, manifested in different 
types of foreign subsidiary roles such as ―centers of excellence‖ (Frost, Birkinshaw, & 
Ensign, 2002).  
As a modern organization, the MNE is strongly committed to shareholders and 
generates value for shareholders through international diversification (Morck & Young, 
1991). Due to the separation of ownership and control, the management team 
implements corporate and international strategies under the monitoring of the board, and 
has a high degree of management autonomy (Davis, 2005). In terms of human resource 
management, the method of appointing those decision makers and the mechanisms of 
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corporate governance can be identified through the attributes of an MNE‘s board of 
directors (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
Organizational Structure  
Key elements of organizational structure include formal structure, locus of 
decision making, and control mechanisms (Hodge et al., 1996). When a firm enters a 
foreign country, there are additional requirements on its organizational structure, control 
mechanisms, and decision-making process (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
The MNE‘s choice of organizational structure depends on factors such as the 
purpose of foreign investment, the degree (depth and width) of multinationality, location 
of subsidiaries, type of target markets, and its international experience (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008). Early form of organizational structure can vary, ranging from forms such 
as the international department or division when the MNE has little international 
activities to regional or global divisions for more mature MNEs (Ghoshal & Westney, 
2005). In the current global environment, the phenomenon of MNEs is more complex. 
Contemporary models include matrix structures, contractual and equity-based strategic 
alliances and hybrid (mixed) structures (Ghoshal & Westney, 2005). For instance, the 
worldwide geographic area structure matches the implementation of the multi-domestic 
strategy; the worldwide product divisional structure matches the implementation of the 
global strategy; and the combination structure (a hybrid form) fits the implementation of 
the transnational strategy (Hitt et al., 2009). 
The MNE‘s organizational structure is contingent on the degree and 
characteristics of international diversification. Depending on the level of international 
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diversification, MNEs choose their organizational structure from the simple structure to 
the complex hybrid and matrix structure accordingly (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). More 
product lines and more complex technology in foreign operations lead to a more 
complex organizational structure. For instance, Unilever created a multidivisional global 
product organization when value added activities become intense. Considering both 
product and regional characteristics, Hewlett-Packard (HP) and ABB have adopted 
hybrid structures (Ghoshal & Westney, 2005). 
The control mechanism of an MNE varies according to its structure (Hitt et al., 
2009) and efficient control facilitates the development of core capabilities for successful 
international competition (Doz, Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Hennart (2005) categorized 
control of subsidiaries into four types: hierarchy, selection and/or socialization, no 
interaction within the firm, and profit centers. Interdependencies can affect the degree of 
centralization. If headquarters cannot price easily the interdependencies, control may be 
more formal, direct and centralized (Hennart, 2005). For instance, in the most complex 
structure of transnational strategy, the organizational structure may be both centralized 
and decentralized (Hitt et al., 2009). With these opposite characteristics in the 
organizational structure, socialization becomes the most important control mechanism to 
support effective coordination within the organization (Hennart, 2005).  
The locus of decision making ranges from centralized to decentralized along a 
continuum, and thus there are different ways in decision making shared by headquarters 
and subsidiaries (Ghoshal & Westney, 2005). Centralization results in the loss of quick 
response and effectiveness of subsidiaries. By contrast, decentralization may lead to 
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inefficiencies of an MNE operation because subsidiary managers may pursue sub-unit 
goals rather than headquarters‘ objectives. An appropriate combination of both 
mechanisms may be pursued for the best outcome (Ghoshal & Westney, 2005). Thus, 
whether and to what degree an MNE is centralized and the rationales behind such 
structure and method of control should be identified. The appropriate selection of locus 
of decision making adopted by the MNE is determined by many factors such as 
nationality of ownership, equity holding by parent, mode of entry, relative and absolute 
size of subsidiary, industry elements, organizational characteristics of parent company, 
and subsidiary performance (Young, Hood, & Hamill, 1985).   
In an MNE, organizational structure and intrafirm relationships are country 
specific due to external uncertainties and internal organizational needs (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008). Cross-border cultural differences matter much in shaping organizational 
structure, more than the effect of technology innovations (Dunning, 2003). National 
boundaries are important but to different extents for differences in organizational 
structure because of different institutional (legal or cultural) elements (Rosenzweig & 
Singh, 1991).  
External Environment 
MNEs confront economic, political, legal and cultural environments that differ 
across home and host countries (Sundaram & Black, 1992; Rugman & Verbeke, 2009). 
These environments generate external pressures on firms, resulting in complex conflicts. 
Hence, in order to better comprehend an MNE as an organizational form, the 
understanding of its external environment is important (Westney & Zaheer, 2009). When 
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I review on the external environment of the MNE, I analyze the expectation on external 
environment, the level of uncertainty confronted by the MNE, and the relationship 
between the state and the MNE as well as the industry distribution of the MNE. 
From an institutional analysis, different types of complexity influence the 
legitimacy of both headquarters and subsidiaries: 1) environmental complexity in terms 
of number of countries and institutional distance; 2) organizational complexity in terms 
of conflict of internal and external legitimacy; and 3) complexity of the legitimation 
process in terms of LOF and legitimacy of other parts of an MNE (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). Among these factors, for instance, liability of foreignness (LOF), the social costs 
of costs of doing business abroad (CDBA), is mainly driven by institutional distance 
between country environments (Eden & Miller, 2004). Different dimensions of the 
liability of foreignness (unfamiliarity, relational and discriminatory costs) (Eden & 
Miller, 2004) bring divergent degrees of complexity and difficulty in achieving 
organizational legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
Because of external environment threats such as more intensive competition in 
the global markets, unfamiliarity with host government regulations, and political 
instability in the host countries, the level of uncertainty in the external environment for 
an MNE is generally high (Rugman & Verbeke, 2009). Ghoshal (1987) notes there are 
four types of risks (macroeconomic, policy, competitive, and resources) in the external 
environment for the MNE. Macroeconomic risks are caused by uncertainties in 
economic development of the home countries. Policy risks are caused by uncertainties in 
political actions of governments in home countries. Competitive risks are caused by 
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uncertainties of competitors‘ competitive actions and responses. And resources risks are 
caused by uncertainties of acquiring resources in home countries, such as human and 
capital (Ghoshal, 1987). Subsequently, when an MNE goes abroad, it often confronts a 
high level of uncertainty.  
The relationship of an MNE with governments is dynamic (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). During the 1970s and the 1980s, governments were generally very critical to 
firms‘ international activities (Dunning, 1994; Vernon, 1971; 1977).  From the 1990s, the 
MNE‘s contribution to national economies has been mainly recognized and realized, 
such as the increase in resource base and production capabilities of those countries 
(UNCTAD, 1995). Governments, thus, announced more friendly laws and regulations to 
both inward and outward foreign direct investments (Eden, 1996). For instance, in 
current global environment, host governments may provide investment incentives, tax 
holidays or low-cost financing to encourage inward foreign investment from foreign 
MNEs. Home countries also take actions to facilitate outward foreign investment, such 
as preferential policies and government support (UNCTAD, 2003). Thus, an MNE has to 
deal with policies and regulations in both host and home country governments in order 
to make profits and operate efficiently (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
Finally, MNEs are located in various industries, particularly industries that are 
internationalized and where product differentiation is high, such as auto, oil and 
semiconductor industries (Caves, 1996). 
Strategies and Change 
When I review strategies and organizational change of the MNE, I analyze how 
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the MNE makes strategic decisions, its attitude to risk taking and innovation, its degree 
of flexibility and organizational inertia confronted by the SOE. 
Pressure for global integration and pressure for local responsiveness influence 
the strategic decisions of MNEs (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Hitt et al. 2009; Leong & 
Tan, 1993). Focusing on managerial processes, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) identified 
four types of international strategies of MNEs: multidomestic, global, international and 
transnational, depending on the firms‘ responses to the global integration-local 
responsiveness matrix.  
When both global integration and local responsiveness pressures are low, the 
MNE faces no pressures to alter its strategies from those developed when it was a 
domestic firm. Thus, the MNE can choose an international strategy that simply replicates 
abroad what it does at home.  
When pressures for global integration are high, the MNE should adopt a global 
strategy, whereby the structure of global firms is centralized and the parent company 
controls the strategic implications of its subsidiaries. The MNE is organized so as to 
achieve maximum global efficiencies from its worldwide operations (Harzing, 2000).   
When pressures for local responsiveness are high, the MNE can let ―1,000 
flowers bloom‖ (Tallman & Yip, 2009), as its foreign subsidiaries pay close attention to 
their local environments. A multidomestic strategy is adopted whereby the structure of 
the multidomestic MNE is decentralized, and its subsidiaries are autonomous.  
Lastly, when both pressures for global integration and local responsiveness are 
high, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) argued that the MNE would adopt a transnational 
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strategy. The MNE must simultaneously balance ―going global‖ with ―being local‖. 
Transnational firms have unique features and function as ―an integrated and 
interdependent network‖ with subsidiaries acting as centers of excellence (Harzing, 2000) 
in terms of affiliate autonomy (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
In the current global market, innovations have become the main and unique 
source of competitive advantage for an MNE to compete successfully (Hitt et al., 1997; 
Tallman & Yip, 2009). With decades of economic development, the sources for 
competitive advantage such as economies of scale and international sourcing in the 
world‘s labor and materials cannot guarantee a sustained competitive advantage (Bartlett 
& Ghoshal, 1990). In this case, leaders in technology and markets may win the 
competition by investing in intensive R&D for new products and services. However, the 
high cost of R&D and the shorted product life cycles generate a high level of risks on the 
way to success (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Thus, in order to become a winner, an MNE 
is generally taking risk and devoting attention to innovative activities. 
The ability to change enables an MNE to adapt to the changing environment, 
either internal or external (Doz, et al., 1990). The ability is influenced by the degree of 
flexibility and by the level of organizational inertia. Flexibility is a key part of 
management (Lorange & Probst, 1990; Uhlenbruck et al., 2003) and flexibility in 
coordination is important for an MNE to realize successful management in international 
competition (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Doz, et al., 1990; Lee and Hitt, 2001). The 
external environment in which the firm operates often changes dramatically. Hence, an 
MNE generally confronts a high level of uncertainty in its external environment when 
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expanding internationally (Tallman & Yip, 2009). Thus, its flexibility in structure, 
strategy and processes to deal with environmental volatility is crucial (Kogut, 1985; Lee 
and Hitt, 2001). Moreover, changes within the firm can also engender organizational 
changes in structure and other aspects of the organization, which makes flexibility 
important (Tallman & Yip, 2009).  
Multinational firms have to adjust their objectives, strategies and structures with 
the changes in the external environment (e.g. institutional regulations in both home and 
host countries) so that they can maintain their competitive positions and realize their 
strategic goals (Tallman & Yip, 2009). For instance, Calof & Beamish (1995) find that 
the modes of entry as well as mode changes are influenced by regulatory environments. 
However, different sources of organizational inertia generate obstacles for firms to fit 
with the external environment. Moreover, the existing rules, procedures, and culture 
inside the organization prevent an MNE from making changes rapidly and effectively 
(Rugman & Verbeke, 2009). Thus, MNEs endeavor to speed up effective changes against 
inertia to ensure their profitability (Rugman & Verbeke, 2009). 
Outcomes  
As an economic organization (Caves, 1996), the MNE is generated when it 
internalizes markets across national boundaries (Buckley & Casson, 2009). The MNE 
operates in foreign countries for added value (Dunning, 1993), improved 
competitiveness and increased profitability (UNCTAD, 1995). During international 
expansion, the MNE continuously creates and exploits advantages for economic returns 
from foreign markets (Buckley & Casson, 2009).  So, from an economic perspective, the 
38 
 
MNE is always looking for efficiency and profitability (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987). 
Prior studies suggest that with advanced technology and managerial skills, 
private MNEs, on average, have a higher level of efficiency compared to SOEs (Park et 
al., 2006; Tan, 2002; Tan & Tan, 2005).  
 
Comparison of the SOE and MNE as Organizational Forms 
I have compared and reviewed key features of SOEs and MNEs as organizational 
forms. These are ―pictures that have been painted with a broad brush‖  in that the 
characteristics of individual SOEs (and of individual MNEs), of course, are likely to 
differ from those described above. However, I argue that these characteristics are 
reasonable descriptions of the key features of the two organizational forms.  
These features are interdependent and will influence an enterprise‘s operations. 
The differences between the SOE and the MNE as organizational forms are explicit in 
regard to goals, corporate governance, external environment, and strategies, but less so 
in terms of organizational structure. Table 2.1 summarizes the main differences between 
SOE and MNE as organizational forms. 
First, MNEs are profit oriented, while SOEs function as the instrument of state 
objectives and may not pursue profits. Second, in terms of corporate governance, for 
SOEs, the main governance mechanism is decided by the state, while that for MNEs is 
decided by the board. Thus, due to the control of the state, SOEs generally have a lower 
level of management autonomy than that of MNEs.  
Third, SOEs and MNEs confront different external environments. For SOEs, 
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because of the protection from the state, SOEs have a relatively stable environment, and 
thus the level of uncertainty in their external environment is lower than that that of SOEs. 
In contrast, MNEs have no particular protection from either home or host governments 
and face additional complexities in the international environment. Thus, MNEs need to 
pursue legitimacy in multiple environments, and the level of uncertainty in their external 
environment is higher than that of SOEs. Consequently, SOEs and MNEs adopt different 
strategies and make subsequent organizational changes.  For instance, SOEs are 
generally risk averse and not active in taking risks. In contrast, MNEs are proactively 
involved in risk taking activities (e.g. innovation) and flexible to change with the volatile 
environment. The above characteristics of SOEs and MNEs are quite different from each 
other. 
Comparatively, the characteristics of their organizational structures in SOEs and 
MNEs do not differ much from the other. In terms of locus of decision making, the MNE 
will choose its way of control from very centralized to very decentralized due to other 
factors inside and outside the organization. Thus, there is no fixed pattern of 
organizational control in MNEs. In SOEs, the locus of decision making is generally 
centralized due to the interference of the state. Therefore, overlap exists in the locus of 
decision making of these two organizational forms. Lastly, because of differences in key 
attributes of the SOE and the MNE, the outcomes differ; i.e., the MNE is generally 
considered more efficient than the SOE. 
  
Table 2.1 Comparing the SOE, MNE and SMNE as Organizational Forms 
Key Features SOE Old Style SMNEs 
(20th century) 
MNE New Style SMNEs 
(21st century) 
Definitions 
 
    
1. Controlling party The state 
 
The state 
 
Ultimate beneficial 
owner (UBO) 
The state + UBO 
 
2. Ownership 
structure 
The state is the 
ultimate owner 
Majority owned by the 
state (state ownership > 
50%) 
Various At least state controlled 
(state ownership >10%) 
3. Geographic spread 
 
One country More than one country More than one 
country 
More than one country 
Goals  
 
    
Objectives 
 
State objectives, 
e.g. output and 
production oriented 
Restrained by national 
objectives 
Profitability and 
efficiency oriented 
Restrained by national 
objectives + 
 efficiency oriented 
Corporate 
Governance 
 
    
1. Internal conflict of 
interests 
 
State vs. 
Management 
 
Both, but more due to 
the conflict between the 
State and Management 
 
Parent vs. 
Subsidiaries 
 
Both, but at different 
organizational levels 
 
2. Management 
autonomy 
 
Low 
 
Low to Medium 
 
High 
 
Medium to High 
 
3. Commitment  
 
Strong to 
Government 
Strong to Government 
 
Strong to shareholders 
 
To Government and other 
shareholders, depending 
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Key Features SOE Old Style SMNEs 
(20th century) 
MNE New Style SMNEs 
(21st century) 
 on the ownership structure 
 
4. HR management 
 
 
Determined by the 
government 
Determined by the 
government 
Determined by the 
board 
Determined by the 
government and the board 
Organizational 
Structure  
 
    
1. Formal structure Hierarchy  
 
Hierarchy Various  forms 
 
Various forms 
 
2. Control Hierarchy 
 
Hierarchy 
 
Hierarchy, 
Socialization, or 
Profit Centers 
 
Hierarchy, Socialization, 
or Profit Centers, 
depending on autonomy 
3. Locus of decision 
making  
Centralized Less centralized 
 
Centralized or 
Decentralized 
 
Less centralized, but 
depending on nationality 
 
External 
Environment 
 
    
1. Expectation  
 
Stability is 
expected  
 
Stability is expected 
 
Legitimacy in 
environments of 
different countries 
Both, but at different 
organizational levels 
 
2. Uncertainty 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Medium to High 
 
3. Industry 
distribution 
 
Key sectors 
 
Various 
 
Various Key sectors  
 
Table 2.1 Continued 
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Key Features SOE Old Style SMNEs 
(20th century) 
MNE New Style SMNEs 
(21st century) 
4. Relationship with 
the State 
 
 
 
 
 
Strong  
 
Less strong  
 
To both home country 
and host country 
governments 
To both home country and 
host country governments, 
but comparatively stronger 
to home country 
government 
Strategies and 
Change 
 
    
1. Risk taking & 
Innovation 
Low 
 
Low to Medium 
 
High Medium to High 
 
2. Degree of 
flexibility 
 
Low 
 
Low to Medium 
 
High 
 
Medium to High 
 
3. Organizational 
Inertia 
 
 
High 
 
Medium to High 
 
Low 
 
Low to Medium 
Outcomes 
 
    
Efficiency Low Low to Medium High Medium to High 
 
Table 2.1 Continued 
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In conclusion, the SOE appears to be quite different from the MNE as an 
organizational form, as shown in their key features. The SMNE is the overlap of the 
SOE and the MNE. Thus, different characteristics of the SOE and the MNE may 
generate conflicts when the attributes of the SOE and those of the MNE coexist in the 
SMNE. Therefore, I expect that the SMNE to evidence a higher level of complexity.  
Below, I first review SMNEs in the 20th century as ―old style SMNEs‖. Due to 
the dramatic changes in global environment, the phenomenon of the SMNE in the 21 st 
century has changed greatly. However, there is little research on today‘s SMNEs. Thus, I 
suggest propositions on this ―new style SMNE‖ as a hybrid organizational form. 
 
The SMNE as a Hybrid Organizational Form 
Based on the above comparison of the key features of MNEs and SOEs, I 
conclude that MNEs and SOEs are very different organizational forms (see also 
Anastassopoulos et al., 1987). Nevertheless, enterprises that have both some degree of 
multinationality and some degree of state ownership do exist, and with some frequency. I 
therefore argue that the state multinational is a hybrid organizational form that is neither 
wholly an SOE nor wholly an MNE, but rather has components of both organizational 
forms.  
An enterprise can start either as an MNE and then acquire state ownership or a 
state owned enterprise can start as a domestic enterprise and become a multinational 
enterprise. An enterprise can therefore start either way to become a state multinational 
enterprise (SMNE), i.e. from an SOE to an SMNE through international diversification 
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or from a multinational to an SMNE through nationalization (Anastassopoulos et al., 
1987).  
There are both coercive pressures and internal motivations for either type to 
become a state multinational. For instance, some industries are already internationalized, 
such as automobiles, oil and semiconductors. Firms in those industries must become 
multinationals because success depends on whether and how they consciously expand 
internationally (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987). 
There are many examples of either type of transformation. On one hand, many 
state enterprises, especially those from emerging markets, are now proactively 
participating in global competition through different types of international diversification 
(Luo & Tung, 2007). In emerging economies, governments encourage SOEs to enter into 
international markets for increased efficiency and improved performance (Toninelli, 
2000). For example, China announced a new ―Go Global‖ policy in 1999, and 
emphasized the policy at the end of 2002 to encourage Chinese firms‘ international 
expansion. The Singapore government declared public policies to encourage the 
international diversification of its state controlled enterprises in 1994 (UNTCAD, 2006).  
There are also coercive pressures for SOEs to become state multinationals. In the 
current global economic environment, competition in domestic markets is more severe 
due to less institutional protection for SOEs and increased competition from private 
domestic firms as well as foreign MNEs (Tan, 2002). Meanwhile, while domestic 
markets are becoming more saturated, there are opportunities in the overseas markets if 
SOEs can act proactively, which force those SOEs to pursue international diversification 
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(Tan & Tan, 2005). 
On the other hand, many MNEs have turned into SMNEs in developed countries 
such as France, the U.K., and the U.S. For instance, in the early 1980s, five multinational 
groups were nationalized in France, all of which were among the world‘s leaders in their 
industries (i.e. Compagnie Generale, d‘Electricite, Thomson, Pechiney, Rhone-Poulenc, 
Saint-Gobain) (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987). In other European countries such as the 
United Kingdom and Greece, major industries groups such as British Petroleum, British 
Leyland Motor Corporation, and Olympic Airlines were also nationalized in 1970s 
(Anastassopoulos et al., 1987).  
Historically, developed country governments used state owned enterprises to 
improve a nation‘s international position. When these firms became multinationals, they 
were expected to follow the investment objectives of the state in terms of corporate 
strategies (Vernon, 1977). Governments in France, Germany and other European 
countries even sacrificed their control in SOEs to encourage them to strengthen the 
competitiveness of national industries in world markets (Lamont, 1979).  
There are also coercive pressures for multinationals to become nationalized. The 
nationalization of multinationals may occur in crisis periods. In the current global 
financial crisis, governments in both developed (US and Western Europe) and 
developing countries have had to nationalize some industry giants, such as finance and 
auto firms in order to stabilize their national economies (Tabb, 2008). For example, 
many financial institutions in the United States, including American International Group 
(AIG) and Citibank, became government controlled or owned to avoid massive 
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disruption due to global financial markets in 2008 (Tabb, 2008).   
Thus, I propose the evolutionary paths for a firm to become an SMNE in Figure 
2.1. There are two dimensions: the pressure for global integration in different industries 
and the pressure for national responsiveness (i.e., government involvement) in different 
industries and/or countries. For instance, in industries such as auto, oil and steel, because 
of the need for economies of scale, the pressure for global integration is high. In 
industries such as national security and national resources and in countries such as China 
and Singapore, the pressure for national responsiveness is high. When there is not much 
pressure on either dimension, private and domestic firms are dominant. When the 
pressure for global integration is high while the pressure for national responsiveness is 
low, the firm operates as an MNE. When the pressure for global integration is high while 
the pressure for national responsiveness is low, the firm operates as an SOE. When 
pressures for both dimensions are high, the SMNE is formed.  
Therefore, I conclude that a company can go either way to become a state 
multinational.   Because of coercive pressures and internal motivations discussed earlier, 
some MNEs have eventually evolved into SMNEs due to the increased pressure for 
social responsibility. Meanwhile, some SOEs have eventually evolved into SMNEs due 
to the increased pressure for global integration in the new global environment.  
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Figure 2.1 
Evolutionary Paths to Become an SMNE 
 
A Tentative Typology of State Multinationals  
Anastassopoulos et al. (1987) identified a typology of nine types of state 
multinationals (see Figure 2.2) using the theoretical lens of corporate identity, which is 
―what makes any enterprise different from others….; at the same time all the individuals 
working in the enterprise adhere to such identity and unite in the pursuit of a common 
goal‖ (p127). The authors considered two dimensions: ‗propensity to multinational 
activities‘ and ‗propensity for the state to intervene in management‘ to identify different 
types of state-owned multinational firms (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987:160). Based on 
the comparison between the development gap between current and potential 
development in economics (wide vs. narrow) and the ideology (free market vs. 
interventionism), the propensity of the state to intervene in the economy can generally be 
determined (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987). For instance, when a firm, located in a 
developed country, acts with a market orientation and is not heavily constrained by state 
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objectives, the propensity for the state to interfere with the firm‘s management is at a 
minimum.  
Based on the sector of activity on multinationalization (favorable vs. unfavorable) 
and the corporate identity on multinationalization (favorable vs. unfavorable) of an 
SMNE, the propensity to go international can be determined (Anastassopoulos et al., 
1987). When the corporate identity of a firm is favorable to expand internationally and 
the firm is located in an industry that favors internationalization (e.g., auto industry), the 
propensity for multinational activities is at a maximum. Thus, their typology shows the 
propensity of a state owned enterprise to be involved in international diversification and 
to be influenced by the state. Firms that were called ―hermits‖ were generally with a 
‗domestic‘ nature and intervened by the state to a great extent, such as those in public 
service sectors. Firms that were called ―unfair competitors‖ were generally located in 
sectors that were internationalized, and in a country that the development gap was wide 
and the prevailing ideology is interventionism. Firms, such as Airbus in France and 
Embraer in India, were treated as ―unfair competitors‖ to their rivals, more specifically, 
to American firms (Vernon, 1977). 
However, the world environment has changed greatly at the international, 
national, and industrial levels (e.g. Ohmae, 1995). Many state multinationals have been 
listed in stock markets and incorporated other types of ownership for more efficient 
corporate governance, resulting in a diversified ownership structure (Tan & Tan, 2005). 
As explained earlier, they also face a better environment to expand into foreign markets 
than the ―old style‖ state multinationals and are involved more deeply in international 
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diversification. Industries the ―new style‖ SMNEs are located are generally key sectors 
and/or with strategic importance (Kikeri & Kolo, 2006). The development gap in 
Anastassopoulos et al. (1987)‘s typology for all SMNEs in the current global 
environment is not significant any longer for many SMNEs, for instance, from European 
countries. Therefore, Anastassopoulos et al. (1987)‘s typology may not hold for the new-
style SMNEs and I suggest my typology for the SMNEs in the new millennium.  
Figure 2.2 
A Typology of Old Style SMNEs* 
 
Note: * Proposed by Anastassopoulos et al. (1987).  
 
Based on the degree of two dimensions (Multinationality and State Ownership), I 
suggest four hybrid types of state multinational enterprises (SMNEs); these are 
illustrated in Figure 2.3. Whereas Anastassopoulos et al. (1987)‘s typology focuses on 
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intention (that is, what SMNEs may do), considering the ideology of a country and 
corporate identify of a firm, my categorization of state multinationals focuses on action 
(that is, what SMNEs are doing). Therefore, my typology is more practically oriented 
than Anastassopoulos et al. (1987) 
When state ownership is lower than 10% (that is, private individuals or other 
firms own more than 90% of the voting shares), I argue that such low ownership is akin 
to portfolio investment. Holders of portfolio investments are passive ―coupon clippers‖, 
buying securities such as bonds and stocks for their dividends and interest receipts, and 
not involved in active management or control of the firm issuing the securities. I assume 
that a government holding less than 10% of the voting shares in an enterprise is similar 
to a portfolio investor and is therefore unlikely to have a significant influence on 
corporate governance, corporate strategies and firm performance. Thus, those 
multinationals function more like private MNEs, conducting their activities depending 
on the degree of multinationality.  
Because the purpose of my dissertation is to focus on the hybrid case where both 
the government and private investors play active roles in managing the multinational 
enterprise, this category -- MNEs with state ownership lower than ten percent --- is not 
my main concern and are excluded from the empirical work in my dissertation.2 
When the degree of state ownership (DOS) is low (above 10% but below 50% of 
                                                          
2 At the post-dissertation stage, it may be useful to also explore whether governments with less than 10% 
ownership have any impact on corporate governance, strategies and performance of state multinationals. I assume the 
impact is zero or close to zero in this dissertation, but in practice even 5% ownership may be sufficient to exercise 
some control over the firm‘s strategies, activities and performance. For example, Japanese keiretsu are typically linked 
by 5% cross-equity share holdings, and function as a corporate group. The question as to whether less than 10% state 
ownership matters for firm strategy and performance is therefore of interest, but reserved for post-dissertation research.    
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equity) the state holds minority ownership. The state therefore should behave as a 
minority investor, similar to a minority joint venture partner. The enterprise is influenced 
by the state‘s policies and under the supervisory of state agents. I therefore consider that 
the state functions as an ―Investor‖ in the SMNE.  
 
Figure 2.3  
A New Typology of SMNEs 
 
 
When the degree of state ownership is high (more than 50%), the state holds 
majority ownership. The major strategic decision making will be highly influenced by 
the state and the state is the ultimate ―Owner‖. I argue that multinationals with state 
ownership over 10% are state controlled or owned (state multinationals; that is, SMNEs).  
I define the degree of multinationality (DOM) by an enterprise‘s geographic 
spread; that is, the number of foreign countries where the MNE has affiliates3 (Kogut & 
Singh, 1988; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). The SMNE must have at least one majority-
                                                          
3  Here I only consider one dimension of the breadth of SMNEs‘ international expansion as the criterion to judge the 
degree of multinationality. However, I check the correlations between Breadth and Depth both for my three-year and 
seven-year samples, which is highly and significantly related.  Thus, I am confident in using this single dimension to 
simplify my judgment on the degree of multinationality. 
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owned foreign affiliate; i.e. control in the foreign affiliate > 50%. When the SMNE 
invests in only a few countries, I consider the degree of multinationality to be low 
(―Narrow‖). When the MNE invests in many countries, the level is considered high 
(―Broad‖). The greater the number of countries where the SMNE has foreign affiliates, 
the greater the internal and external complexities faced by the SMNE (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999; Sundaram & Black, 1992). 
The state multinational (SMNE) therefore can be decomposed into a 2x2 matrix, 
depending on its degree of state ownership and degree of multinationality. Although a 2 
x2 matrix is coarse grained, it includes the main factors (state ownership and 
international diversification) that can influence the development of SMNEs. I identify 
the different types of SMNEs in these four cells as hybrid organizational forms, based on 
the data collected and confirmed by the end of 2009. 
First, when the degree of state ownership (DOS) is low and the degree of 
multinationality (DOM) is low (L-L), the state multinationals are minority owned by the 
state and narrowly invest in a few foreign markets. An example of an L-L state 
multinational is Hellenic Petroleum, a Greek petroleum firm, which has 27% state 
ownership and foreign affiliates in seven countries. Another example is the MTN Group 
Limited in South Africa, which operates in the communication services industry, has 15% 
state ownership, and foreign affiliates in five countries. The L-L group includes those 
state multinationals, which are minority controlled by their home country governments 
and are narrow foreign investors. Compared to SMNEs with majority state ownership, 
the L-L group should have a higher degree of autonomy and may be more likely to 
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improve their performance through their process of international diversification.  
Second, when the degree of state ownership is low and the degree of 
multinationality is high (L-H), state multinationals are minority owned by the state but 
are broadly invested in many foreign countries. Firms here are generally located in 
internationalized industries, such as steel and auto. For instance, Rautaruukki is a steel 
multinational headquartered in Finland, with 40% state ownership and foreign 
subsidiaries in 28 countries. In the L-H group, these SMNEs are under some control of 
their home governments and have a broad geographic spread.  Compared to SMNEs 
with small numbers of foreign affiliates, SMNEs in the L-H group are likely to face 
more challenges in managing their external environments and relationships with their 
foreign affiliates due to broader geographic spread.  
Third, when the degree of state ownership is high and the degree of 
multinationality is low (H-L), the state multinationals are majority owned by the state 
and narrowly invest in a few foreign markets. High state ownership means these 
enterprises must fulfill government initiatives. An example of a H-L enterprise is PTT in 
Thailand, a petroleum and products wholesaler with over 50% state ownership, and 
foreign affiliates in five countries. Indian Oil, a petroleum firm headquartered in India, 
has more than 80% state ownership and foreign affiliates in four countries. Petroleo 
Brasileiro, a Brazilian natural gas and crude petroleum enterprise, has 55% state 
ownership and foreign affiliates in six countries by the end of 2009. This group includes 
many state multinationals in key sectors with strategic purposes (e.g. oil, natural gas). As 
the ultimate owner, the state highly influences their motivations and organizational 
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behaviors. In comparison with SMNEs with low state ownership, I expect the state to 
play a greater role here in corporate strategies.  
Fourth, when both the degree of state ownership and the degree of 
multinationality are high (H-H), the state multinationals are majority owned by the state 
and broadly invested in many foreign markets. An example of a H-H firm is Singapore 
Telecommunications, located in telecommunication industry, with over 50% state 
ownership, has foreign affiliates in 22 countries. Gdf Suez in France, located in natural 
gas transmission industry, has 80% state ownership and foreign affiliates in 34 countries. 
The H-H firms are majority owned by their home-country governments and therefore 
influenced by government objectives. The firms also enter multiple international markets 
to enjoy the benefits of international diversification and at the same time, contribute to 
the national economic development. Because of the direct intervention from supervisory 
agents of governments, the negative effects of state ownership on corporate governance 
may be prominent. Moreover, they may be highly influenced by national initiatives when 
implementing international strategies, which may interfere with their corporate goals of 
pursuing economic performance (Luo & Tung, 2007).  
Illustrative Examples of the Development of State Multinationals 
 Substantive examples may help us to understand the development of SMNEs as a 
hybrid organizational form. I therefore illustrate the development of SMNEs from 1990 
to 2008, using four typical cases. These cases are summarized in Figure 2.4, which 
reproduces but shows the patterns by which the four SMNEs moved in terms of their 
DOS and DOM over the 1990-2008 period:  
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 COSCO, a Chinese shipping multinational, became an SMNE in the 1980s and 
continued to expand internationally throughout the time period. In 1990, the 
SMNE therefore started from Quadrant II (high DOS and low DOM ) and ends in 
Quadrant III (high DOS and high DOM). 
 Renault, a French auto multinational, was nationalized into an SMNE (100% 
state ownership) in 1945. Renault gradually reduced its state share and by 1994, 
it had 53% state ownership. Although it was privatized in 1996, Renault is still 
under the state control (state ownership 15.01%). Renault therefore starts in 1990 
in Quadrant III (high DOS and high DOM) and ends in Quadrant IV (low DOS 
and high DOM). 
 Outokumpu, a steel firm headquartered in Finland, is active in international 
investment and activities. For instance, it fully acquired Swedish stainless steel 
maker AvestaPolarit in 2002 and upgraded its production complex (Outokumpu, 
2009). Although always highly controlled by the government (state ownership > 
30%), it continuously endeavors to improve its performance. Outokumpu starts 
in Quadrant I (low DOS and low DOM) and ends the period in Quadrant IV (low 
DOS and high DOM).  
 ENI, an Italian petroleum firm, first expanded into international markets such as 
Romania and Albania in the 1930s (ENI, 2009). Established in the 1920‘s by the 
Italian government, ENI was a tool to improve the country‘s economy and help 
the development of the industry. In the 1980s, ENI was still wholly state owned. 
But it went public in 1995. Through four successive public offerings, it has 
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greatly reduced its state ownership from 100% to around 30%. Meanwhile, ENI 
continuously expands into international markets and is highly involved in 
international activities (ENI, 2009). Therefore, ENI starts in Quadrant II (high 
DOS and low DOM) and ends the period in Quadrant IV (low DOS and high 
DOM). 
The general trend in all four cases is southeast; that is, a decrease in the degree of 
state ownership as the degree of multinationality increases (a movement into cell IV). 
Thus, in order to enjoy benefits of international diversification (Hejazi & Santor, 2009), 
SMNEs may maintain autonomy in management to prevent a high level of the state‘s 
intervention and expand into international markets more broadly when their resources 
and capabilities allow them to do so. I anticipate that this will be the general trend for 
SMNEs in the current world, but do expect exceptions.  
Figure 2.4  
Typical Examples of SMNEs, 1990-2008 
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through two typical and successful cases:  
 COSCO is from a developing country (China) and evolved from an SOE to 
an SMNE; 
 Renault is from a developed country (France) and evolved from an MNE to 
an SMNE. 
Case 1: China Ocean Shipping Co. (COSCO) in China  
 COSCO is a shipping firm that does ocean shipping. It was established with only 
four ships in 1961 as a large and wholly owned SOE under the control of China‘s 
traditional planned economy (Jin, 2007). With more than 40 years‘ development, 
COSCO, still majority owned by the state, has achieved a high level of profitability in 
the global shipping industry (Che, 2009). 
As a traditional SOE, COSCO pursued output and employment in its early stages 
of development rather than profitability. The 1960s and 1970s were periods when 
COSCO greatly increased its fleet scale. From 1993 to 1998, COSCO implemented a 
diversified corporate-level strategy. During this period, COSCO expanded so fast in its 
scale and business lines that its expenses surpassed revenue, thus putting it into such a 
danger that it lacked sufficient working capital to maintain normal daily operations 
(COSCO, 2008). However, before China‘s ―Go Global‖ policy, COSCO was fully under 
the guidance of China‘s planned economic system and centralized. Although it increased 
its scale rapidly, it did not suffer much from environmental risks due to the government 
protection (COSCO, 2008). 
In 1988, COSCO established a wholly owned subsidiary through acquisition in 
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the United Kingdom, where it started its journey of international diversification 
(COSCO, 2008). As a successful state multinational, COSCO has its own organizational 
characteristics to compete in the 21st century. COSCO has a market-oriented top 
management team (TMT), in which the key TMT members are determined by the 
government (Che, 2009). Moreover, COSCO‘s way to succeed is to reform when it 
participates in the international competition (Che, 2009). COSCO established a ―state 
owned but privately run‖ mechanism, thus adjusting its operational and strategic 
decisions based on market demand while fitting in government objectives (COSCO, 
2008). Therefore, COSCO obtained a high degree of autonomy and gradually improves 
its core competences while maintaining the controlling power of national assets. In 
addition, with a high degree of autonomy in management, COSCO considers both risks 
and opportunities in international markets (Che, 2009).  
During COSCO‘s process of international diversification, it serves the state, the 
ultimate owner, while obtaining substantial support from the state (Wei, 2005). For 
instance, in developed countries, the Chinese government helps COSCO to compete for 
a fair competitive environment. A typical example is the solution to the exemption of its 
previous ―Controlled Carrier‖ status in the United States because COSCO is a state 
owned company. The difference from ―Carrier‖ is that a controlled carrier has to change 
its price after 30 days‘ notice, which means COSCO cannot adjust its freight within 24 
hours based on the market demands. In 2003, the unfair situation was eventually 
changed after the Chinese government negotiated with the U.S. government for three 
years (Wei, 2005).  
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In conclusion, COSCO is an SMNE that competes broadly and successfully in 
the global market. Government supports its expansion into foreign markets when needed 
while endowing a high degree of autonomy to COSCO‘s management in daily 
operations. Thus, COSCO is able to improve its performance while contributing to 
China‘s national economic development. 
Case 2: Renault in France 
Renault was founded in 1899 by Renault brothers to produce automobiles. It 
began its international production by setting up a manufacturing plant in Belgium in 
1901 through an international license contract. Renault, as a multinational company, was 
nationalized in 1945 (state ownership was 100%) (Renault Club, 2008). After its 
nationalization, it continued its international expansion. For instance, in the 1950s, 
Renault began to cooperate with the Italian automobile body design company Ghia by 
establishing a styling centre in Italy (Renault Club, 2008). 
From the 1980s, the French government began to reduce its holdings in Renault. 
In 1994, the French government still held 53% of Renault‘s share. Privatization process 
in 1996 reduced the French state‘s share to 46%, which means Renault was not majority 
owned by the state any longer. From then on, the French government kept reducing its 
share holding through different types of transactions; as of 2008, the state holds 15.01% 
of Renault‘s share capital (Renault, 2008). 
  The nationalization of major industries may bring inefficiency to some 
multinationals (e.g. British Steel and British Leyland). However, present in more than 
100 countries, Renault remains one of the most dynamic automotive firms in the world 
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and maintains its ranking as Western Europe‘s top brand of cars (Renault Club, 2008). 
Rather than traditional international strategies for automakers (i.e., economies of scope), 
Renault had strong product quality, a range of product variety and innovation resources 
and capabilities to support its international expansion in 1990s (Midler, Neffa, & Monnet, 
2002). In order to compete successfully in the new global environment, Renault is taking 
advantage of collaboration with partners, such as international strategic alliances with 
General Motor Europe in 1996 (Midler et al., 2002), and Nissan in 1999.   
Renault's success is because it operates more like a private MNE, which pursues 
profitability. The French state supports Renault in its financing. For instance, on 
February 2009, the French government approved around $4 billion to Renault (Henry, 
2009). The state objective is to maintain employment and output in France. However, the 
state does not interfere with Renault‘s major corporate strategies and decisions (e.g. the 
choice of car models). For instance, Renault had to purchase firms that were in trouble 
upon government‘s requirement. But the decision was made by mangers, who chose 
those firms that support Renault‘s activities (Freyssenet, 1998). The top management 
team communicates with the French State on corporate strategies and activities while 
having a great extent of management autonomy. This has been called the ―French style‖ 
of running a state owned multinational (Renault Club, 2008).  
The French government, on the one hand, supports Renault for production and 
jobs in the national economy (Henry, 2009), while one the other hand, gives Renault a 
high degree of autonomy in management and operations(Midler et al., 2002). The 
motivation of the French government is consistent with one of the motivations that 
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attract governments to encourage the state ownership in multinationals – to improve the 
national economy in the global competition (Lamont, 1979). 
 
Old and New Style State Multinationals 
In this section, I argue that, due to the dramatic changes in the global 
environment, SMNEs in the 20th century are different from SMNEs in the 21st century. 
After explaining their key features as organizational forms, I call SMNEs in the 20th 
century ―old style‖ SMNEs and SMNEs in the 21st century ―new style‖ SMNEs. 
State Multinationals in the 20
th
 Century (“Old Style” SMNEs) 
Governments controlled national economy through the control over SOES 
(Aharoni & Seidler, 1986). Some SOEs were guided to enter into international markets. 
For instance, SOEs were used to restructure industries in order to be more competitive in 
the world markets, and subsequently these SOEs quickly changed into state 
multinationals (Lamont, 1979). In general, state multinationals were under the control of 
government, strongly committed to government, and had the state‘s approval to go 
international (Mazzolini, 1980). Moreover, the control of governments over state 
multinationals was often lower than that over domestic SOEs, to encourage the 
development of SMNEs in the international markets (Stopford, Strange, & Henley , 
1991). Due to the protection of the state, state multinationals confronted a lower level of 
uncertainty when entering new foreign markets (Vernon, 1977). For instance, before 
China‘s market liberalization, COSCO followed government‘s requirement to enter into 
certain countries and obtained government support in personnel, financing. Thus, it did 
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not face a high level of uncertainty in foreign markets because of government protection 
within the planned economic system (Jin, 2007). 
Western SOEs were forced by their governments to compete in global markets, 
but also to remain under control of their home governments (Toninelli, 2000). When 
SMNEs developed corporate strategies, they had to integrate objectives of their home 
government into their strategic plans. ―The stimulating nation-state mix—the nexus---
appears to be stronger than the sum of its parts, a totally new and formidable force in the 
international economy‖ (Lamont, 1979: 110). In order to achieve success in the global 
market, state multinationals needed commercial autonomy to both deal with complex 
conditions in foreign countries and achieve governments‘ national goals.  
In developing and emerging countries, SOEs‘ international activities were 
different from those in Western SOEs. For instance, outward foreign investment in the 
COMECON countries was totally made by SOEs due to a state monopoly (McMillan, 
1987). Not only the ownership, but also the administrative control, was under the 
supervision of state agents. Thus, SMNEs had less autonomy than those SMNEs from 
developed countries and even other developing countries. State owned and centrally 
controlled firms were instruments to realize national policies (Aharoni & Seidler, 1986). 
As a result, the state made the decision of foreign direct investment and the rules of 
game. Firms just followed and participated in required international activities. The 
decision making process was centralized, even though guidance might be insufficient 
and errors might occur (Shiva Ramu, 1986).  
Industries, within which firms were owned or controlled by the government and 
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also multinationalized in the 20th century, were often product diversified, including auto, 
power, infrastructure, finance, some sectors of manufacturing (e.g. paper, aluminium, 
and engineering) and energy (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987). 
Therefore, the attributes of state multinationals in the 20 th century (I call them 
―old style‖ SMNEs) are generally characterized as highly influenced by government 
policies and national objectives and only have limited autonomy in developing corporate 
strategies and decision making process (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987). Such attributes 
may vary, depending on the nationality of those state MNEs. Thus, the key features of 
old style state multinationals are similar to those of SOEs to a high degree. 
Dramatic World Changes: International, National and Industrial  
The Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Since then, the world has changed dramatically in 
global economic development (Ohmae, 1995; Vernon & Kapstein, 1992), manifested at 
international, national and industrial levels. These changes have highly influenced the 
development of state multinationals. 
At the international level, globalization, collaboration, and changes in regulations 
influenced the growth of state MNEs. First, restraints imposed by superpowers (the 
United States and former Soviet Union) on other countries do not exist any longer 
(Ohmae, 1995). The fast growth of European countries and the economic boom of 
developing countries ended U.S. dominance in the global economy (Vernon & Kapstein, 
1992). Also, the fast-developing technology strongly drives the world towards a 
converging global market (Hitt et al., 2009). Moreover, the easily transferred information 
brings people‘s tastes and preference together and movement of factors such as people 
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and capital across borders become more easily (Ohmae, 1995). 
  These changes result in the emergence of standardized products that enable 
enormous economies of scale in MNE activities such as production, marketing, and 
management. The trend of globalization in those value-added activities comes together 
with the increase in the volatility of changes, due to increased competition and 
imbalanced economic development around the world (Tan, 2002). Hence, state 
multinationals may confront more frequent and more intensive competition in the more 
volatile global market than before, which may influence their strategic decisions as well 
as the state-SMNE relationship. Thus, SMNEs may not be able to depend on 
governments for protection, such as compensation for significant losses and resource 
allocation (Tan & Tan, 2005), from coping with risks in such turbulent global 
environment as before.  
Second, collaboration becomes more crucial during the trend of globalization for 
MNEs both from developed countries and from developing countries (Hamel, Doz & 
Prahalad, 1989). International trade continued increasing at a fast pace, the world‘s 
technological pool kept widening due to new technologies continuously invented in 
different countries through innovation, and the structure of large international firms 
changed to adapt to the new global environment (Dunning, 1995). Thus, national 
economies are more dependent on one another than ever before and on foreign 
technology.  
Moreover, in order to create more national wealth and improve national 
competitiveness, governments take advantage of SMNEs to strategically cooperate with 
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foreign MNEs and encourage SMNEs to enter into foreign markets (Dunning, 1995). For 
instance, the Chinese government encourages firms to build strategic alliances with 
foreign MNEs to obtain advanced technologies and improve Chinese firms‘ competitive 
capabilities (Hitt et al., 2009). Structures of enterprises had changed to resemble 
multinational network in the world markets and there was strong trend toward 
international diversification in firms with advanced technological capability (Vernon & 
Kapstein, 1992). Through different types of collaboration (e.g. contractual agreements or  
strategic alliances), firms are more involved in international cooperation (Dunning, 
1995). Thus, SMNEs may depend more on international collaboration, manifested in 
their international strategies and structure.  
Third, international institutions established new codes and regulations that help 
the growth of SMNEs in the changing environment. Graham & Marchick (2006) review 
postwar efforts at making rules on FDI and argue that at the international level, WTO, 
OECD, UN, World Bank and IMF continuously set rules to guide the flow of FDI and 
the operations of MNEs. They also recognize the regional approaches on international 
investment and MNEs. All these efforts established a series of institutionalized rules to 
influence the development of MNEs.  
Moreover, international institutions also realize the importance of state 
ownership in fostering economic growth. Both the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank have assisted in financing privatization in developing countries since 1990s, 
which accelerated the privatization process in those countries (Bortolotti & Perotti, 
2007). The World Bank published a research report on ―government ownership‖ in 1995 
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and investigated the role of state enterprises in output and investment. Based on the 
analysis of state enterprise reform experience, the Bank provides suggestions to assist in 
reforming state enterprises in order to reduce bureaucracy and improve their 
performance (World Bank, 1995). Furthermore, OECD has done research on the 
development of SOEs from 1998, and published guidelines on corporate governance of 
SOEs in 2005. The guidelines represent the first international benchmark to assistant 
corporate governance and help SOEs improve performance (OECD, 2005). Therefore, 
the great changes in the international regulations for MNEs and SOEs will make SMNEs 
better adapt to the global competitive environment. 
At the national level, privatization, the improvement in host and home country 
institutional environment and the existence of institutional voids can be identified, all of 
which affect the existence and development of SMNEs. First, the process of privatization 
brings private ownership, reduces the state ownership in state owned multinationals 
(Kikeri & Kolo, 2006; Gupta, 2005) and transforms firms in terms of organizational 
values, cultures, and strategies (Zahra et al., 2000). From late 1970s to late 1990s, 
privatization has obtained more and more attention from different countries, and it has 
helped governments in many countries and regions reduce their economic role (Yarrow, 
1986; Megginson, Nash, Netter, & Poulsen, 2004). Privatization reached its peak in 1997 
with a value of US$ 157 billion for the global market (OECD, 2002), which signifies the 
fall in the twentieth-century of state owned enterprises, especially in the Western world 
(Toninelli, 2000).  
Privatization has substantially reduced state ownership in Central and Eastern 
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Europe, and the largest developing economies such as Brazil and Mexico (Kikeri & Kolo, 
2006). For instance, although Mexican government nationalized its banking system in 
early 1980s, during the global trend of privatization, it privatized most of its banks from 
1990s to increase the efficiency of those banks (Karaoglan & Lubrano, 1995). The 
literature suggests that private ownership is more efficient than public ownership and 
privatization leads to increased efficiency and profitability (e.g. Megginson, Nash, & 
Van Randerborgh, 1994; D‘Souza, Megginson, & Nash, 2005). For instance, 
privatization brings national and organizational changes, which may improve 
organizational learning, and enable the firm to access more technological opportunities 
and business networks (Zahra et al., 2000). In state owned enterprises, agency conflict 
generally leads to the inefficiency, where managers lack incentives and proper 
monitoring (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). Moreover, such agency conflict also results in the 
lack of efficiency in employment, investment and choice of production and location due 
to political interference (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). After privatization, managers have to 
confront market forces and be responsible to increase shareholder value, and thus are 
willing to take risks and devote to entrepreneurial activities for innovations (Hoskisson, 
Hitt & Hill, 1993; Rodriguez, Espejo, & Cabrera, 2007). Privatization also brings 
dramatic changes in organizational structure and culture, e.g. downsizing and faster 
decision making through flattened structure (Zahra et al., 2000). Therefore, the 
incorporation of different types of ownership through privatization helps the firms 
increase their efficiencies (Uhlenbruck & De Castro, 2000). 
Second, under such new international contexts, many countries are taking efforts 
68 
 
 
68 
 
to consciously attract inward FDI and encourage outward FDI through the improvements 
in their institutional environment on regulation and legal systems, infrastructure, and 
market structure (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Ghemewat, 2003; Galan et al., 2007; 
Flores & Ruth, 2007). Both host country environment and home country environment 
influence the growth of MNEs, either private or state-owned, either from developed 
economies or from developing and emerging economies (OECD, 2002; UNCTAD, 
2006). For instance, in order to attract more FDI, governments in host countries improve 
their macroeconomic and institutional environment and upgrade their infrastructure and 
technology and human competences (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002).  
Meanwhile, in order to augment national competitiveness, governments in home 
countries have encouraged technology transfer and international trade through 
continuous liberalization and deregulation in the economy (OECD, 2002). For instance, 
the value of stock exchanges in BRIC countries has continued to grow in last decade, 
according to the IMF statistics (Lu, 2007). The boom in the capital market has helped to 
attract both foreign corporate and institutional investors. Consequently, extra capital has 
been brought in to fund international expansion, advanced knowledge can be absorbed in 
and the management of multinationals can be improved (Gillan & Starks, 2003). Thus, 
the participation of foreign investors is especially important to SMNEs from developing 
and emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 1999). Therefore, SMNEs have both better 
host and home environment conditions in order to further expand into international 
markets. 
Third, institutional voids exist in imperfect markets and the effect of institutional 
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voids on the development of SMNEs has seldom been discussed in the literature. 
Institutional voids exist in one country when a formal set of institutions to help the 
market to function smoothly cannot be fully provided in this country (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Institutional contexts affect economic growth and the 
degree of their efficiency is dependent on the presence of specific intermediaries 
(Spulber, 1996). The institutional context in developed countries like the U.S. is 
regarded as efficient with specialized intermediation. However, institutional voids exist 
in imperfect markets like emerging and transition countries with a variety of market 
failures (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Guillén, 2000). For instance, 
in the financial markets where there is little transparency in terms of information 
disclosure, regulations are not effective in monitoring corporate activities, and thus there 
are always issues on corporate governance.  
With such market imperfections, the literature suggests that business groups can 
substitute for institutional voids (e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; 
Guillén, 2000). However, government intervention in SMNEs may also be considered an 
alternative to deal with issues generated by institutional voids. For instance, because of 
the imperfect development of financial markets, an MNE may counter difficulties in 
financing its international expansion. With government support in finance, a state 
multinational will find it easier to access needed capital (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). 
Therefore, for those countries with institutional voids, the interference from government 
supervisory agents benefits the growth and development of SMNEs. 
At the industry level, there are still some state multinationals, which are 
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generally located in key sectors. Till 1990s before privatization and the market 
liberalization, state ownership was pervasive in many industries in Western Europe and 
in developing countries (Thomas, 1986). These industries includes aerospace, steel, 
telecommunications, railways, gas, computer and electronics, airlines, mining (e.g. coal),  
petroleum, and automobiles. And in France, Italy, U.K., Mexico, Brazil and India, the 
largest MNEs were generally owned by the state respectively (Walters & Monsen, 1979).  
Currently, after two decades of privatization, in industries such as manufacturing 
and services, private firms are generally dominant (Kikeri & Kolo, 2006). However, in 
strategic sectors such as infrastructure (power, telecommunications, transport and water), 
finance and energy, government ownership and operation are still widely spread 
(Desvaux, Wang, & Xu, 2004; Green & Liu, 2005). On one hand, government restricts 
the entry of private and foreign enterprises into some key sectors, such as aerospace and 
railways, for the sake of national security. On the other hand, the government, especially 
those from developing countries, still has strong initiatives to support national economic 
growth and control national key industry sectors in the exploitation of raw materials, 
such as oil and gas (Kikeri & Kolo, 2006). Therefore, we can see a concentrated 
industrial distribution of SMNEs in the current global market. 
State Multinationals in the 21
st
 Century (“New Style” SMNEs)  
Given the great change in the new global environment, the phenomenon of 
SMNEs has also changed dramatically. SMNEs still exist in the business world. 
However, there has been to date little research on SMNEs in the 21st century (new style 
SMNEs). Thus, I propose today‘s SMNE, the new-style state multinational, exists as a 
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hybrid organizational form. 
In the current global environment, today‘s new style state multinationals are 
experiencing dramatic changes as an organizational form. As explained in Chapter I, 
today‘s new style state multinational is defined as a state owned or controlled MNE with 
at least 10% state ownership in my dissertation. This definition is different from that of 
the old style SMNE in the 20th century, an MNE with more than 50% state ownership 
(Anastassopoulos et al., 1987). 
Based on the comparison of the SOE and the MNE, I propose that, as 
organizational forms, the SOE and the MNE may be considered two extremes along a 
continuum in terms of their key features. The old style state multinational and the new 
style state multinational are typically located in the middle, while the new style state 
multinational is located closer to the right end (Figure 2.5). As explained before, the old 
style SMNE behaves similar to an SOE because of a high level of control from 
government. Today‘s new style state multinational exists with these tensions because of 
the coexistence of state ownership and multinational orientation, leading to its unique 
characteristics and location closer to MNEs. 
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Figure 2.5  
Positions of SMNE in the SOE—MNE Continuum 
 
 
Below I develop several propositions comparing multinationals with state 
ownership (new-style SMNEs) and without state ownership (private MNEs). These 
propositions illustrate the impacts that state ownership can have on the MNE in the new 
global environment.   
Goals  
  MNEs are profit oriented (Caves, 1996) and focused on achieving a certain level 
of average efficiency (e.g. Tan & Tan, 2005). In contrast, SOEs are generally constrained 
by government objectives (Lin, Cai & Li, 2001), and not productivity oriented. With 
both characteristics of MNEs and SOEs, a state multinational, on the one hand, has the 
intention to improve its performance when the enterprise expands internationally. On the 
other hand, the SMNE is owned by the government or still under government guidance, 
and thus restrained by government objectives, which may be divergent from the aim for 
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profits for typical private MNEs (Luo & Tung, 2007). This type of tension embedded in 
the SMNE may prevent it from purely targeting profits when establishing its goals, 
management, and operations. Therefore, I propose that 
 Proposition 1. SMNEs are, on average, less profit oriented than MNEs. 
Corporate Governance 
To be more efficient and compete with domestic and international competitors, 
state multinationals were restructured and/or privatized in 1990s, and many are now 
publicly listed on stock markets (Tan & Peng, 2003). Thus, corporate governance of 
SMNEs in the 21st century, in general, may be more effective than that of SMNEs in the 
20th century because of monitoring from other shareholders (Ricketts, 2002). Moreover, 
under the current new global environment, state multinationals have a higher level of 
management autonomy than old style SMNEs, because government may reduce its 
interference in corporate governance to encourage SMNEs to improve their profitability 
(Tan, 2002).  
However, state multinationals still suffer from bureaucratic obstacles and 
political intervention from governments (Luo & Tung, 2007). Moreover, a state 
multinational has to commit to the government besides their commitment to other 
shareholders. Continuation of agency problems due to state ownership can be especially 
troubling when competing in a changing international environment with pressures of 
increased competition, complexity and dynamism (Tan, 2002). Besides confronting 
problems in corporate governance what will be experienced when state multinationals go 
abroad, they face additional corporate governance issues due to the intervention of 
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governments. Thus, the corporate governance issues may be more complex for an SMNE 
than for a private MNE. Therefore, I propose that 
Proposition 2. SMNEs, on average, confront a higher level of corporate 
governance complexity than MNEs. 
Organizational Structure and Culture 
After the restructuring and privatization in 1990s, state multinationals now have 
a higher level of autonomy and are under less control of the government (Tan & Tan, 
2005). In order to compete successfully in the severe competition of international 
markets, the management may not prefer a hierarchical structure for control. 
Organizational culture will be more market oriented (Ralston et al., 2006).  
However, state multinationals are still under some governmental influence or 
guidance. Due to this influence, state multinationals have less power than MNEs in 
strategic decisions, resulting in a final choice that is not optimal (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
Thus, compared to MNEs, SMNEs still have a lower level of autonomy to decide on 
their organizational structure. Therefore, I propose that 
Proposition 3. SMNEs, on average, have a lower level of autonomy in 
establishing organizational structure than MNEs. 
External Environment 
As explained before, the global environment has changed dramatically at 
international, national, and industrial levels. Involved in foreign operations and 
headquartered in home countries, SMNEs have to abide by both home country and host 
country policies and regulations for legitimacy. However, due to the existence of state 
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ownership, SMNEs are constrained by home country government in several areas such 
as business policies (Lin, 2004). Thus, SMNEs have a more certain home country 
environment than MNEs. Moreover, SMNEs may obtain institutional support from 
governments in order to compete successfully in international markets (Luo & Tung, 
2007). Thus, they may experience less uncertainty than private MNEs. 
Industries that are still owned or controlled by the government and also active in 
international markets are generally located in key sectors such as power, infrastructure, 
finance, and energy. Thus, I propose that 
Proposition 4a. SMNEs, on average, experience a lower level of uncertainty than 
MNEs in the external environment of both home and host countries.  
In addition, state multinationals have to deal with both host and home country 
governments to improve their performance and achieve their goals. In home countries, 
they obtain direct support from governments on financing, business policies, and 
business relationships4 (OECD, 2002), thus greatly reducing their level of uncertainty 
(see the Renault case described earlier in this chapter). In host countries, they confront 
similar external environments with multinationals from other countries. They may obtain 
support from home country governments when they have to settle down critical issues 
(see COSCO case). However, such support may not as direct and comprehensive as the 
support they obtain in home country environment. Thus, although the environment in 
host countries for SMNEs may be less certain than that for MNEs, SMNEs confront an 
even less certain home country environment than other multinationals. Therefore, I 
                                                          
4 Governments include federal/central governments and local governments, since both types of governments intervene 
with SMNEs‘ operations based on their corporate structures (e.g., Luo, 1995). 
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propose that 
Proposition 4b. The difference in the level of uncertainty between SMNEs and 
MNEs is greater in home countries than in host countries. 
Strategies and Change 
The tensions, as explained above, in terms of goals, corporate governance, and 
organizational structure generate internal complexity for SMNEs. The situation in the 
external environment creates external complexity for those firms. Both internal and 
external complexity in the SMNE as a hybrid organizational form influences how it 
makes corporate strategies and its ability to change (Figure 2.6).  
Figure 2.6 
 Complexity for the New-Style SMNE  
 
MNEs generally act proactively in the international markets and are flexible in 
their ability to change (Doz et al., 1990). Thus, they invest in innovative activities to win 
the competition in the global market. With this characteristic, today‘s state multinationals 
are more likely to take risks in the international markets and may have a lower level of 
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organizational inertia than old style state multinationals.  
Moreover, due to the existence of state ownership in SMNEs, as explained above, 
they may confront a lower level of uncertainty in the external environment than MNEs. 
Hence, they should be able to invest more in risky activities in international markets. 
However, government still guides or controls those firms, even when state 
multinationals expand into international markets. Those firms experience government 
intervention in terms of investment strategies and implementation (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
Thus, SMNEs have a lower level of autonomy in strategic decisions in international 
strategies and related risk-taking activities than other MNEs.  
Tension exists when SMNEs may be more proactive but restrained by 
government interference while making strategic decisions and changes. Thus, both 
internal and external complexity confronted by SMNEs make them have more difficulty 
than private MNEs in terms of decision making on strategies and changes. Therefore, I 
propose that 
Proposition 5. SMNEs, on average, have more difficulty in making strategic 
decisions on corporate strategies and organizational changes than MNEs. 
Outcomes 
The strategic management literature tells us that firms can achieve strategic 
competitiveness and improve firm performance when they formulate and implement 
strategies successfully (Hitt et al., 2009). As proposed in Proposition 1, SMNEs are 
generally less profit oriented than MNEs. Moreover, compared to MNEs, they have 
difficulty in making strategic decisions (Proposition 5), a higher level of corporate 
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governance complexity (Proposition 2) and a lower level of autonomy in establishing 
organizational structure (Proposition 3). Considering these important steps leading to 
any improvement on efficiency, SMNEs are generally at competitive disadvantages to 
MNEs, and thus less profitable than SMNEs. Therefore, I propose that 
Proposition 6. SMNEs are, on average, less efficient than MNEs. 
 
Summary 
    It is well known in the literature that SOEs and MNEs are different 
organizational forms. What characterizes a state multinational, which has characteristics 
of both an SOE and an MNE? To clearly answer this question, I start by explaining 
MNEs and SOEs are organizational forms by their key attributes, such as corporate 
governance, structure, and strategies and change. I then suggest a tentative typology of 
SMNEs and further give two typical illustrative firm examples to track the quadrant 
changes in types of SMNEs.  
    The comparison between MNEs and SOEs helps me to move forward to 
investigate SMNEs as an organizational form. Explaining the main features as an 
organizational form, I distinguish state multinationals in two time periods (―old style‖ in 
the 20th century vs. ―new style‖ in the 21st century) because of the global environment 
changes at international, national, and industrial levels. By doing so, I find differences in 
key features of SMNEs from those of SOEs or MNEs. I further suggest a series of 
propositions to argue that today‘s new style SMNE as an organizational form is different 
from the MNE. These propositions are testable by using surveys to collect data and 
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measure constructs involved. I conclude that today‘s SMNE exists as a hybrid 
organizational form. 
   Before further empirical tests on the above propositions presented in this chapter, 
it is better to first know what happens inside the SMNE. Thus, I am motivated to conduct 
research on the impact of state ownership on SMNEs‘ organizational activities, such as 
their corporate governance and different types of strategies. In Chapter III, I narrow my 
research topic to SMNEs‘ corporate governance and investigate how the existence of 
state ownership influences SMNEs‘ international diversification and performance. 
Moreover, I consider the influence of SMNEs‘ external environment and compare the 
influence of different home country environment on the relationships on state ownership 
and international diversification. Followed is Chapter IV on methodology, empirically 
testing proposed relationships involved in Chapter III.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE IMPACT OF STATE OWNERSHIP ON INTERNATIONAL 
DIVERSIFICATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE OF STATE 
MULTINATIONALS 
 
Introduction 
In Figure 3.1, I first present an overall framework of research on today‘s new 
style SMNE. I, then, follow the corporate governance and strategic management streams 
to introduce the research focus of this chapter. I review managerial changes of SMNEs 
acknowledged in the literature and suggest that corporate governance of today‘s SMNEs 
is worthwhile to explore under the current global environment. By analyzing agency 
problems and support from the state due to the existence of state ownership in MNEs, I 
explore the effect of state ownership on the SMNE‘s international diversification and 
then on firm performance. Recognizing the beneficial influence of institutional 
ownership on corporate governance, I also investigate the moderating effects of 
institutional investors on the mitigation of agency problems. The figure in page 87 
summarizes the major theoretical arguments addressed in this chapter, which I develop 
below. 
Having identified today‘s new style SMNE as a hybrid organizational form, I 
recognize that because of the global environmental changes, the new style SMNE in the 
21st century has unique key features as an organizational form. Thus, an important 
research question arises: How does this new style SMNE operate and improve its 
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performance in the new global environment? First, firm characteristics, such as the 
quality of corporate governance and the relationship with government, will determine 
how the SMNE‘s top management team makes corporate goals, strategies, and structure. 
Second, due to differences in goals, implementing strategies and building 
organizational structure, SMNEs may achieve different firm performance both at the 
subsidiary level and the parent level. Meanwhile, SMNEs operate both in host (for their 
foreign subsidiaries) and home (for the parent and their domestic subsidiaries) countries. 
Thus, both home country and host country environments, as external environment 
factors, influence the firm characteristics-processes–performance relationship. 
Therefore, I propose the following framework on SMNE activities and development as 
shown in Figure 3.1. 
Performance=f (firm characteristics (e.g. corporate governance, relationship with 
states); home country environment; host country environment; firm strategies) 
Figure 3.1  
A Research Framework on the New Style SMNE’s Development  
 
Firm 
Characteristics 
1) SOE 
2) MNE 
*Goals 
*Strategies (e.g.  
international 
diversification) 
*Structure 
SMNE 
Performance 
1) Parent 
2) Subsidiaries 
Home Country 
Environment 
Host Country 
Environment 
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The research framework suggests broader research directions than I can address 
here. Based on the framework developed from the analysis in Chapter II, I narrow my 
research by focusing on the corporate governance and strategic management research 
streams. As explained in Chapter II, the new style SMNE has characteristics both from 
the SOE and the MNE, the ‗parents‘, but is closer to the MNE. Thus, it is worthwhile to 
do a comparison between the new style SMNE and the MNE. The major research 
question arises of how state ownership influences the new style SMNE‘s strategies and 
performance. In Chapter II, I have already explained the rationale for SMNEs from both 
developed and developing countries to expand into international markets. The fast 
growing international activities of state multinationals is the motivation behind the 
research ideas of my dissertation. Thus, among corporate goals, strategies and structure, 
international diversification draws the first attention. Therefore, I investigate the impact 
of state ownership on international diversification and firm performance of SMNEs.  
I also examine the influence of home country institutional environments on the 
relationships proposed in the first two hypotheses. From an institutional perspective, 
institutional environment affects firm strategies and institutional voids exist in 
developing economies. In those countries, governments play an important role in 
shaping SMNEs‘ strategic behavior, functioning as a substitute for institutional voids. 
Thus, proposed relationships between state ownership - international diversification vary 
between developed countries and developing and emerging countries. 
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Managerial Challenges of SMNEs 
As explained in Chapter II, a firm can go either way to become a state 
multinational due to different motivations and coercive pressures, i.e. from an SOE to an 
SMNE or from an MNE to an SMNE. The existence of SMNEs has always been 
recognized as a managerial challenge in the literature due to related agency issues 
(Negandi et al., 1986a). State multinationals often encountered problems with corruption, 
administrative obstacles and managerial incentives, and were in goal conflict between 
maximizing profitability and output /employment (Stopford et al., 1991). SMNEs 
confronted more complex competitive conditions in the global market as explained in 
Chapter II. Moreover, consideration for firms‘ profitability and interests was heavily 
influenced by the degree of government control. Thus, such problems became more 
prominent when SMNEs expanded internationally (Zif, 1983) where the divided 
loyalties within SMNEs reduced their ability to effectively compete in international 
markets (Stopford et al., 1991). Therefore, the negative influence of dominant 
government ownership on MNEs‘ international strategies and firm performance is well 
acknowledged in previous literature. 
Moreover, managerial behaviors of SMNEs may be highly influenced by the 
existence of state ownership during international expansion. Managers make key 
strategic decisions in international expansion. Potential managerial opportunistic 
behaviors may have negative influence on state multinationals‘ international strategies 
and firm performance since managers might pursue their own benefits while making 
strategic decisions to compete and adapt to the changing global environment (Aharoni & 
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Seidler, 1986). For instance, managerial opportunistic behaviors in state multinationals 
have been associated with foreign direct investment (Wells, 1983). Because of the goal 
conflict and lack of incentives, managers are more liable to pursue individual interests 
through international expansion. During the process of international diversification, 
managers deal with foreign operations, resulting in information asymmetries (i.e., 
information may be held by managers without disclosing to owners (Gomez-Mejia & 
Balkin, 1992)). Thus, agency problems were more likely to occur due to managers‘ 
behaviors (e.g., in terms of the degree of autonomy by foreign subsidiaries) on overall 
corporate strategies, network stability in management structure, and entrepreneurial tasks 
(Lamont, 1979). 
Therefore, previous literature suggests that the management of SMNEs implies 
complex agency problems and greatly affects firm objectives, strategies and performance 
(Lamont, 1979; Negandi et al., 1986a; Stopford et al., 1991). The ability of an SMNE to 
manage the complexity of balancing national objectives set by the government and 
strategic objectives of the firm‘s own international expansion highly influences the 
SMNE‘s success in the global markets (Anastassopoulos et al., 1987).  
As explained in Chapter II, the world has changed dramatically in global 
economic development (Ohmae, 1995). At the international level, SMNEs are no longer 
as sheltered and protected by governments as before, and face more competition in 
global markets. Strategic alliances have become important for international 
competitiveness. Thus, governments encourage their state owned firms to strategically 
cooperate with foreign MNEs and enter into foreign markets (Dunning, 1995). Moreover, 
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international institutions have established new codes, guidelines and regulations to help 
the growth of SMNEs, e.g. the OECD 2005 guidelines on corporate governance of 
SMNEs (OECD, 2005).  
At the national level, privatization has substantially reduced state ownership in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and in large emerging economies such as Brazil and Mexico 
(Yarrow, 1986; Kikeri & Kolo, 2006; Zahra et al., 2000a; D‘Souza, Megginson, & Nash, 
2005), resulting in different types of MNEs with state ownership, such as Renault in 
France (around 15%), and Indian Oil (around 80%). Moreover, many countries are 
taking efforts to improve their institutional environments to attract inward FDI and 
encourage outward FDI. Thus, SMNEs have both better home and host environments to 
help the firms further expand into international markets (UNCTAD, 2006). At the 
industry level, after two decades of privatization and liberalization, SMNEs are more 
concentrated in strategic sectors such as infrastructure (power, communications, 
transport and water), finance and natural resources, because governments may restrict 
entry of other types of firms in key sectors and/or intend to control strategic sectors to 
support national economic growth.  
Consequently, SMNEs have changed greatly in the new global environment. On 
one hand, governments may provide support for SMNEs depending on their extent of 
state ownership. On the other hand, SMNEs may confront similar corporate governance 
challenges to those that affected these firms in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Stopford et al., 
1991). Thus, as proposed in Chapter II, in terms of corporate governance, SMNEs must 
operate with a higher level of complexity than that of MNEs (Sanders & Carpenter, 
86 
 
 
86 
 
1998). Therefore, how to manage today‘s SMNEs is an important research question 
worthy of investigation (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009).  
I narrow my research focus from the big framework and concentrate on the 
influence of state ownership on international diversification and performance, as shown 
in Figure 3.2, through the lens of corporate governance and international business.  
In addition, because of management challenges faced by SMNEs and also 
because my samples are public listed SMNEs, I consider including institutional 
ownership as a moderator to investigate whether the participation of institutional 
investors helps to monitor management and constrain managerial opportunistic 
behaviors during SMNEs‘ international expansion (Pound, 1992; Tihanyi et al., 2003; 
Useem, 1996). Institutional investors as equity holders include ―bank trusts, insurance 
companies, investment companies (mutual funds), investment advisors (brokerage firms), 
pension funds, and endowments with at least $100 million in equity (Grinstein & 
Michaely, 2005)‖ (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2008: 29).  The literature on corporate 
governance tells us that these large shareholders may actively participate in monitoring 
and controlling management, and thus influence a firm‘s significant strategic decisions 
(Dalton et al., 2008). In this study, institutional ownership is considered one of 
mechanisms that will influence the effectiveness of corporate governance of SMNEs. 
Therefore, as shown in Figure 3.2, I investigate its effects on the state ownership-
international diversification relationship in terms of corporate governance. 
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Figure 3.2 
Model of State Ownership, International Diversification and SMNE Performance 
 
Institutional Environment and Institutional Voids 
For the first two hypotheses, I also consider the influence of home country 
institutional environment. As already discussed, home country and host country 
environments influence the development of SMNEs (OECD, 2002; UNCTAD, 2007). 
Previous research suggests that home and host country institutions have different 
influences on SMNE development. For instance, in 1970s, the Indian government had 
limitations and requirements for outward FDI (e.g. entry modes). Brazil also required 
approval of investment through control procedures (Wells, 1983).  
In the new international environment, governments in either host or home 
countries endeavor to improve their country environments. Recent research suggests the 
improvement on the host country environment on regulation and legal systems, 
infrastructure, and market structure (e.g., Galan et al., 2007; Guler & Guillen, 2010; 
Flores & Ruth, 2007) attracts inward FDI and improve national competitive capabilities. 
State Ownership International 
Diversification 
SMNE  
Performance 
Institutional Ownership  
H3 (+) 
H4 (∩) 
H1 (∩) 
H2 (+) 
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However, little study has been done on MNEs in terms of their home country 
environments (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003; Shinkle & Kriauciunas, 2010), not mentioning 
studies of influence of home country environments on SMNEs. Thus, research on home 
country institutional environments and their effects on SMNE strategies and 
performance would give high added value and insights to the understanding on SMNEs.  
Institutions are a series of rules that guide conducts in the areas of politics, law 
and society and are reflected through, e.g., rules of laws, government regulations, and 
the regulation of capital markets (North, 1990; Scott, 2001). When conducting research 
on multiple countries, institutional theory should be considered, because different levels 
of institutional efficiency greatly influence firm strategies and performance (Hoskisson 
et al., 2000; Guillen, 2000; Guler & Guillen, 2010; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
& Vishey, 1998).  
The institutional environment in developed countries such as the United States is 
considered efficient with well-established rules and regulations. However, institutional 
voids exist in emerging and transition countries with a variety of market failures 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Guillén, 2000). For instance, Khanna 
& Palepu (2000) argue that  government policies are not stable, regulations are not 
investor oriented, and there is a lack of system to protect property rights as well as a  lack 
of transparency through information disclosure. 
In economies with such market imperfections, the literature suggests that 
business groups substitute for institutional voids (e.g. Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Guillén, 
2000). However, the government role in SMNE activities has been ignored when dealing 
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with institutional voids (Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2003). 
For instance, without the existence of political stability, a firm may suffer from an 
unstable business environment and investors may suffer from policy instability (Doh, 
Teegen & Mudambi, 2004). Due to the interference from the state, the firm may obtain 
help from the state to cope with the unstable business environment through beneficial 
policies or government endowment. In this case, state ownership can be considered an 
alternative to substitute for institutional voids (Doh et al., 2004). Different developing 
countries may have different levels of institutional voids in terms of political stability, 
regulatory quality, and rule of law (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007). Therefore, 
this chapter focuses on the influence of home country institutional environment on the 
state ownership-international diversification relationship. 
 
State Ownership and International Diversification 
Agency theory asserts that a large firm is more efficient with the separation of 
ownership and managerial control (Fama & Jensen, 1983). At the same time, agency 
problems can occur when owners are unable to effectively monitor managers, and 
managers display behaviors that are not in the best interests of owners.  
The literature suggests that state owned enterprises traditionally suffered from 
high agency problems due to bureaucratic and obsolete methods of governance (e.g. Luo, 
1995; Xu & Wang, 1999).  As explained in Chapter II, state multinationals are both 
motivated and forced to go international because of increased competition and 
dynamism in the global market. Agency problems in state multinationals have been 
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especially complex due to the changing international environment (Tan, 2002; Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998).  
When agency theory is applied to examine the effects of state shareholding on 
international diversification, a significant negative impact might be expected on 
international strategies. The literature suggests that state ownership generates 
comparatively higher agency costs (e.g., Park et al., 2006; Zou & Adams, 2008) and may 
negatively influence the level of international expansion, especially when SMNEs 
confront intensive global competition.  
First, international expansion for profitability conflicts with government goals for 
output and employment (Zif, 1983). The divided loyalties may result in a deviation from 
pursuing profitability through international diversification (Park, et al., 2006). The state 
may treat SMNEs as the means to realize its own goal. Although SMNEs want to 
achieve a higher level of international expansion for higher profitability, the state 
objectives will prevent them from efficiently allocate their resources and capabilities. 
For instance, when an SMNE lays off some employees to reduce redundancy and invests 
resources saved in international expansion to exploit new international opportunities, the 
state may pressure on the firm, preventing it from laying off its employees 
(Anastssopoulos et al., 1987). The greater the degree of state ownership, the more 
heavily the target for efficiency from international expansion will be influenced, and 
thus a higher level of conflict will be expected.  
Second and subsequently, managers can easily pursue opportunistic behaviors 
during international diversification (Aharoni & Seidler, 1986). Given the conflicting 
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goals between the state and SMNEs, managers may not be compensated based on firm 
growth and performance (Zou & Adams, 2008), and thus have not incentives to 
maximize gains from international expansion. Moreover, managers of SMNEs may have 
a low level of autonomy in making international strategies (e.g., the choice of modes of 
entry or the location choice) than managers of private MNEs (Luo & Tung, 2007), and 
thus firm profitability of SMNEs will not be managers‘ main concern when managers 
decide to enter into international markets. Therefore, managers may not be profit 
oriented and do not seize new opportunities in international markets, but use strategic 
decisions on international expansion to further their self interests, such as individual 
economic gains or promotion opportunities (Morck, Yeung & Zhao, 2008).  
Third, an international expansion strategy makes the situation more complex to 
manage (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Hitt et al., 1997) due to bureaucratic and 
administrative obstacles (Stopford et al., 1991), leading to a loss in management 
efficiency (Park, et al., 2006). As explained in Chapter II, when entering international 
markets, SMNEs confront a higher level of difficulty in strategic formulation and 
implementation than MNEs due to internal and external complexity. Subsequently, 
international diversification is expensive due to the costs of managing diversified 
operations (Lu & Beamish, 2004), especially for SMNEs. Therefore, corporate 
governance of SMNEs is more complex for managers to deal with than that of private 
MNEs as explained in Chapter II and related agency costs are expected to be high.  
However, in the context of SMNEs, the negative influence of state shareholding 
on international diversification may not hold when the state does not hold a majority 
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ownership (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). First, related agency problems may be mitigated to 
some extent by a forward-looking government‘s efforts to reduce its interference in 
governance (Tan, 2002). In order to improve national competitiveness, governments may 
encourage state owned firms to expand into international markets and collaborate with 
foreign MNEs, for example, through international strategic alliances (Dunning, 1995). 
To successfully compete in international markets, SMNEs typically need less control 
from the government than SOEs competing in domestic markets (see Chapter II). Thus, 
governments may endow a higher degree of autonomy and flexibility to state 
multinationals in terms of corporate governance.  
Second and subsequently, managers of SMNEs may have more incentives and 
become more willing to invest in innovative and risky activities proactively (Tan & Tan, 
2005), such as international expansion, to improve their performance. First, given a 
higher level of autonomy in decision making in international expansion, managers may 
grasp international opportunities to have the SMNE enjoy benefits of international 
diversification for improved profitability (Luo & Tung, 2007). Second, after 
privatization and market liberalization, there are more incentives to monitor SMNEs‘ 
effectiveness of management (e.g., the increase in institutional ownership and incentives 
of supervisory agents), which reduces managers‘ opportunistic behaviors in the process 
of international expansion. Therefore, managers will be more motivated to improve 
SMNEs‘ profitability through international diversification, rather than pursue their own 
interests.  
Third, government typically provides support to state multinationals to ensure 
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growth in firm performance (Bortolotti & Perotti, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007). As 
explained in Chapter II, governments depend on state owned or controlled multinationals, 
for instance, to improve the nation‘s international position and to acquire resources and 
upgrade national technological capabilities. Thus, SMNEs are generally given favorable 
treatment or support from the government (Lin, 2004; Luo & Tung, 2007) and often 
obtain support such as financing, personnel, and international trade policies from the 
government (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). Thus, SMNEs are able to build their resources 
and competitive capabilities necessary to succeed in international competition.  
Therefore, I argue that different levels of state ownership may have different 
effects on an SMNE‘s international strategies. At a low level of state ownership, the 
existence of such ownership may be considered a signal of state support for international 
strategies, especially when a state multinational expands internationally and confronts 
difficulties in foreign countries (see the COSCO case as an example). As the percentage 
of state ownership increases, the negative effect on corporate governance may gradually 
dominate the overall influence on an SMNE‘s international diversification. Thus, I 
expect a non-linear relationship between state ownership and the level of international 
diversification. 
Hypothesis 1a: For a state multinational, the relationship between state 
ownership and international diversification is nonlinear; that is, the higher the 
percentage of state ownership the more likely is the SMNE to be involved in 
international diversification until a threshold; after the threshold, the further 
increase in state ownership hinders the firm’s international diversification. 
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Comparison of the Influence of Home Country Institutional Environment 
Home and host country institutions have different impact on firm development 
(Galan, et al., 2007; Hall & Jones, 1999; Rodrik, 1997). Keefer and Knack (1997) 
employed divergent indicators of home country institutional quality and found that since 
economic activity of those firms takes place in the institutional environment, the 
competitive capabilities of home countries depends on such an environment. Poor 
countries cannot grow faster than rich countries because of their lag in the quality of 
institutions.  
In the new international environment, home country institutional environment 
influences the development of SMNEs, both in developed economies and in developing 
and emerging economies (OECD, 2002; UNCTAD, 2006). Currently, many countries are 
improving their country environment on regulation and legal systems, infrastructure, and 
market structure (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Ghemewat, 2003; Galan et al., 2007; 
Flores & Ruth, 2007). Moreover, the boom in capital markets in some countries helps 
attract foreign corporate and institutional investors that bring in extra capital to fund 
international expansion and better monitor the management of multinationals (Gillan & 
Starks, 2003; Kogut, Walker, & Anand, 2002).  
 In developed countries, political stability, well-established regulations and rules 
of law as well as the protection system for property rights generate a friendly 
institutional environment to ensure the development and growth of firms (Vaaler 
&Schrage, 2009), through strategies such as international expansion. In developing 
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countries, however, institutional constraints on the above mentioned perspectives 
negatively influence the development of SMNEs (Djankov et al., 2003). In developing 
and emerging economies, the level of institutional environments is generally low due to 
the existence of institutional voids. Thus, the quality of home country institutional 
environment is especially important to the development of SMNEs in developing and 
emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 1999).  
 Home country differences in institutional environments influence the behavior of 
SMNEs in the global markets. State ownership acts as a substitute for established 
regulations and policies (Henisz, 2001; Djankov et al., 2003; Doh et al., 2004; Vaaler & 
Schrage, 2009). With a well-developed institutional environment that implies investor-
friendly institutions (e.g., rule of law and protection for property rights), the benefits 
brought by state ownership to show the support from the government will vanish (Vaaler 
& Schrage, 2009). In contrast, with the existence of institutional voids in developing and 
emerging markets, the existence of state ownership provides the potential support from 
government for international investments to deal with market failures (Doh et al., 2004). 
For instance, Bortolotti and Perotti (2007) find that when there are no effective executive 
restraints in the corporate governance system, the existence of state ownership may 
operate as a signal of executive forbearance. However, if the institutions related to a 
corporate governance system are in place, the importance of state ownership will reduce 
(Bortolotti & Perotti, 2007). Moreover, based on research in telecommunication 
infrastructure projects in developing and emerging economies, Doh et al. (2004) suggest 
when state policies to protect investment in the infrastructure system are not available, 
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state ownership becomes a substitute for such investment policies. When institutions are 
lacking, government support will substitute for them to fill in the institutional voids 
(Doh et al., 2004; Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). Hence, the function of state ownership in 
developing and emerging economies is more important than that in developed economies 
for the state ownership-international diversification relationship. Therefore, I propose 
that  
Hypothesis 1b: The relationship between state ownership and international 
diversification is stronger for SMNEs in developing and emerging economies 
than for those in developed economies. 
 
The Moderator Effect of Institutional Ownership 
Agency theory asserts that due to the significant benefits and risks related with 
international diversification, investors are interested in this strategy (e.g. Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998). Prior research on corporate governance suggests that institutional 
investors are increasingly active in their role of monitoring and controlling management 
(e.g., David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001; Tihanyi et al., 2003). Pursuing investment returns, 
institutional investors are more interested in international diversification, whatever their 
types and relevant strategic targets, and thus benefit a firm‘s corporate governance5 
(Tihanyi et al., 2003).  
Institutional ownership helps to resolve agency problems, because institutional 
investors may be able to more effectively monitor managers than other types of 
                                                          
5  The average institutional ownership in my three-year sample is 0.23; the average institutional ownership in my 
seven-year sample is 0.21. 
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shareholders (Dalton et al., 2008). First, compared to individual investors, with 
cumulative experiences and expertise, institutional investors have more tools and 
resources to monitoring, and have a cost advantage (Pound, 1988). Because they invest 
in a large portfolio of stock, they devote resources in the management of funds involved, 
e.g., gathering information and professional analysis (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Thus, 
compared to other types of shareholders, they have greater expertise to monitor the 
management of a firm.   
Second, they have coordination mechanisms (e.g., Institutional Shareholder 
Services and Investor Responsibility Research Center) to guarantee their effectiveness 
(Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). Because of their amounts in ownership and goals for 
investment return, institutions may monitor SMNEs with their resources (e.g. established 
coordination mechanisms). Thus, they can improve an SMNE‘s corporate governance 
through effective monitoring. 
Third, they may be able to obtain inside information, which will help them 
monitor the management of a firm (Dalton et al., 2008). Managers may take advantage 
of information asymmetry to pursue their own benefits in complex contexts (Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin, 1992) such as international diversification. When institutional investors 
have inside information, the level of information asymmetry will be lower, and their 
monitoring on the management will be more effective.  
Fourth, managers need support from institutional shareholders to fund risky and 
costly international activities for the success in global markets. Thus, managers are 
forced to be under the monitoring of those investors (Tihanyi et al., 2003).  
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When the percentage of state ownership is below a certain level and the benefits 
from the existence of state ownership dominate its influence on the SMNE‘s 
management and international strategies, agency problems in corporate governance due 
to state interference are not severe. In this case, the positive influence of institutional 
investors on corporate governance may not be prominent enough to affect managers‘ 
international strategies. In contrast, when the level of state ownership is above a certain 
level, related agency problems become a major factor influencing the SMNE‘s 
management and its international diversification. In this case, the existence of 
institutional investors in the MNEs is a signal of better control for more efficient 
management, which may mitigate the suspect from other investors on the management 
and then on the expectation of international strategies. For instance, the increase in the 
institutional shareholdings in certain types of stocks will lead to increasing demand for 
the stock and subsequently rising prices (Gompers & Metrick, 2001). 
 Therefore, I expect that institutional ownership moderates the relationship 
between state ownership and the level of international diversification in such a way that, 
for SMNEs with a high percentage of institutional ownership, the influence of state 
ownership will result in a higher level of international diversification than those with a 
low percentage of institutional ownership. This expectation suggests that because of 
enhanced monitoring of institutional owners, subsequent better corporate governance, 
and then more efficient management, the apex of the curvilinear relationship between 
state ownership and the level of international diversification shifts upward and to the 
right, that is, the effect of state ownership on the level of international diversification 
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strengthens. 
Hypothesis 2a: Institutional ownership positively moderates the relationship 
between state ownership and an SMNE’s international diversification in such a 
way that as the percentage of institutional ownership increases, the relationship 
between state ownership and the level of international diversification becomes 
stronger. 
Comparison of the Influence of Home Country Institutional Environment 
Institutional ownership is one mechanism to improve the effectiveness of 
corporate governance through monitoring (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). In different 
home country institutional environments, the influence of institutional ownership may 
differ. The degree of efficiency of institutional contexts depends on the establishment of 
specific intermediaries (Spulber, 1996). In developed countries, institutional contexts are 
considered efficient. Although the state will influence the governance of SMNEs through 
the existence of state ownership, the power is restrained by the established governance 
system. Institutional investors may not be affected by the state objectives when involved 
in the governance structure. Therefore, institutional investors can well perform their 
monitoring functions on management through well-established systems.  
In contrast, in developing and emerging markets, there are a variety of market 
imperfections, such as the lack of capital market regulations and protection to property 
rights (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Guillén, 2000) and institutional 
voids exist to influence the management of SMNEs (e.g., Henisz, 2001; Doh et al., 
2004). SMNEs may need government support to deal with different types of market 
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failures. Consequently, the influence of governments in developing and emerging 
economies on SMNEs‘ corporate governance will be greater than that of governments in 
developed economies. Hence, the ability to monitor managers of institutional investors 
investing SMNEs in developing countries, on the one hand, may be hindered due to 
government‘s intervention. On the other hand, those institutional investors may not find 
efficient intermediaries to realize their monitoring effectiveness. Therefore, I propose 
that 
Hypothesis 2b: The moderating effect of institutional ownership on the state 
ownership -international diversification relationship is weaker for SMNEs in 
developing and emerging economies than for those in developed economies. 
 
International Diversification and Firm Performance 
Previous studies investigating the international diversification—performance 
relationship have reported inconclusive and controversial findings (Hitt et al., 2006b; 
Contractor, Kumar, & Kundu, 2007). Some findings suggest a negative influence of 
international diversification on firm performance (Kumar, 1984), some findings suggest 
a positive influence (Qian, 1997; Hejazi & Santor, 2009), some findings suggest 
inconclusive results (Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1989; Sambharya, 1995), and some 
findings suggest complex U-shaped, inverted-U-shaped, or S-shaped associations (Capar 
& Kotabe, 2003; Contractor et al., 2007; Eden & Thomas, 2004; Hitt et al., 1997). Given 
that there are no conclusive findings on the international diversification—performance 
relationship, future research on the relationship are suggested to consider historical and 
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contextual characteristics (Contractor et al., 2007; Lu & Beamish, 2004).  
Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck, and Shimizu (2006) suggest that at an intermediate 
level, international diversification will positively influence firm performance. Consistent 
with Hitt et al. (2006a)‘s findings, this study also suggests that the level of international 
diversification positively influences a state multinational‘s performance.  
SMNEs may not be as profit oriented as private MNEs, but they are influenced 
by government objectives to different extents, depending on the percentage of state 
ownership. However, governments may encourage SMNEs to enter into foreign markets 
in order to create more national wealth and improve national competitiveness (Dunning, 
1995). Thus, those firms may still intend to benefit from international diversification, 
such as new business opportunities (Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000), advanced knowledge 
in technology and managerial skills (Li, 2006).  
The positive effects of international diversification on performance have long 
been recognized by the literature. First, international diversification is a popular strategic 
option to obtain sustainable competitive advantages (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005). Second, 
firms can realize economies of scale and scope, access new resources (e.g. knowledge), 
reduce cost, and extend its innovative capabilities through international expansion (Hitt 
et al., 1997; Hitt et al., 2009). For instance, expanding operations in different 
international markets, firms may be able to realize economies of scale through 
production standardization, sharing production facilities, and sharing resources and 
knowledge (Hitt et al., 2009). Third and subsequently, firms can identify new business 
opportunities in international markets to increase profitability (Zahra et al., 2000). 
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Fourth, international diversification provides a new alternative to create more value by 
taking advantages of foreign stakeholders (Hitt et al., 2006b). Thus, I conclude that all 
these positive effects of international diversification will improve an SMNE‘s firm 
performance. 
The negative effects of international diversification such as increased governance 
costs of a high level of international diversification (e.g. Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999) 
or the liabilities of newness and foreignness at the beginning of internationalization (Lu 
& Beamish, 2004) can be mitigated in the case of SMNEs, which are at intermediate 
levels of international diversification.  
For new-style SMNEs, the government may provide support such as financing, 
personnel and international trade policies to help these firms compensate for mistakes in 
strategic actions (Rao & Tagat, 1986). While managers can learn how to effectively 
manage their international operations to reduce costs of doing business abroad (Goerzen 
& Beamish, 2003; Hitt et al., 2006a), government‘s support can also enable those firms 
to mitigate the liabilities of newness and foreignness and generate higher rents from 
international markets.  
In addition, the privatization and restructuring of state owned enterprises reached 
its peak in 1997 (De Castro & Uhlenbruck, 1997), resulting in new-style of SMNEs in 
the 21st century. New-style SMNEs with modern governance structures mainly has an 
early or moderate level of international diversification. Thus, their managers are able to 
implement international diversification by exploitating firm capabilities (Hitt et al., 
2006a). These new-style MNEs may not suffer from a high level of transaction and 
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coordination costs, and their level of international diversification are unlikely to have 
passed the international threshold to negatively influence firm performance (Hitt et al., 
1997; Hitt et al., 2006a). Therefore, for new-style SMNEs, the higher the level of 
international diversification, the greater firm performance is.  
Hypothesis 3: For a state multinational, the more deeply it is involved in 
international diversification, the more its performance will be improved. 
 
State Ownership and Firm Performance 
 The literature suggests that SOEs generally perform worse compared to other 
types of companies (e.g. Lin, 2004; Luo, 1995; Mazzolini, 1979; Tan, 2002; Xu & Wang, 
1999). Prior studies provide evidence that agency costs between governments and 
managers of SOEs are high because of the lack of effective managerial monitoring and 
control (e.g., Goldeng et al., 2008; Xu & Wang, 1999; Zou and Adams, 2008). The 
differences in the objectives between principal (governments) and agents (managers) of 
SOEs and the lack of incentives to managers to align the interest of the managers and 
that of the owners eventually lead to negative influence on firm performance (Zou and 
Adams, 2008; Goldeng et al., 2008).   
 Due to the existence of state ownership, SMNEs are certainly influenced by 
governments or supervisory agents (Luo & Tung, 2007). However, different levels of 
state ownership have divergent effects on SMNEs‘ performance. When the level of state 
ownership is low, the government may influence the governance of the SMNE through 
its state ownership. On the one hand, the negative influence of state ownership may not 
104 
 
 
104 
 
be prominent, because the voice and power of the government in corporate governance 
of SMEs is low, thus producing low intervention in other business management 
decisions. Managers of SMNEs may have increasing responsibility and autonomy to 
increase firm efficiencies and improve firm performance through corporate strategies 
(White, 2000), such as international expansion. On the other hand, the government 
desires to improve the SMNE‘s performance (Bortolotti & Perottie, 2007). Thus, when 
the SMNE needs government support to expand into international markets, the 
government will react favorably (Lin, 2004; Luo & Tung, 2007) in terms of financing, 
business relationships and international trade policies (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). With 
such support, the SMNE is able to enjoy the benefits of international diversification 
discussed earlier and then improve its performance. 
 When the level of state ownership is high, the government interferes with the 
strategic decisions and operation of an SMNE (Zou & Adams, 2008). The important top 
management team members may be directly appointed by the government, e.g. CEO and 
directors, and thus the government may directly intervene with other corporate strategic 
decisions (Fan & Wong, 2004). Subsequent bureaucratic obstacles begin to play a major 
role in terms of the state ownership impact (Luo & Tung, 2007). Thus, as the state 
holding increases, the negative impact of such holding on the SMNE‘s performance will 
surpass the positive impact, and eventually harm the firm performance. Therefore, I 
propose that  
Hypothesis 4: For a state multinational, the relationship between state ownership 
and performance is nonlinear; that is, the higher the percentage of state 
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ownership the higher its performance until a threshold; after the threshold, the 
further increase in state ownership hinders the firm’s performance. 
 
The Mediation Effect of International Diversification 
 The relationship between equity ownership, one type of mechanism of corporate 
governance, and firm performance has long been studied in the agency theory tradition 
(see Dalton et al., 2008 for a good review). Investors with large block equity in a firm 
are considered shareholders with concentrated ownership (Dalton et al., 2008). However, 
how concentrated outside ownership 6  (influences firm performance is seldom 
investigated in the agency theory literature. In building theoretical support for a 
mediated relationship, I extend previous work that suggests general linkages among 
ownership structure, international diversification and firm performance (Hitt et al., 
2006b) by providing the understanding of mediation; that is, how international 
diversification mediates the relationship between state ownership and performance.  
With concentrated ownership, shareholders have both the incentives and power to 
monitor top management teams (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Although concentrated 
ownership itself offers potential impact on firm performance (Dalton et al., 2003), the 
eventual influence depends on the strategies a firm employs.  
International strategies, as one type of important corporate strategies, are adopted 
by SMNEs to exploit and/or augment their competitive advantages, enjoy the benefits of 
international expansion and generate increased growth and profitability from 
                                                          
6  Concentrated outside ownership includes state ownership in SMNEs as per the definition of the SMNE in Chapter I. 
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international activities (Hitt et al., 2006b). Thus, international strategies influence 
SMNEs‘ overall firm performance. Governments monitor the management of SMNEs 
based on their percentage of shareholdings. Managers of SMNEs execute their functions 
by making strategic decisions on divergent types of corporate strategies (here more 
specifically, international strategies), resulting in different levels of firm performance 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This three-step process highlights the role of international 
diversification in realizing the potential influence of state ownership on firm 
performance.  
Government influences SMNEs‘ firm performance through the control over 
SMNEs during their international expansion. For instance, when a state multinational is 
state majority owned, the CEO may be directly appointed by the government as well as 
the selection of board directors (Zou & Adams, 2008). In Fan and Wong (2004)‘s sample, 
about 30% state owned firms in China have CEOs that are government officials. Due to 
the high level of government interference, when the top management team makes 
international strategies, such strategies may represent government goals, which may 
deviate from the interest of the firm (i.e., profit maximization) (Park et al., 2006), 
resulting in a negative impact on firm performance. When state ownership is low, as 
explained in Hypothesis 4, a state multinational may benefit from government support 
and improve its performance while maintaining a high level of autonomy in management 
when it expands into international markets and confronts costs of doing business aboard.  
In contrast, government may have control over SMNEs, but the potential 
influence of such ownership on firm performance depends on how the top management 
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team makes strategic decisions and implements strategies. Without taking any actions 
(i.e., implementing international expansion), the potential influence by state ownership 
will not yield any meaningful performance outcomes.  
 In conclusion, government influences corporate governance of an SMNE 
through its state ownership. Corporate governance mechanisms monitor the management 
team of an SMNE, who makes strategic decisions on and implements international 
strategies, thus affecting firm financial performance. Therefore, international 
diversification mediates the relationship between state ownership and firm performance 
by realizing its value. 
Hypothesis 5: For a state multinational, the level of international diversification 
mediates the relationship between state ownership and firm performance. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I first present a research framework based on the analysis in 
Chapter II to investigate the phenomenon of today‘s SMNEs. I narrow down the research 
following the corporate governance and strategic management streams, and focus on 
corporate governance issues of SMNEs. I analyze managerial challenges confronted by 
state multinationals in the 20th century. I suggest that, in the new global environment, the 
influence of state ownership of today‘s SMNEs on international strategies and 
performance may be specific, different from that of old style SMNEs in the 20 th century.  
This chapter has explored the influence of state ownership at different levels on 
international strategies and firm performance of SMNEs. Hypotheses are proposed 
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regarding how state ownership affects international strategies and performance, 
depending on the percentage of state shareholdings. The moderator effect of institutional 
ownership has also included. Furthermore, this chapter proposes a mediation effect of 
international strategies on the state ownership-performance relationship. 
Moreover, this chapter also investigates the influence of home country 
institutional environment, given the existence of institutional voids. I propose that in 
developing and emerging markets where institutional voids exist, the government role is 
stronger in SMNEs to affect their international strategies in terms of corporate 
governance than that in developed markets. In addition, since states of developing and 
emerging markets play a more important role in controlling management, the monitoring 
function of institutional investors in developing and emerging countries is weaker than 
that of developed countries. 
 The next chapter describes the research design used to empirically test the 
theoretical hypotheses proposed in Chapter III.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
  
This chapter describes the research design that is used to test the hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter III. I present the sample selection, measurement of variables, and 
statistical models below. 
 
Sample Selection 
The best source of data on MNEs with state ownership is Bureau van Dijk‘s  
ORBIS database, which provides detailed ownership data of over 200 countries in the 
world besides normal financial and subsidiary data. As shown in Table 4.1, as of 
November 2008, the ORBIS database lists 5,468 public quoted firms MNEs (defined as 
a firm with at least one majority-owned foreign affiliate; i.e. control in the foreign 
affiliate > 50%) that have some positive percent of state ownership7. With a minimum of 
10 percent state ownership, the number of state-controlled MNEs drops to 379 firms. 
With a minimum of 50 percent state ownership, the number of majority-state-owned 
MNEs drops to 97 firms. My reference group is the middle group of 379 state 
multinationals; I consider these the most appropriate sample of state multinationals for 
investigating my research questions.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The data were collected by November 20, 2008 and the database is updated monthly. 
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Table 4.1 
Key Definitions of Firm Type 
Public Quoted State ownership  
(>0%) 
State ownership  
(>10%) 
State ownership  
(>50%) 
Foreign Sub (>10%) 5,569 395 102 
Foreign Sub (>50%) 5,468 379 97 
Source: Bureau van Dijk‘s ORBIS database, collected on November 20, 2008. 
 
When collecting data, I do not include the banking industry due to the difference 
in accounting rules from other industries. Thus, my initial sample size is reduced to 278. 
The sample is also limited by the availability of data on the main variables involved in 
this study. For instance, missing ownership and performance data result in the reduction 
in my samples. Because of the potential problems by involving missing data when 
applying analytical methods (Schonfeld & Rindskopf, 2007), if I could not find 
information on both ownership and performance of a firm, which are the main variables 
in my initial sample, I do not include the firm in my final sample. 
Because the BVD database only has detailed ownership information for all firms 
from 2004 to 2007 and major ownership structure (i.e. top ten shareholders) from 2000 
to 2007, I conduct two tests to examine my hypotheses. In Test 1, I collect four-year data 
on ownership structure, subsidiaries and financial information 2004 to 2007 for all my 
samples. In Test 2, I collect eight-year data from 2000 to 2007, for firms with major 
ownership structure in the database. By so doing, I check the consistency of my 
analytical results.  
The international diversification literature suggests that a one-year lag best 
reflects a typical planning cycle (e.g., Geringer, Tallman, & Olsen, 2000), and I 
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accordingly incorporate a one-year lag between the independent and mediator variables 
and the dependent variables. Thus, for Test 1, I gather data for four years, from 2004 to 
2006 for independent, mediator and control variables and from 2005 to 2007 for the 
dependent variable. For Test 2, I gather data for seven years from 2000 to 2006 for 
independent, mediator and control variables and from 2001 to 2007 for the dependent 
variable. For firm level data, I gather information mainly from the BVD database. I 
collect country level data from the EIU database. In my final sample, for the three-year 
sample, I have 675 firm-year observations. For the seven-year sample, I have 1372 firm-
year observations. 
In sum, the empirical tests in Chapter III contain a set of tests on my sample and 
are conducted twice (the above Test 1 and Test 2). To investigate the impact of home 
country environment on SMNEs proposed in Hypotheses 1b and 2b, I separate my 
samples into firms from developed countries and those from developing and emerging 
markets by incorporating a dummy variable (Developed, explained in the control 
variables section). Following the definition of the United Nations, I use the Human 
Development Index (HDI) to identify developed countries. The countries left in my 
sample are categorized as developing and emerging countries. The HDI index includes 
an economic measure (national income) and other indices, and thus is a more 
comprehensive measure than other economic-condition-focused anomalies (such as 
World Bank‘s High Income Economies (HIE), and International Monetary Fund (IMF)‘s 
Advanced Economies (AE)) to identify developed countries (shown in Appendix A). 
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Sample Selection Bias  
 Because my sample is restricted and nonrandom, a key concern is that the sample 
has the potential for selection bias in terms of the relationships between independent and 
dependent variables in the present study. Heckman‘s sample selection correction model 
is adopted to address this issue. I investigate this potential bias and conclude that sample 
selection bias is not present in my sample. I empirically test for sample selection bias 
following Wooldridge‘s (1995, 2002) modified Heckman test (i.e., two-stage approach) 
for panel datasets. The identifying variable involved in the test is the industry dummy for 
natural resources, because it affects the probability of government control through state 
ownership but does not directly influence international diversification or firm 
performance. For the two measures of international diversification, the non-significant 
inverse-mills ratio (Lambda) coefficients (for the three-year sample, the breadth -1.01 
p<0.13; the depth 0.75, p<0.29; for the seven-year sample, the breadth -2.35, p<0.24; the 
depth 0.14, p<0.77) suggest that selection bias due to nonrandom selection of state 
involvement in SMNEs is not a concern for my sample.  For performance measures, I do 
not obtain censored observations to conduct the test, thus suggesting my sample 
selection is not biased on firm performance. This finding is consistent with the literature, 
which suggests that governments may interfere with SMNEs‘ operation and strategic 
decision for state objectives rather than for profits (e.g., Rao & Tagat, 1986; Lamont, 
1979; Goldeng et al., 2008). 
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Measures 
Dependent Variable  
Firm Performance  
My theoretical arguments suggest that I need to measure the extent to which state 
multinationals can obtain returns from their assets while pursuing international 
diversification. Based on previous studies on international diversification and firm 
performance, I use return on assets (ROA) (e.g., Hitt et al., 1997) and return on sales 
(ROS) (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Geringer et al., 2000) as my accounting-
based measures of firm performance and Tobin‘s q (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Hillman, 
Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007) as a market-based measure of firm performance for those 
listed SMNEs.  Tobin‘s q is a ratio comparing the market value of a firm‘s assets with the 
replacement cost and reflects the perceptions of the market on the firm‘s current and 
potential performance (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 
2007).  
Independent Variables 
State Ownership 
    I measure state ownership as the extent to which the home-country government is 
represented in the ownership of the firm by the percentage of state shares in the total 
shares of SMNEs (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). 
Institutional Ownership  
    Institutional ownership is the moderator. I measure institutional ownership as the 
extent to which institutional investors are represented in the ownership of the firm as the 
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percentage of institution-owned shares in the total shares of SMNEs (Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro, 1998; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; Tihanyi et al., 2003). 
Following Grinstein and Michaely‘s (2005) definition of institutional investors, I 
calculate the percentage of institutional ownership annually for my samples in the 
ORBIS database. 
International Diversification 
Early studies mainly investigate the depth, or scale of international 
diversification (Contractor et al., 2003; Hitt et al., 1997; Tallman & Li, 1996). Other 
scholars examine the breadth, or scope, of international expansion (Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). In this study, I 
measure both dimensions of international diversification.  
Use of multiple measures on international diversification is recommended (Hitt 
et al., 2006b; Sullivan, 1994). Following prior research, I measure the depth of 
international diversification (Depth) by combining three widely used measures: (1) the 
ratio of sales in foreign markets to the total sales (foreign sales ratio: FSTS); (2) the ratio 
of assets in foreign markets to the total assets (foreign assets ratio: FATA); (3) the ratio 
of foreign subsidiaries to the total subsidiaries (foreign subsidiary ratio: OSTS) (e.g. Hitt 
et al., 2006b; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Sullivan, 1994; Tihanyi et al. 2003). The 
results of a factor analysis suggest that these three individual variables load on the same 
factor. For the three-year sample, the factor loadings for the three measures are 0.79 
(FSTS), 0.82 (FATA), and 0.63 (OSTS); the Cronbach alpha for the combined factor is 
0.77. For the seven-year sample, the factor loadings for the three measures are 0.81 
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(FSTS), 0.84 (FATA), and 0.64 (OSTS); the Cronbach alpha for the combined factor is 
0.73. 
I measure the breadth of international diversification (Breadth) by combining two 
widely used measures: (1) the number of foreign countries (NFC); (2) the number of 
foreign subsidiaries (NFS) (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Reuer 
& leiblein, 2000; Zahra et al., 2000b). Both measures are transformed by natural log to 
guarantee the assumption for a normal distribution as a continuous dependent variable 
when testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. After transformation, I check the distribution, which 
fits well with the assumption for continuous dependent variables. The results of a factor 
analysis suggest that the two individual variables load on the same factor. For the three-
year sample, the factor loadings for the two measures are 0.88 (NFC), 0.94 (NFS); the 
alpha reliability for the factor is 0.75. For the seven-year sample, the factor loadings for 
the two measures are 0.83 (NFC), 0.92 (NFS); the alpha reliability for the factor is 0.76. 
The data on international diversification are gathered from the ORBIS database. 
Control Variables 
 Because the study is a multi-country, multi-industry investigation on proposed 
relationships, I include control variables at the firm level, industry level, and country 
level to rule out alternative explanations for my hypotheses. 
Firm-level Controls 
The data on firm-level controls are gathered from the ORBIS database. I include 
several firm-level control variables. First, I controll for organizational slack due to its 
influence on the potential for international diversification (Tan & Peng, 2003). I focus on 
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a firm‘s unabsorbed slack and measure organizational slack by the Current Ratio (CR) 
(Chen, Su & Tsai, 2007).  Second, firm size can influence international activity 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Vernon, 1977). Since larger firms may have more resources 
in order to succeed in foreign operations. Accordingly, I measure Firm size (size) as the 
total employees of a firm, and use its logarithmic transformation to account for its 
skewed distribution (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003).  
Third, I control for capital structure by leverage. I measure Leverage (leverage) 
as debt divided by total sales. Since previous studies suggest that firms may expand 
internationally to mitigate their problems in domestic markets (Doukas & Travlos, 1988), 
I include it as a control variable (Tihanyi et al., 2003). Fourth, Firm age (age) is the 
number of years since the year of a firm‘s founding. Firm age is transformed into its 
natural logarithm, following prior research (e.g., Ingram & Baum, 1997) to account for 
the possibility that the marginal value of each incremental unit of experience declines as 
overall experience increases.  
To test Hypotheses 1b and 2b, I develop a dummy variable Developed to identify 
the group of firms and then generate the interaction terms. Developed is coded 1 if the 
firm is located in a developed country, 0 if others. If the results are significant, I will 
divide my full sample into two subsamples and further conduct analysis on two 
subgroups (SMNEs in developed countries and SMNEs in developing and emerging 
countries). 
Industry-level Controls 
In addition, industries dummies are included to control industry effects for 
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SMNEs. The coding is 1 in national resources; 2 in manufacturing; 3 in services; 4 in 
high technology; and 0 in others. Therefore, I have four industry dummies to control for 
industry effects. 
Country-level Controls 
The data on country-level controls are gathered from the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) database. At the country level, I control for country size, the development 
level of a country‘s economy, and outward foreign direct investment (outward FDI) 
intensity. I use the average value within the time periods (i.e., the three-year sample and 
the seven-year sample) for the three variables in my analytical models (hierarchical 
linear modeling) (Zickar & Slaughter, 1999). 
First, I use GDP to control for country size, transformed into its natural logarithm 
(Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). Larger countries may have a larger domestic market size for 
firms to explore opportunities for higher profits and thus, outward FDI activities may not 
as many as those in smaller countries.  
Second, I use GDP per capita (GDP/capita) control for the development of a 
country‘s economy (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009) and also transform it into its natural 
logarithm. Economic conditions of countries influence firms‘ international strategies, 
such as the modes and timing of entry and location choices (Barkema & Drogendijk, 
2007; Wooster, 2006). SMNEs that are located in wealthier countries may be more 
willing to enter into international markets to exploit their competitive advantages for 
continuous growth in profitability.  
Finally, I control for OFDI/GDP, which is measured by FDI outflows as a 
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percentage of GDP. ―Higher FDI intensity may reflect better institutions and a healthier 
economy‖ (Wooster, 2006: 184). Firms in wealthier but smaller countries are more 
willing or pushed to invest in international markets than those in large but developing or 
emerging countries or those in large and wealthier countries. These investment activities 
by SMNEs in foreign countries lead to the outflow of foreign direct investment. For 
instance, OFDI/GDP in European countries is much higher than that in North America 
and most of developing and emerging markets (EIU, 2010). 
 
Statistical Models 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) models are used to test on the cross-section 
time-series panel data set with multiple (3) levels (t repeated measures, firm-level (and 
industry-level) and country-level). For the mediation effect, I adopt Baron and Kenny 
(1986)‘s technique, complemented by the Sobel test. All statistical analyses are 
conducted using STATA/SE, version 11.0. 
Panel Data Analysis 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling  
In this study, both dependent and independent variables are at the firm level in 
multiple years. For control variables, I have firm-level, industry-level, and country-level 
variables. Thus, three-level Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) models are appropriate 
to test hypotheses; i.e., t-th repeated measured nested within i-th firms, and i-th firms 
nested within j-th countries. I have industry dummies to control for industry effects. 
However, because I already have three levels of variables, and statistical power is a 
119 
 
 
119 
 
problem to implement HLM models if the number of clusters (here the number of 
industries) is lower than 15 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), four industry dummies are 
included in the second (firm) level.  
The HLM technique has its advantages to be implemented in this study. First, the 
variance of dependent variables can be partitioned between different levels in multilevel 
analysis (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007; Poston, 2002; Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002). Moreover, in the HLM context, potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity is 
not a problem as it is in the context of OLS regression, since variability in variances can 
be built into HLM models (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, Svobodina, 2004; O‘Connell 
& MaCoach, 2008). Furthermore, the HLM technique has the advantage for longitudinal 
studies because it is flexible enough to handle irregularities in data collection (Helson, 
Jones & Kwan, 2002; Osgood & Smith, 1995). Because of HLM‘s flexibility, I can 
incorporate firms that have data in different years. HLM equations per hypothesis were 
presented in Chapter V. Level 1 included time varying variables within firms, Level 2 
included industry dummies for firms, and Level 3 included country-level control 
variables. 
Statistical Power and Sample Size in HLM 
 Power in multilevel models is determined by the number of higher level dyads, 
not the number of units within the dyads (Snijders & Bosker, 1993). In other words, a 
large number of higher level dyads generate a high level of statistical power for testing 
parameters in HLM models. To increase the number of higher level dyads is the best 
way to increase the power (O‘Connell & McCoach, 2008). Raudenbush & Bryk (2002) 
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suggest a size of larger than 15 in higher level dyads. In two sets of tests, I have three 
years as three units or seven years as seven units in Level 1. In Level 2, in the three-year 
sample, I have 225 firms, while in the seven-year sample, I have 196 firms as clusters. In 
Level 3, in both samples, I have 40 countries as clusters. Therefore, data in my sample 
yield a high level of statistical power in HLM models. These 40 countries can be found 
in Appendix A. 
Missing Data 
 Generally, missing data imply potential problems with most methods of analysis. 
There are three types of missing data: (1) missing completely at random (MCAR); (2) 
missing at random (MAR); (3) nonignorable nonresponse (Little & Rubin, 2002).  The 
HLM models can easily address data that are MAR (Schonfeld & Rindskopf, 2007).  
 During the data collection, I already take efforts to reduce the involvement of 
missing data. However, because foreign assets are not always reported and then included 
in the database, the variable FATA (foreign assets ratio) has a large portion of missing 
data (for the three-year sample, 53%; for the seven-year sample, 54%). Given the large 
problems with missing data in FATA, it is necessary to deal with the issue (Wang & 
Robins, 1998). Multiple imputation is a recommended approach to deal with missing 
data (Honaker & King, 2010). I adopt STATA‘s MI, a statistical technique based on 
simulation, to handle missing data. M=20 is selected to conduct the multiple imputation. 
The second step is the completed data analysis, followed by the pooling step. Thus, a 
single result is produced through the combination of the results of M completed-data 
analyses (Little & Rubin, 2002). Option ―cmdok‖ allows estimation when estimation 
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command is not one of the typical commands (e.g., xtmixed). In the robustness tests, 
considering the advantage of the HLM technique to deal with missing data, first, I 
conduct tests without imputed FATA data to check the consistency and robustness of my 
findings. Second, I choose M=100 to check the consistency and robustness of my 
findings related to Depth. 
Endogeneity  
 The endogeneity problem may happen when changes in the outcome variable 
cause changes in the independent variables. If the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variable is not exogenous, estimated coefficients will be 
biased and inconsistent (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003). In this study, theoretically, I 
deny that the level of international diversification will influence state ownership. I also 
empirically test the potential of such problem. The instrumental variable I choose is the 
industry dummy for natural resources, which is related to government involvement, but 
not related to international diversification and firm performance (Hamilton & Nickerson, 
2003). I conduct "Durbin-Wu-Hausman" (DWH) test, the results of which suggest that 
endogeneity is not a potential problem for my study. For the three-year sample, the chi-
square is 0.94 (p<0.33) for Depth and 0.28 (p<0.59) for Breadth. For the seven-year 
sample, the chi-square is 1.23 (p<0.26) for Depth and 0.64 (p<0. 42) for Breadth. 
Therefore, the empirical results of the endogeneity test are consistent with my theoretical 
arguments and I am able to conduct further data analysis. 
Mediation Effect Analysis 
 To test the mediation effect of international diversification on the relationship 
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between state ownership and an SMNE‘s firm performance (Hypothesis 5), I adopt the 
traditional Baron & Kenny (1986)‘s technique. ―Three regression equations provide the 
tests of the linkages of the mediation model‖ (Baron and Kenny, 1986: 1177). First, the 
independent variables must significantly influence the dependent variables. Second, the 
independent variables must significantly influence the mediators. Third, the mediators 
must significantly affect the dependent variables after the influence of the independent 
variables are controlled for. If these relationships are found to be significant, it is 
included that a mediation effect exists. Therefore, I checked whether my results satisfy 
the three steps to determine a mediational relationship (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
 I further adopt Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) to investigate on the above results to 
decide what kind of the mediation effect, none, partial or full they belong to (Jose, 2008). 
I.E. there is no significant indirect effect if the Sobel test z-value is not significant 
(<1.96); the mediational relationship is partial is the Sobel test z-value is significant 
(>1.96) and the effect ratio is lower than .8; and the mediational relationship is full is the 
Sobel test z-value is significant (>1.96) and the effect ratio is over .8 (Jose, 2008). By 
doing so, I determine the type of the mediational effect. 
   
Summary 
 In sum, this chapter describes the methods that were used to select the sample 
firms, the measures for important variables, and the statistical models. Results and 
findings are provided in Chapter V. Chapter VI discusses the reported results before the 
concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 The purpose of this chapter is to report the results of the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter III. The full model of my hypotheses is presented in Figure 5.1. For the three-
year sample, I first present the descriptive and correlation statistics for the sample.  
Second, the results of HLM null models are reported. Third, I report the results of 
hypotheses. For the seven-year sample, I repeat the above three steps, but mainly present 
results without repeating detailed explanation in techniques. Next, I compare the two 
sets of tests to check the consistency of my findings. I conduct the robustness check by 
using different techniques before the summary. 
Figure 5.1 
Empirical Model of State Ownership, International Diversification and SMNE 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
State Ownership 
International 
Diversification 
-Depth 
-Breadth 
SMNE  
Performance 
      -Tobin‘s q 
-ROA   
-ROS 
Institutional Ownership  
H3 (+) 
H4 (∩) 
H1 (∩) 
H2 (+) 
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Three-year Sample Tests 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics and the correlation relationships for Level-
1 variables. Table 5.2 presents summary statistics and the correlation relationships for 
Level-3 variables. I include dependent variables in both Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. 
Dependent variables include three measures of performance (ROA, ROS, and Tobin‘s q) 
for Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 and two measures of international diversification (Depth and 
Breadth) for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b. 
Level-1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Level-1 variables include all firm-level variables, including dependent variables, 
independent variables, as well as four control variables.  
 As shown in Table 5.1, all four control variables are significantly related to the 
dependent and independent variables but to different extents, suggesting that these 
variables need to be controlled in analytic models.  
First, Tobin‘s q is significantly related to both dimensions of international 
diversification and both state ownership and institutional ownership. ROS is different 
from Tobin‘s q, since it is not significantly related to any dimension of international 
diversification, but only significantly related to ownership structure. However, ROA is 
not significantly related to international diversification and ownership structure at all. 
Second, both Breadth and Depth are significantly related to state ownership and 
institutional ownership. Further, Breadth is significantly related to Depth. Third, state 
ownership is negatively but significantly related to institutional ownership. 
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Table 5.1  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Level 1 Variables (three-year sample) 
Variable 
 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Tobin’s q 
 
1.91 3.27 
          2. ROS 
 
0.11 0.25 0.05 
         3.ROA 
 
0.07 0.09 0.28* 0.47* 
        4.Depth 
 
1.12 0.76 0.11* -0.02 -0.01 
       5. Breadth 
 
1.63 1.04 0.09* 0.02 0.03 0.45* 
      6. State Ownership 
(SO) 
 
0.29 0.22 0.12* 0.08* -0.01 -0.11* -0.09* 
     7. Institutional 
Ownership (IO) 
 
0.23 0.18 0.11* -0.10* 0.01 0.10* 0.20* -0.42* 
    8. Leverage 
 
0.56 0.18 -0.06 -0.16* -0.24* -0.09* 0.13* -0.04 0.10* 
   9. CR 
 
1.67 1.52 -0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13* -0.04 -0.46* 
  10. Age 
 
32 32.73 0.19* 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.18* -0.04 0.11* 0.07 -0.06 
 11. Size 
 
8.58 1.82 0.41* 0.07 0.09* 0.09* 0.28* 0.25* -0.04 0.21* -0.25* 0.15* 
 
 
Note: 
1. All values that are greater than 0.11 or less than -0.11 are significant at 0.05. 
2. ＋ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
3. Factor loadings of Depth: FSTS 0.81; FATA 0.83; OSTS 0.64. Cronbach alpha: 0.77.  
4. Factor loadings of Breadth: NFC 0.88; NFS 0.94. Cronbach alpha: 0.75. 
5. Both Breath and Size are transformed using logs. 
6. N=675.
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Table 5.2  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Level 3 Variables (three-year sample) 
 
Variable 
 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Tobin’s q 
 
1.91 3.27 
       2. ROS 
 
0.11 0.25 0.05 
      3.ROA 
 
0.07 0.09 0.28* 0.47* 
     4.Depth 
 
1.12 0.76 0.11* -0.02 -0.01 
    5. Breath 
 
1.63 1.04 0.09* 0.02 0.03 0.45* 
   6. GDP 
 
6.39 1.36 -0.12* -0.10* -0.29* -0.06 -0.13* 
  7. GDP/capita 
 
9.67 0.91 0.08* -0.05 -0.08* 0.05 0.27* -0.37* 
 8. OFDI/GDP 
 
29.01 29.72 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.24* 0.19* -0.44* 0.51* 
 
 
Note:  
1. All values that are greater than 0.11 or less than -0.11 are significant at 0.05. 
2. ＋ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
3. Both GDP and GDP/capita are transformed using logarithm. 
 
In sum, ownership structure has statistically significant correlations with 
international diversification. Meanwhile, performance is significantly related to both 
international diversification and ownership structure. 
Level-3 Descriptive Statistics 
 Level-3 variables include three country-level control variables. As mentioned 
above, I also included dependent variables in Table 5.2. OFDI/GDP are not significantly 
related to any measure of performance, but are significantly related to my two measures 
of international diversification. GDP is significantly related to all three measures of 
performance, but only to Depth. GDP /capita is significantly related to Tobin‘s q and 
ROA of performance, and only to Depth. 
 In sum, these results suggest that these country-level variables need to be 
controlled in analytic models. 
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Centering Variables  
I follow Irwin and McClelland (2001) by ―mean-centering all right-hand side 
variables at zero, with the exception of the dummy variables‖ (Miller & Eden, 2006: 348) 
due to the involvement of the higher-order term and the interaction in this study. The 
inclusion of higher order terms in analytical models can result in non-essential 
multicollinearity problems (Aiken & West, 1991). Such problems are caused by 
including multiple derivatives of a single independent variable in one model. Centering 
variables can reduce non--essential multicollinearity problems by changing the scaling 
of those variables involved. 
As a robustness check, I conduct a pooled estimation of the above models and 
calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF). The maximum VIF is 2.34 while the 
mean VIF is 1.76. The results show that VIF scores for each equation is far below the 
cutoff of 10, indicating no major multicollinearity problems. 
HLM Null Models 
 In this study, as explained in Chapter IV, I use three-level HLM models to test 
my hypotheses. Country-level control variables are in Level-3, industry dummies are in 
Level-2, while firm-level variables are in Level-1. For my hypotheses to be supported, 
there must be significant between Level-2 and between Level-3 variances in the outcome 
variables. Therefore, I estimate the null models in which no predictors are specified for 
any of three levels. The null model is in Table 5.3. 
  
 
 
 
128 
 
 
128 
 
Table 5.3 
Null Model 
 
Level 1  
Ytij = π 0ij + etij 
Level 2  
 π 0ij  = β00j +r0ij 
Level 3  
 β 00j = γ000 + U00j 
 
Combined  
 Ytij = γ000 + etij+r0ij +U00j 
Note: Ytij : performance or international diversification 
I estimate the null model for each of two dependent variables (three measures of 
performance and two dimensions of international diversification). Results of these null 
models are in Table 5.4. I examine the significance of between Level-2 variance and 
between Level-3 variance, and their intra class correlation (ICC), which indicates the 
proportion of variance in the outcome variables that is explained by between-subjects. 
As indicated in Table 5.4, when the outcome is Depth, both between Level-2 dyads (0.77, 
p<0.001; ICC=0.54) and between Level-3 dyads (0.44, p<0.001; IC=0.18) variances are 
statistically significant. When the outcome is Breadth, both between Level-2 dyads (0.66, 
p<0.001; ICC=0.73) and between Level-3 dyads (0.32, p<0.001; ICC=0.17) variances 
are statistically significant. Thus, the results suggest that important level-2 and Level-3 
predictors are needed to explain Depth and Breadth. 
 For the three measures of performance, when outcomes are ROA, both between 
Level-2 dyads (0.06, p<0.001; ICC=0.53) and between Level-3 dyads (0.04, p<0.001; 
IC=0.24) variances are significant. When outcomes are ROS, both between Level-2 
dyads (0.18, p<0.001; ICC=0.51) and between Level-3 dyads (0.05, p<0.05; IC=0.04) 
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variances are significant. However, when outcomes are Tobin‘s q, only between Level-2 
dyads (3.05, p<0.001; ICC=0.88) variance is significant. These results suggest that 
important level-2 and Level-3 predictors are needed to explain ROA and ROS, while 
important level-2 predictors are needed to explain Tobin‘s q. Thus, I proceed with 
hypotheses testing by using STATA multilevel modeling. 
Table 5.4 
Results of Null Models 
 Breadth of ID Depth of ID ROA ROS Tobin‘s q 
Constant 1.63*** 1.11*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 1.91*** 
sd(country) 0.44*** 0.32** 0.04*** 0.05* 0.46 
sd(firm) 0.77*** 0.66*** 0.06*** 0.18*** 3.05*** 
sd(residual) 0.55*** 0.24*** 0.04*** 0.17*** 1.10** 
LR 284.28*** 249.25*** 347.45*** 167.89*** 753.31*** 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
          ICCcountry: ρcountry=τu/(τr + τu +σ2 );  ICCfirm: ρfirm=τr/(τr + τu +σ2 ) (Hox, 2002) 
 
Tests of Hypotheses 
As discussed in Chapter IV, all hypotheses are tested in hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) because independent variables and control variables are in different 
levels. The results of null models testing also suggest that I proceed with HLM analysis, 
although for Tobin‘s q, a two-level model should be adopted rather than a three-level 
model for other dependent variables. STATA‘s XTMIXED is the appropriated procedure 
to test the hypotheses. 
Control and first-order variables are entered the first, second order variables the 
second, followed by third order variables.  
Control Variables 
Table 5.5 presents the HLM model including control variables and first-order 
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terms. As shown in Table 5.5, I include all three-level control variables and two first-
level first order terms (i.e. state ownership and institutional ownership). I fix the 
coefficient of each Level-1 firm variable in Level 2 (π 0ij , π 1ij , π 2ij , π 3ij , π 4ij , π 5ij, π 6ij ,  ), 
and the coefficient of each Level-2 variable in Level 3 (β1ij  ,β2ij,  β3ij ,β4ij,  β5ij , β6ij, β 01j, β 
021j, β 31j, β 41j) for the following two reasons. First, cross-level interaction effects are not 
the main interest in this study. Thum & Bryk (1997) suggested that ―either all 
coefficients should be fixed or the random slopes should be objects of study‖ (p105). 
Unless the estimation of the variability in the effect of differences across firms or across 
countries is the primary research question, no random effects should be specified 
(O‘Connell & McCoach, 2008). Second, adding Level-2 or Level-3 variables to predict 
lower level variables will lead to many cross-level interaction terms in the combined 
model. Thus, potential multicollinearity problems may be caused in analytical models.  
Therefore, I set the Level-2 random error term r1ij, r2ij, r3ij, r4ij, r5ij, r6ij, and the Level-
3 random error term U 10j, U 20j, U 30j, U 40j, U 50j,  U60j, U 01j, U 02j, U 03j, U 04j to be zero. In this 
case, the HLM model is called a random-intercept model indicating that only Level-2 and 
Level-3 intercepts are randomly varying at lower levels; yet lower level coefficients are 
not allowed to randomly vary at higher levels. 
 First two columns present the results of control and first-order variables while 
dependent variables are Depth and Breadth. Size and GDP/capita are significant for 
Breadth, which suggests the importance of controlling for both firm- and country- level 
variables in analytical models. 
 First two columns present the results of control and first-order variables while 
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Table 5.5 
Control Variable and First Order Term Model 
 
Level 1  
Ytij = π 0ij + π 1ij CR+ π 2ij size+ π 3ij leverage+ π 4ij age+ π 5ij SO+ π 6ij IO+ etij 
Level 2  
 π 0ij  = β00j + β01j inddum1+ β02j inddum2+ β03j inddum3+ β04j inddum4+r0ij 
π 1ij  = β10j  
π 2ij  = β20j  
π 3ij  = β30j  
π 4ij  = β40j  
π 5ij  = β50j  
π 6ij  = β60j  
Level 3  
 β 00j = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP+  U00j     
 β 10j = γ100    β 01j = γ010 
 β 20j = γ200     β 02j = γ020 
 β 30j = γ300     β 03j = γ030 
 β 40j = γ400      β 04j = γ040 
  β 50j = γ500 
   β 60j = γ600    
Combined  
 Ytij = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP + γ100 CR+ +γ200 size+ γ300 
leverage+γ400  age+ γ500 SO + γ600 IO + γ010inddum1+ γ020 inddum2+ γ030 inddum3+  γ040 
inddum4+etij+r0ij +U00j 
Note: Ytij : dependent variables (Breadth and Depth); Performance measures 
dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance. Leverage, size and GDP 
are significant for ROA and ROS, which suggests the importance of controlling for both 
firm- and country- level variables in analytical models. 
Hypothesis 1a 
 Hypothesis 1a predicts that there is a non-linear relationship between state 
ownership and international diversification. As shown in Table 5.6, state squared (a 
second-order term) is added in the HLM analytical model. As discussed in control 
variables section, I fix the coefficients of each level-1 and level-2 variables. I apply the 
HLM models twice for both Depth and Breadth. 
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Table 5.6 
Hypothesis 1a Model 
 
Level 1  
Ytij = π 0ij + π 1ij CR+ π 2ij size+ π 3ij leverage+ π 4ij age+ π 5ij SO+ π 6ij IO+ π 7ij SO2+ etij 
Level 2  
 π 0ij  = β00j + β01j inddum1+ β02j inddum2+ β03j inddum3+ β04j inddum4+r0ij 
π 1ij  = β10j  
π 2ij  = β20j  
π 3ij  = β30j  
π 4ij  = β40j  
π 5ij  = β50j  
π 6ij  = β60j  
π 7ij  = β70j  
 
Level 3  
 β 00j = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP+  U00j     
 β 10j = γ100    β 01j = γ010 
 β 20j = γ200     β 02j = γ020 
 β 30j = γ300     β 03j = γ030 
 β 40j = γ400      β 04j = γ040 
  β 50j = γ500 
   β 60j = γ600 
  β 70j = γ700 
   
Combined  
 Ytij = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP + γ100 CR+ +γ200 size+ γ300 
leverage+γ400  age+ γ500 SO + γ600 IO+ γ700 SO2 + γ010inddum1+ γ020 inddum2+ γ030 inddum3+  
γ040 inddum4 +etij+r0ij +U00j 
Note: Ytij : dependent variables: Breadth and Depth.  
The non-linear relationship is marginally significant to Depth (-1.78, p<0.10). 
The sign is negative, which suggests an inverted-U shaped relationship between state 
ownership and Depth. For Breadth, the relationship is stronger than that for Breadth (-
4.13, p<0.001) (the threshold is 26%). These results provide support for Hypothesis 1a.  
Hypothesis 2a 
Hypothesis 2a suggests that institutional ownership positively influences the 
relationship between state ownership and international expansion. Due to the 
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professional monitoring by institutional investors on corporate governance, the 
relationship between state ownership and international diversification will move upward 
and to the right, which suggests a positive impact on the state ownership-international 
diversification relationship. 
Table 5.7 
Hypothesis 2a Model 
 
Level 1  
Ytij = π 0ij + π 1ij CR+ π 2ij size+ π 3ij leverage+ π 4ij age+ π 5ij SO+ π 6ij IO+ π 7ij SO2+ π 8ij 
IO*SO+ π 9ij  IO* SO 2 + etij 
Level 2  
 π 0ij  = β00j + β01j inddum1+ β02j inddum2+ β03j inddum3+ β04j inddum4+r0ij 
π 1ij  = β10j  
π 2ij  = β20j  
π 3ij  = β30j  
π 4ij  = β40j  
π 5ij  = β50j  
π 6ij  = β60j  
π 7ij  = β70j  
π 8ij  = β80j  
π 9ij  = β90j  
 
Level 3  
 β 00j = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP+  U00j     
 β 10j = γ100    β 01j = γ010 
 β 20j = γ200     β 02j = γ020 
 β 30j = γ300     β 03j = γ030 
 β 40j = γ400      β 04j = γ040 
  β 50j = γ500 
   β 60j = γ600 
  β 70j = γ700 
 β 80j = γ800 
 β 90j = γ900 
Combined  
 Ytij = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP + γ100 CR+ +γ200 size+ γ300 
leverage+γ400  age+ γ500 SO + γ600 IO + γ700 SO 2+ γ800 IO*SO + γ900 IO*SO2+ γ010inddum1+ γ020 
inddum2+ γ030 inddum3+  γ040 inddum4+etij+r0ij +U00j 
Note: Ytij : dependent variables: Breadth and Depth of international diversification. 
As shown in Table 5.7, interaction terms (institution* state and institution*state2) 
is added in the analytical model.  
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To further understand this moderation effect, I draw a graph to show the 
influence of institutional ownership using constant and unstandardized regression 
coefficients for state and institutional ownership split at two standard deviations above 
and below the mean (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). As shown in Figure 5.2, the 
relationship between state ownership and the level of international diversification in 
SMNEs with a low level of institutional ownership (-1SD) is similar to the result of H1a 
(the threshold point of state ownership is 0.27). By contrast, with a high level of 
institutional ownership (+1SD), the proposed inverted U-shaped relationship between 
state ownership and the level of international diversification moves upward and to the 
right (the threshold point of state ownership is 0.37), which supports a positive 
moderator effect of institutional ownership.  
Figure 5.2 
The Moderator Effect of Institutional Ownership 
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Table 5.8  
Results for H1a and H2a 
 
 Control Variables 
and First-Order 
Hypothesis 1a Hypothesis 2a 
 Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  
Fixed effects:       
Constant  -0.52 
(1.70) 
-3.56*** 
(1.02) 
-0.55 
(1.18) 
-4.10** 
(1.23) 
-0.81 
(0.51) 
-3.52** 
(1.21) 
CR -0.06 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Leverage 0.21 
(0.31) 
0.51 
(0.30) 
0.22 
(0.31) 
0.40 
(0.30) 
0.22* 
(0.11) 
0.52＋ 
(0.30) 
Size  0.05 
(0.04) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.27** 
(0.08) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
Age  -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
GDP 0.04 
(0.07) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
GDP/capita 0.04 
(0.09) 
0.42** 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.42** 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.42** 
(0.13) 
OFDI/GDP 0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.06＋ 
(0.03) 
0.07＋ 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
 
SO -0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.78* 
(0.33) 
1.24 
(0.91) 
2.30* 
(0.96) 
-1.46＋ 
(0.83) 
1.42* 
(0.69) 
IO (0.16) 
(0.19) 
0.85** 
(0.26) 
0.24 
(0.22) 
0.81** 
(0.26) 
0.58 
(0.70) 
0.82* 
(0.40) 
SO2    -1.78＋ 
(1.07) 
-4.13*** 
(1.20) 
-0.15 
(0.36) 
-2.67*** 
(0.82) 
IO*SO     -0.39 
(1.02) 
-2.31* 
(1.14) 
IO*SO2     2.21 
(1.68) 
4.98* 
(2.43) 
Industry dummy included 
Random effects:       
Sd(country) 0.24 0.36** 0.24 0.36** 0.24 0.35** 
Sd(firm) 0.68*** 0.65*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.69*** 0.65*** 
Sd(residual) 0.24*** 0.52*** 0.24*** 0.51*** 0.24*** 0.51*** 
Wald Chi-
square 
20.31＋ 105.98*** 22.97＋ 119.38*** 24.18 126.24*** 
LR 235.23*** 201.57*** 216.82*** 205.10*** 221.68*** 209.73*** 
 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
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As discussed in control variables section, I fix the coefficients of each level-1 and 
level-2 variables. I apply the HLM models twice for both Depth and Breadth. 
Table 5.8 presents the results. For Depth, the interaction term is positive but not 
statistically significant (2.21, n.s.), and the second-order term (state squared) is not 
statistically significant (-0.15, n.s.) as well. For Breadth, the interaction term is positive 
and statistically significant (4.98, p<0.05), while the second-order term (state squared) is 
still statistically significant (-2.67, p<0.01). These results suggest that Hypothesis 2a is 
supported and institutional investors do help to improve the quality of corporate 
governance of SMNEs as proposed. 
Institutional Environment Tests 
Considering the differences in their institutional environment, I propose Hypotheses 
1b and 2b in Chapter III to test whether the influence of corporate governance differs for 
two sub sample groups (SMNEs in developed countries and SMNEs in developing and 
emerging countries). 
Hypothesis 1b 
Hypothesis 1b predicts that the relationship between state ownership and 
international diversification is stronger for SMNEs in developing and emerging 
economies than for those in developed economies. Since the dummy variable Developed 
positively influences the state ownership-international diversification relationship, I 
further conduct data analysis on two subsamples.  
The model for H1a still applies for the test of H1b, but using two subsamples 
(SMNEs in developed countries and SMNEs in developing and emerging countries) 
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rather than the full sample. As discussed in control variables section, I fix the 
coefficients of each level-1 and level-2 variables. I apply the HLM models twice for the 
two dimensions of international diversification (Breadth and Depth). 
Table 5.9 presents the results. For SMNEs in developed countries, no support is 
found for Depth (-0.93, n.s.) and Breadth (-1.15, n.s.). For SMNEs in developing and 
emerging countries, the inverted U-shaped relationship is statistically significant for 
Breadth (-3.62, p<0.001) (the threshold point is 32%) while marginally and statistically 
significant for Depth (-2.90, p<0.10). Thus, the overall coefficients imply a weaker state 
ownership-international diversification relationship for SMNEs from developed 
countries. 
Next, following the technique suggested by Cohen et al. (2003) and used by Hitt 
et al. (2004), I examine differences between the two subsamples (SMNEs in developed 
countries and SMNEs in developing and emerging countries) on the state ownership—
international diversification relationship. I compare the coefficients obtained in my HLM 
analyses by adjusting the standard errors of coefficients (Adj STE) using the following 
formula: 
Adj STE = (STD DV / STD IV) ×STE IV 
where STD refers to standard deviation, STE refers to standard error, and 
Breadth and Depth are the dependent variables. Z score is calculated to compare 
coefficients across the two subgroups using the following formula:  
z=(Bi Developed –BiDeveloping)/((ADJ STEiDeveloped)2 –(ADJ STEiDeveloping)2)1/2  
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Table 5.9  
Results for Hypothesis 1b 
 
 Developed  Developing  
 Control Variables 
and First-Order 
Second Order Control Variables 
and First-Order 
Second Order 
 Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  
Fixed 
effects: 
        
Constant  -2.17 
(3.47) 
-0.19 
(1.16) 
-2.50 
(3.84) 
-0.12 
(0.49) 
2.78 
(2.63) 
-1.89** 
(0.54) 
1.01 
(2.56) 
-2.64** 
(1.16) 
CR -0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.09＋ 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.09＋ 
(0.05) 
-.08 
(0.07) 
0.14** 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.05) 
Leverage 0.02 
(0.32) 
0.21 
(0.38) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.38) 
0.21 
(0.43) 
0.91* 
(0.46) 
0.30 
(0.45) 
0.48 
(0.43) 
Size  0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.28** 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
Age  -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
GDP 0.05 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.28) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
0.20 
(0.37) 
0.35** 
(0.14) 
GDP/capit
a 
0.18 
(0.43) 
-0.36 
(0.87) 
0.21 
(0.39) 
-0.36 
(0.88) 
-0.31 
(0.68) 
0.57* 
(0.26) 
-0.11 
(0.68) 
0.79** 
(0.25) 
OFDI/GD
P 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.10** 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.11** 
(0.03) 
 
 
SO -0.16 
(0.56) 
-0.09 
(0.24) 
0.51 
(1.17) 
1.38 
(1.50) 
-0.39 
(1.08) 
-0.84 
(1.02) 
2.12 
(1.37) 
2.35 
(1.82) 
IO  0.57 ＋ 
(0.30) 
0.68* 
(0.34) 
0.59* 
(0.30) 
0.69* 
(0.34) 
0.10 
(0.32) 
1.21** 
(0.40) 
0.11 
(0.33) 
1.23** 
(0.40) 
SO2   -0.93 
(1.41) 
-1.15 
(0.99) 
  -2.90＋ 
(1.74) 
-3.62** 
(1.41) 
 
Industry dummy included 
Random 
effects: 
        
Sd(country
) 
0.38 0.36** 0.38 0.49** 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.05 
Sd(firm) 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.55*** 
Sd(residua
l) 
0.21*** 0.52*** 0.21*** 0.46*** 0.26*** 0.57*** 0.26*** 0.56*** 
Wald Chi-
square 
15.09 61.32*** 12.48 64.37*** 15.22* 47.86**
* 
18.70* 85.16**
* 
LR 123.24**
* 
112.64**
* 
118.63**
* 
138.32**
* 
101.96**
* 
62.81**
* 
88.20**
* 
51.37**
* 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
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where B refers to coefficients produced in the HLM analyses and z, the test 
statistic, is normally distributed. 
The results presented show that the coefficients for Depth are negative and only 
marginally significant in the subsample of SMNEs in developing and emerging countries. 
Furthermore, the relevant z statistic is positive and statistically significant (z=2.91; 
p<0.05), suggesting that for SMNEs in developing and emerging countries, state 
ownership has a stronger impact on Depth for those in developed countries. 
Moreover, the results show that the coefficients for Breadth are negative and only 
significant in the subsample of SMNEs in developing and emerging countries. 
Furthermore, the relevant z statistic is positive and statistically significant (z=2.51; 
p<0.05), suggesting that for SMNEs in developing and emerging countries, state 
ownership has a stronger impact on Breadth for those in developed countries. 
These results suggest that Hypothesis 1b is supported. 
Hypothesis 2b 
Hypothesis 2b predicts that the moderating effect of institutional ownership is 
weaker for SMNEs in developing and emerging economies than for those in developed 
economies. In another word, the higher the level of home country institutional 
environment, the greater the moderation effect of institutional ownership. Since 
Developed positively influences the state ownership-ID relationship, I further conduct 
data analysis on two subsamples.  
  
140 
 
 
140 
 
Table 5.10  
Results for Hypothesis 2b 
 
 Developed  Developing  
 Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  
Fixed effects:     
Constant  -1.34 
(2.90) 
0.28 
(1.06) 
0.92 
(1.56) 
-2.31** 
(1.14) 
CR -0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.05) 
Leverage 0.24 
(0.47) 
0.22 
(0.38) 
0.30 
(0.45) 
0.44 
(0.43) 
Size  0.10＋ 
(0.06) 
0.29** 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
Age  -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02＋ 
(0.01) 
GDP 0.04 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.14) 
0.20 
(0.39) 
0.32* 
(0.14) 
GDP/capita 0.11 
(0.42) 
-0.37 
(0.62) 
-0.12 
(0.68) 
0.73** 
(0.25) 
OFDI/GDP 0.03 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
 
 
SO 0.53 
(1.44) 
0.83 
(0.56) 
-2.09 
(1.43) 
1.87 
(1.48) 
IO 1.22 
(1.11) 
1.73＋ 
(1.02) 
0.42 
(0.97) 
1.27 
(1.40) 
SO2 -1.26＋ 
(0.74) 
-1.65* 
(0.82) 
-3.47 
(2.52) 
-3.62＋ 
(2.17) 
IO*SO -0.74 
(1.26) 
-0.42 
(0.89) 
1.99 
(2.56) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
IO*SO2 8.39** 
(3.11) 
8.16** 
(2.98) 
-2.51 
(3.48) 
-2.33 
(3.84) 
 
Industry dummy included 
Random effects:     
Sd(country) 0.24 0.54** 0.07 0.03 
Sd(firm) 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.63*** 0.56*** 
Sd(residual) 0.24*** 0.45*** 0.26*** 0.56*** 
Wald Chi-
square 
22.97＋ 67.85*** 19.52＋ 85.75*** 
LR 216.82*** 139.69*** 84.48*** 52.86*** 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
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The model for H2a still applies for the test of H2b, but using two subsamples 
(SMNEs in developed countries and SMNEs in developing and emerging countries) 
rather than the full sample. As discussed in control variables section, I fix the 
coefficients of each level-1 and level-2 variables. I apply the HLM models twice for the 
two dimensions of international diversification (Breadth and Depth). 
Table 5.10 presents the results. Support is found for Depth (8.39, p<0.01) and for 
the breadth (8.16, p<0.01) for SMNEs from developed countries. No support is found for 
SMNEs from developing and emerging countries on either Depth (-2.51, n.s.) and 
Breadth (-2.33, n.s.) Thus, the overall coefficients imply that institutional ownership 
functions much better for SMNEs from developed countries than that for SMNEs from 
developing and emerging countries. 
Table 5.11 
Coefficients Comparison for H1b and H2ba 
 
 Developed Developing & Emerging  
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Z 
H1b       
Depth  -0.93 1.41 -2.90＋ 1.74 2.91* 
Breadth  -1.15 0.99 -3.62*** 1.41 2.51* 
H2b      
Depth  8.39** 3.11 -2.51 3.48 1.99* 
Breadth  8.16** 2.98 -2.33 3.84 1.91＋ 
a. Two-tail tests 
b. ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
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The results presented in Table 5.11 show that the coefficients for Depth are 
positive and significant in the subsample of SMNEs in developed countries. Furthermore, 
the relevant z statistic is positive and statistically significant (z=1.99; p<0.05), 
suggesting that for SMNEs in developed countries, institutional ownership has a stronger 
moderation effect on the state ownership -- Depth relationship than for those in 
developing and emerging countries. 
Moreover, the results presented in Table 5.11 show that the coefficients for 
Breadth are positive and significant in the subsample of SMNEs in developed countries. 
Furthermore, the relevant z statistic is positive and marginally significant (z=1.91; 
p<0.10), suggesting that for SMNEs in developed countries, institutional ownership has 
a stronger moderation effect on the state ownership -- Breadth relationship than for those 
in developing and emerging countries. 
These results suggest that Hypothesis 2b receives support. 
Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that international diversification positively affects firm 
performance.  
As shown in Table 5.12, both Breadth and Depth are added in the analytical 
model. As discussed in control variables section, I fix the coefficients of each level-1 and 
level-2 variables. I apply the HLM models three times for the three measures of firm 
performance (Tobin‘s q, ROA and ROS).  
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Table 5.12 
Hypothesis 3 Model 
 
Level 1  
Ytij = π 0ij + π 1ij CR+ π 2ij size+ π 3ij leverage+ π 4ij age+ π 5ij SO+ π 6ij IO+ π 7ij Breadth + π 
8ij Depth + etij 
Level 2  
 π 0ij  = β00j + β01j inddum1+ β02j inddum2+ β03j inddum3+ β04j inddum4+r0ij 
π 1ij  = β10j  
π 2ij  = β20j  
π 3ij  = β30j  
π 4ij  = β40j  
π 5ij  = β50j  
π 6ij  = β60j  
π 7ij  = β70j  
π 8ij  = β80j  
 
Level 3  
 β 00j = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP+  U00j     
 β 10j = γ100    β 01j = γ010 
 β 20j = γ200     β 02j = γ020 
 β 30j = γ300     β 03j = γ030 
 β 40j = γ400      β 04j = γ040 
  β 50j = γ500 
   β 60j = γ600 
  β 70j = γ700 
 β 80j = γ800   
Combined  
 Ytij = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP + γ100 CR+ +γ200 size+ γ300 
leverage+γ400  age+ γ500 SO + γ600 IO+ γ700 Breadth + γ800 Depth + γ010inddum1+ γ020 inddum2+ 
γ030 inddum3+  γ040 inddum4+etij+r0ij +U00j 
Note: Ytij : dependent variables—three measures of firm performance. 
No support is found for Tobin‘s q. Only marginally and statistically significant 
support is found by Depth effect on ROA (0.02, p<0.10) while both Depth (0.03, p<0.05) 
and Breadth (0.02, p<0.05) provide support for ROS. These results provide partial 
support for Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that there is a non-linear relationship between state 
ownership and firm performance.  
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As shown in Table 5.13, state squared is added in the analytical model. As 
discussed in control variables section, I fix the coefficients of each level-1 and level-2 
variables. I apply the HLM models three times for the three measures of firm 
performance (Tobin‘s q, ROA and ROS). 
No support is found for Tobin‘s q. Only marginally significant support is found 
for ROA (-1.43, p<0.10) and for ROS (-3.59, p<0.10). These results suggest that 
Hypothesis 4 receives only partial and marginal support. 
Table 5.13 
Hypothesis 4 Model 
 
Level 1  
Ytij = π 0ij + π 1ij CR+ π 2ij size+ π 3ij leverage+ π 4ij age+ π 5ij SO+ π 6ij IO+ π 7ij SO2 + etij 
Level 2  
 π 0ij  = β00j + β01j inddum1+ β02j inddum2+ β03j inddum3+ β04j inddum4+r0ij 
π 1ij  = β10j  
π 2ij  = β20j  
π 3ij  = β30j  
π 4ij  = β40j  
π 5ij  = β50j  
π 6ij  = β60j  
π 7ij  = β70j  
 
Level 3  
 β 00j = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP+  U00j     
 β 10j = γ100    β 01j = γ010 
 β 20j = γ200     β 02j = γ020 
 β 30j = γ300     β 03j = γ030 
 β 40j = γ400      β 04j = γ040 
  β 50j = γ500 
   β 60j = γ600 
  β 70j = γ700 
   
Combined  
 Ytij = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP + γ100 CR+ +γ200 size+ γ300 
leverage+γ400  age+ γ500 SO + γ600 IO+ γ700 SO2 + γ010inddum1+ γ020 inddum2+ γ030 inddum3+  
γ040 inddum4+etij+r0ij +U00j 
Note: Ytij : dependent variables—three measures of firm performance. 
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Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 proposes a mediation effect of international diversification on the 
relationship between state ownership and an SMNE‘s firm performance. ―Three 
regression equations provide the tests of the linkages of the mediation model‖ (Baron 
and Kenny, 1986: 1177). First, the independent variables must significantly influence the 
dependent variables. Second, the independent variables must significantly influence the 
mediators. Third, the mediators must significantly affect the dependent variables after 
the influence of the independent variables are controlled for. If these relationships are 
found to be significant, it is included that a mediation effect exists (Baron and Kenny, 
1986).  
As shown in Table 5.14, state squared, both the depth and the breadth of 
international diversification are added in the analytical model. As discussed in control 
variables section, I fix the coefficients of each level-1 and level-2 variables. I apply the 
HLM models three times for the three measures of firm performance (Tobin‘s q, ROA 
and ROS). 
None of the three steps to identify the existence of mediation effect is significant, 
because no support for the relationship between international diversification and Tobin‘s 
q, as well as the relationship between state ownership and firm performance. Thus, the 
meditational effect of international diversification does not exist for Tobin‘s q.  
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        Table 5.14 
     Hypothesis 5 Model 
 
Level 1  
Ytij = π 0ij + π 1ij CR+ π 2ij size+ π 3ij leverage+ π 4ij age+ π 5ij SO+ π 6ij IO+ π 7ij SO2+ π 8ij 
Breadth + π 9ij Depth + etij 
Level 2  
 π 0ij  = β00j + β01j inddum1+ β02j inddum2+ β03j inddum3+ β04j inddum4+r0ij 
π 1ij  = β10j  
π 2ij  = β20j  
π 3ij  = β30j  
π 4ij  = β40j  
π 5ij  = β50j  
π 6ij  = β60j  
π 7ij  = β70j  
π 8ij  = β80j  
π 9ij  = β90j  
 
Level 3  
 β 00j = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP+  U00j     
 β 10j = γ100    β 01j = γ010 
 β 20j = γ200     β 02j = γ020 
 β 30j = γ300     β 03j = γ030 
 β 40j = γ400      β 04j = γ040 
  β 50j = γ500 
   β 60j = γ600 
  β 70j = γ700 
 β 80j = γ800 
 β 90j = γ900   
Combined  
 Ytij = γ000 + γ001 GDP+ γ002GDP/capita + γ003 OFDI/GDP + γ100 CR+ +γ200 size+ γ300 
leverage+γ400  age+ γ500 SO + γ600 IO+ γ700 SO2+ γ800 Breadth+ γ900Depth+ γ010inddum1+ γ020 
inddum2+ γ030 inddum3+  γ040 inddum4+etij+r0ij +U00j 
Note: Ytij : dependent variables—three measures of firm performance. 
Table 5.15 presents the results. For ROA, we see marginally significant support 
for the international diversification-performance relationship and for the state-ownership 
relationship. When the meditational effect is tested, state squared loses its significance, 
while Breadth is significant (0.02, p<0.05).  
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Table 5.15 Results of Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 
 Controls and First Order H3 H4 H5 
 Tobin‘s q ROA ROS Tobin‘s q ROA ROS Tobin‘s q ROA ROS Tobin‘s q ROA ROS 
Fixed effects:             
Constant  6.55 
(4.10) 
0.19* 
(0.09) 
0.48 
(0.29) 
3.41 
(3.29) 
0.41＋ 
(0.21) 
0.57＋ 
(0.30) 
6.59＋ 
(4.07) 
0.18* 
(0.09) 
0.47 
(0.29) 
3.36 
(3.34) 
0.38* 
(0.19) 
0.58＋ 
(0.30) 
CR -0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.29 
(0.42) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
Leverage -0.39 
(0.66) 
-0.21** 
(0.07) 
-0.28** 
(0.08) 
0.68* 
(0.29) 
-0.27** 
(0.08) 
-0.26** 
(0.07) 
-0.36 
(0.66) 
-0.22** 
(0.07) 
-0.27** 
(0.09) 
-0.67 
(0.78) 
-0.25** 
(0.09) 
-0.26** 
(0.08) 
Size  -0.15 
(0.10) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.19 
(0.31) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.14 
(0.10) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Age  -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
GDP -0.30 
(0.20) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.03＋ 
(0.02) 
-0.76 
(0.54) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.30 
(0.19) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.27 
(0.22) 
-0.18 
(0.20) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
GDP/capita -0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.30 
(0.63) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
OFDI/GDP -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02＋ 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
SO -0.37 
(0.59) 
-0.04＋ 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.10 
(0.26) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-1.71 
(1.68) 
0.49 
(0.64) 
1.22 
(1.20) 
-2.36 
(2.49) 
-0.21 
(0.14) 
-0.11 
(0.20) 
IO 1.08＋ 
(0.59) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
3.20＋ 
(1.83) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
1.11＋ 
(0.60) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
1.08 
(0.72) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
SO2        -1.70 
(1.44) 
-1.43＋ 
(0.77) 
-3.59＋ 
(2.13) 
-2.84 
(3.67) 
0.22 
(0.18) 
0.08 
(0.20) 
Breadth    0.11 
(0.26) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
   0.04 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
Depth    0.38 
(0.46) 
0.02＋ 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
   0.16 
(0.21) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
Industry Dummies Included 
Random effects:             
Sd(country)  0.01 0.04  0.03 0.05*  0.01 0.03  0.02 0.05* 
Sd(firm) 3.03*** 0.06*** 0.18*** 5.07*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 3.03*** 0.06*** 0.19*** 1.45*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
Sd(residual) 1.11*** 0.04*** 0.17*** 2.11*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 1.11*** 0.04*** 0.17*** 0.95*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 
Wald Chi-
square 
16.72＋ 168.61*** 27.36** 18.36 65.96*** 39.93**
* 
19.84＋ 171.05*** 29.19** 17.63 68.22**
* 
39.95*** 
LR 335.51*** 310.81*** 162.27*** 211.32*** 129.04*** 71.77**
* 
388.78*** 312.86*** 160.72*** 116.62*** 124.28*
** 
73.89*** 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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For ROS, the results are stronger. We see significant support for the international 
diversification-performance relationship and marginally significant support for the state-
ownership relationship. When the meditational effect is tested, state squared lost its 
significance, while both Breadth is significant (0.02, p<0.05) and Depth is significant 
(0.03, p<0.05). These results suggested that Hypothesis 5 is partially supported. 
I further adopt Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) to investigate on the above results to 
decide what kind of the mediation effect, none, partial or full they belong to (Jose, 2008). 
I.e. there is no significant indirect effect if the Sobel test z-value is not significant 
(<1.96); the mediational relationship is partial is the Sobel test z-value is significant 
(>1.96) and the effect ratio is lower than .8; and the mediational relationship is full if the 
Sobel test z-value is significant (>1.96) and the effect ratio is over .8 (Jose, 2008). Only 
for ROS, the meditational effects were significant. For Depth, Z=1.66, suggesting a 
marginally significance. For Breadth, Z=2.14, suggesting a significance at p<0.05. In 
terms of magnitude, an effect ratio of .02 (indirect effect over total effect) by Depth for 
ROS and 0.04 by Breadth for ROS suggests a partial mediational relationship. 
 
Seven-year Sample Tests 
I only briefly introduce the results of the seven-year sample with the intension of 
comparison with the results of the three-year sample. I expect insights and differences 
due to the different time periods (short-term and long-term). HLM models for the seven-
year sample are the same as those for the three-year sample. Thus, I only include results 
tables and explain differences in findings based on the comparison. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.16 presents summary statistics and the correlation relationships for 
Level-1 variables. Table 5.17 presents summary statistics and the correlation 
relationships for Level-3 variables. I include dependent variables in both Table 5.16 and 
Table 5.17. Dependent variables include three measures of performance (ROA, ROS, 
and Tobin‘s q) for Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 and two measures of international 
diversification (Depth and Breadth) for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b. 
Level-1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Level-1 variables include all firm-level variables, including dependent variables, 
independent variables, as well as four control variables. The mean of institutional 
ownership here (0.21) is lower than that in the three-year sample (0.23). 
 As shown in Table 5.16, four control variables are significantly related to 
dependent and independent variables but to different extent, suggesting that these 
variables need to be controlled in analytic models.  
First, Tobin‘s q is significantly related to both dimensions of international 
diversification and both state ownership and institutional ownership. ROS is different 
from Tobin‘s q, since it is not significantly related to any dimension of international 
diversification, but only significantly related to ownership structure. However, ROA is 
not significantly related to international diversification and ownership structure at all.  
Second, both Breadth and Depth are significantly related to state ownership and 
institutional ownership. Further, Breadth is significantly related to Depth. Third, state 
ownership is negatively but significantly related to institutional ownership. 
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Table 5.16  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Level 1 Variables (seven-year sample) 
Variable 
 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Tobinq 
 
1.74 2.71 
          2. ROS 
 
0.07 0.32 0.09* 
         3.ROA 
 
0.05 0.21 0.16* 0.62* 
        4.Depth 
 
1.02 0.76 0.07* -0.06 -0.07 
       5. Breath 
 
1.43 1.07 0.09* 0.02 0.02 0.51* 
      6. State Ownership 
(SO) 
 
0.29 0.24 -0.12* 0.09* -0.04 -0.16* -0.09* 
     7. Institutional 
Ownership (IO) 
 
0.21 0.18 0.12* -0.05 0.01 0.09* 0.10* -0.39* 
    8. Leverage 
 
0.56 0.23 -0.12* -0.27* -0.33* 0.08* 0.14* 0.02 0.03 
   9. CR 
 
1.81 2.31 0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.09* -0.16* 0.01 -0.32* 
  10. Age 
 
40 42 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.21* -0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.08 
 11. Size 
 
8.45 1.78 -0.11* 0.07 0.07 0.09* 0.30* 0.25* -0.04 0.22* -0.22* 0.20* 
 
 
Note: 
1. Both Breath and Size are transformed using logs. 
2. All values that are greater than 0.11 or less than -0.11 are significant at 0.05. 
3. ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
4. Factor loadings of Depth: FSTS 0.79; FATA 0.82; OSTS 0.63. Cronbach alpha: 0.73.  
5. Factor loadings of Breadth: NFC 0.83; NFS 0.92. Cronbach alpha: 0.76. 
6. Maximum VIF=3.50, Mean VIF=2.13. 
7. N=1372.
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In sum, ownership structure has statistically significant correlations with 
international diversification. Meanwhile, performance is significantly related to both 
international diversification and ownership structure. 
Level-3 Descriptive Statistics 
Level-3 variables include three country-level control variables. As mentioned 
above, I also included dependent variables in Table 5.17. OFDI/GDP are not 
significantly related to any measure of performance, but significantly related to two 
measures of international diversification. GDP is significantly related to all three 
measures of performance, but only to Depth. GDP /capita is significantly related to 
Tobin‘s q and ROA of performance, and only to Depth. 
In sum, these results suggest that these country-level variables need to be 
controlled in analytic models. 
Centering Variables  
I center my variables to reduce non—essential multicollinearity problems by 
changing the scaling of those variables involved. As a robustness check, I conduct a 
pooled estimation of the above models and calculate the variance inflation factors (VIF). 
After centering my variables, I check the potential multicollinearity problem for each of 
equations. The  maximum VIF is 3.50 while the mean VIF is 2.13. Thus, I conclude that 
the multicollinearity is not an issue for my seven-year sample. 
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Table 5.17  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Level 3 Variables (seven-year sample) 
 
Variable 
 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Tobinq 
 
1.74 2.71 
       2. ROS 
 
0.07 0.32 0.09* 
      3.ROA 
 
0.05 0.21 0.16* 0.62* 
     4.Depth 
 
1.02 0.76 0.07* -0.06 -0.07 
    5. Breath 
 
1.43 1.07 0.09* 0.02 0.02 0.51* 
   6. GDP 
 
6.31 1.35 -0.12* -0.10* -0.29* -0.06 -0.13* 
  7. GDP/capita 
 
9.58 0.95 0.08* -0.05 -0.08* 0.05 0.27* -0.37* 
 8. OFDI/GDP 
 
26.98 27.71 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.24* 0.19* -0.42* 0.56* 
 
 
Note:  
1. Both GDP and GDP/capita are transformed using logs. 
2. All values that are greater than 0.11 or less than -0.11 are significant at 0.05. 
3. ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
 
 
HLM Null Model 
I estimate the null model for each of two dependent variables (three measures of 
performance and two dimensions of international diversification). Results of these null 
models are in Table 5.18. I examined the significance of between Level-2 variance and 
between Level-3 variance, and their intra class correlation (ICC), which indicates the 
proportion of variance in the outcome variables that is explained by between-subjects. 
As indicated in Table 5.18, when the outcome is Depth, both between Level-2 dyads 
(0.74, p<0.001; ICC=0.49) and between Level-3 dyads (0.44, p<0.001; IC=0.17) 
variances are significant. When the outcome is Breadth, both between Level-2 dyads 
(0.65, p<0.001; ICC=0.72) and between Level-3 dyads (0.29, p<0.001; ICC=0.14) 
variances are significant. Thus, the results suggest that important level-2 and Level-3 
predictors are needed to explain Depth and Breadth. 
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For the three measures of performance, when the outcome is ROA, both between 
Level-2 dyads (0.05, p<0.001; ICC=0.06) and between Level-3 dyads (0.05, p<0.001; 
IC=0.06) variances are significant. When the outcome is ROS, both between Level-2 
dyads (0.14, p<0.001; ICC=0.18) and between Level-3 dyads (0.08, p<0.05; IC=0.06) 
variances are significant. However, when the outcome is Tobin‘s q, only between Level-
2 dyads (2.06, p<0.05; ICC=0.63) variance is significant. These results suggest that 
important level-2 and Level-3 predictors are needed to explain ROA and ROS, while 
important level-2 predictors are needed to explain Tobin‘s q. thus, I proceed with 
hypotheses testing by using STATA multilevel modeling. 
Table 5.18 
Results of Null Models (seven-year sample) 
 Breadth of ID Depth of ID ROA ROS Tobin‘s q 
Constant 1.38*** 1.03*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 1.73*** 
Sd(country) 0.44*** 0.29** 0.05*** 0.08* 0.29 
Sd(firm) 0.74*** 0.65*** 0.05*** 0.14*** 2.06* 
Sd(residual) 0.61*** 0.29*** 0.19*** 0.28*** 1.59** 
LR 696.52.28*** 500.93*** 57.97*** 158.65*** 862.60*** 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
Hypothesis 1a 
Table 5.19 present the results. As shown in Table 5.19, state squared is not 
significant to Depth (-0.78, n.s.). The sign is negative, which suggests an inverted-U 
shaped relationship between state ownership and Depth. For Breadth, the relationship is 
stronger than that for the breadth (-3.14, p<0.001) (the threshold for Breadth is 33%). 
These results suggest that Hypothesis 1 is partially supported.  
Hypothesis 2a 
Table 5.19 presents the results. For Depth, the interaction term is positive and 
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significant (3.24, p<0.05), while the second-order term (state squared) is not significant 
(-0.34, n.s.). For Breadth, the interaction term is positive and significant (3.72, p<0.05), 
while the second-order term (state squared) is still significant (-3.02, p<0.01). For 
Breadth, when the institutional ownership is low (-1SD), the relationship is similar to 
that in H1a (the threshold is 37%). When the institutional ownership is high (+1SD), the 
relationship moves upward and to the right (the threshold is 48%). These results suggest 
that Hypothesis 2a is supported and institutional investors do help to improve the quality 
of corporate governance of SMNEs as proposed. 
Hypothesis 1b 
For SMNEs in developed countries, no support is found for Depth (-1.04, n.s.) 
but strong support is found for Breadth (-1.62, p<0.05). For SMNEs in developing and 
emerging countries, the inverted U-shaped relationship is significant for Breadth (-3.83, 
p<0.001) (the threshold point is 34%) while not significant for Depth (-0.49, n.s.).  
Next, following the technique suggested by Cohen et al. (2003) and used by Hitt 
et al. (2004), I examine differences between the two subsamples (SMNEs in developed 
countries and SMNEs in developing and emerging countries) on the state ownership—
international diversification relationship.  
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Table 5.19 
     Results for H1a and H2a (seven-year sample) 
 
   H1a H2a 
 Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  
Fixed 
effects: 
      
Constant  -1.04 
(1.44) 
-3.96*** 
(1.50) 
-1.09 
(1.28) 
-4.47** 
(1.38) 
-1.03 
(1.27) 
-4.38** 
(1.52) 
CR 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Leverage 0.06 
(0.11) 
0.22 
(0.23) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
0.23 
(0.23) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
0.24 
(0.23) 
Size  0.07 
(0.04) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.26** 
(0.08) 
0.06＋ 
(0.03) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
Age  -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
GDP 0.03 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
GDP/capita 0.05 
(0.11) 
0.45** 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.46** 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.46** 
(0.14) 
OFDI/GDP 0.06 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.07＋ 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
 
SO -0.12 
(0.16) 
-0.30 
(0.21) 
-0.59 
(0.46) 
2.09* 
(0.96) 
0.39 
(0.27) 
2.27*** 
(0.54) 
IO 0.35* 
(0.15) 
0.92** 
(0.29) 
0.33* 
(0.15) 
0.71** 
(0.26) 
1.10* 
(0.49) 
2.20*** 
(0.49) 
SO*IO     -0.29 
(0.75) 
-1.93* 
(0.86) 
SO2    -0.78 
(0.59) 
-3.14*** 
(1.02) 
-0.34 
(0.29) 
-3.02** 
(0.96) 
IO*SO2     3.24* 
(1.43) 
3.72** 
(1.72) 
Industry dummy included 
Random 
effects: 
      
Sd(country) 0.22 0.35** 0.24 0.35** 0.22 0.36** 
Sd(firm) 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.67*** 0.64*** 0.66*** 0.64*** 
Sd(residual) 0.29*** 0.59*** 0.24*** 0.59*** 0.29*** 0.58*** 
Wald Chi-
square 
23.91* 155.89*** 27.20* 188.37*** 30.19* 204.50*** 
LR 423.23*** 458.07*** 216.82*** 464.72*** 417.82*** 467.04*** 
 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.20  
   Results for Hypothesis 1b (seven-year sample) 
 
 Developed  Developing & Emerging 
 Control Variables 
and First-Order 
Second Order Control Variables 
and First-Order 
Second Order 
 Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  
Fixed 
effects: 
        
Constant  -2.18 
(2.83) 
-3.68 
(2.51) 
-2.91 
(3.69) 
-2.73 
(1.75) 
0.29 
(0.40) 
-2.81* 
(1.42) 
0.50 
(0.56) 
-3.17* 
(1.56) 
CR 0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
Leverage 0.35 
(0.36) 
0.26 
(0.28) 
0.37 
(0.36) 
0.29 
(0.28) 
-0.11 
(0.23) 
0.09 
(0.37) 
-0.10 
(0.25) 
0.48 
(0.43) 
Size  0.12* 
(0.05) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.29*** 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.19*** 
(0.05) 
Age  -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
GDP -0.04 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.14) 
-0.03 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.34) 
0.22 
(0.16) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.17 
(0.16) 
GDP/capit
a 
1.08 
(0.81) 
0.58 
(0.87) 
1.15 
(0.82) 
0.66 
(0.88) 
-0.06 
(0.47) 
0.54* 
(0.27) 
-0.06 
(0.48) 
0.45 
(0.29) 
OFDI/GD
P 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.12** 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
 
SO -0.43 
(0.31) 
-0.09 
(0.24) 
1.20＋ 
(0.67) 
1.35* 
(0.63) 
-0.09 
(0.28) 
-0.13 
(0.33) 
-0.97 
(0.71) 
2.63*** 
(0.79) 
IO  0.79** 
(0.24) 
0.68* 
(0.34) 
0.71** 
(0.25) 
0.61** 
(0.21) 
0.09 
(0.19) 
1.20*** 
(0.39) 
0.09 
(0.19) 
0.98** 
(0.30) 
SO 
squared  
  -1.04 
(0.81) 
-1.62** 
(0.76) 
  -0.49 
(0.36) 
-
3.83*** 
(0.83) 
 
Industry dummy included 
Random 
effects: 
        
Sd(countr
y) 
0.41** 0.51** 0.41** 0.52** 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.20 
Sd(firm) 0.63*** 0.73*** 0.64*** 0.72*** 0.65*** 0.51*** 0.66*** 0.52*** 
Sd(residua
l) 
0.28*** 0.52*** 0.28*** 0.52*** 0.30*** 0.66*** 0.30*** 0.64*** 
Wald Chi-
square 
22.18** 86.00*** 24** 97.93*** 16.02 62.00**
* 
18.70 82.96**
* 
LR 175.68**
* 
368.79**
* 
177.00**
* 
379.61**
* 
233.97**
* 
71.44**
* 
228.93**
* 
78.94**
* 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.20 presents the results. The results presented in Table 5.21 show that the 
coefficients for Depth are only negative and marginally significant in the subsample of 
SMNEs in developing and emerging countries. Furthermore, the relevant z statistic is 
negative and not significant (z=-0.19; n.s.). 
Moreover, the results presented in Table 5.21 show that the coefficients for 
Breadth are only negative and significant in the subsample of SMNEs in developing and 
emerging countries. Furthermore, the relevant z statistic is positive and statistically 
significant (z=2.01; p<0.05), suggesting that for SMNEs in developing and emerging 
countries, state ownership has a stronger impact on Breadth for those in developed 
countries. 
These results suggest that Hypothesis 1b is partially supported. 
Table 5.21 
Coefficients Comparison for H1b and H2b (seven-year sample)a 
 
 Developed Developing & Emerging  
 Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Z 
H1b       
Depth  -1.04 0.81 -0.49 0.36 -0.19 
Breadth  -1.41** 0.79 -3.83*** 0.87 2.01* 
H2b      
Depth  6.05** 1.66 3.24* 1.49 1.96* 
Breadth  6.98** 2.39 8.42** 2.50 -0.75 
a. Two-tail tests 
b. ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.22 
Results for Hypothesis 2b (seven-year sample) 
 
 Developed  Developing & 
Emerging  
 Depth  Breadth  Depth  Breadth  
Fixed effects:     
Constant  -3.04 
(2.37) 
-3.71 
(4.82) 
-1.09 
(1.46) 
-5.13** 
(1.49) 
CR 0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
Leverage 0.36 
(0.37) 
0.26 
(0.28) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
-0.03 
(0.36) 
Size  0.12* 
(0.05) 
0.29*** 
(0.10) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
Age  -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
GDP -0.03 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
0.23 
(0.16) 
GDP/capita 1.14 
(0.81) 
0.68 
(0.89) 
0.06 
(0.18)  
0.52⁺ 
(0.27) 
OFDI/GDP -0.02 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.07⁺ 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
     
SO 1.36⁺ 
(0.78) 
1.54* 
(0.70) 
1.11 
(0.78) 
3.06*** 
(0.87) 
IO 1.46* 
(0.57) 
1.43* 
(0.58) 
1.48* 
(0.68) 
0.67* 
(0.30) 
SO2 -0.37 
(0.42) 
-1.65** 
(0.51) 
-0.34 
(0.30) 
-1.74*** 
(0.45) 
IO*SO -2.02 
(2.27) 
-2.30* 
(0.98) 
-0.29 
(0.75) 
-1.76 
(1.55) 
IO*SO2 6.05*** 
(1.66) 
6.98** 
(2.39) 
3.07* 
(1.49) 
8.42** 
(2.50) 
     
Industry dummy included  
Random effects:     
Sd(country) 0.41** 0.54*** 0.12 0.17*** 
Sd(firm) 0.64*** 0.72*** 0.65*** 0.53*** 
Sd(residual) 0.28*** 0.52*** 0.30*** 0.63*** 
Wald Chi-square 26.44** 90.29*** 22.84* 97.32*** 
LR 189.71*** 365.38*** 209.22*** 84.07*** 
 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
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Hypothesis 2b 
Table 5.22 presents the results. Support is found for Depth (6.05, p<0.001) and 
for Breadth (6.98, p<0.05) for SMNEs from developed countries. Also, support is found 
for SMNEs from developing and emerging countries on either Depth (3.07, p<0.05) and 
Breadth (8.42, p<0.01).  
I also conduct analysis on the coefficients differences between two subsamples. 
The results presented in Table 5.22 show that the coefficients for Depth are positive and 
significant in both subsamples of SMNEs. Furthermore, the relevant z statistic is positive 
and statistically significant (z=1.96; p<0.05), suggesting that for SMNEs in developed 
countries, institutional ownership has a stronger moderation effect on the state ownership 
-- Depth relationship than for those in developing and emerging countries. 
Moreover, the results presented in Table 5.22 show that the coefficients for 
Breadth are both positive and significant in the subsample of SMNEs in developed 
countries. Furthermore, the relevant z statistic is not significant (z=-0.75; n.s.), 
suggesting that we may not conclude that for SMNEs in developed countries, 
institutional ownership has a stronger moderation effect on the state ownership -- 
Breadth relationship than for those in developing and emerging countries. 
These results suggest that Hypothesis 2b is partially supported. 
Hypothesis 3 
As shown in Table 5.23, significant support is found for Tobin‘s q (0.13, p<0.05). 
Only marginally significant support is found by Depth for ROA (0.02, p<0.10) while 
both Depth (0.02, p<0.10) and Breadth (0.02, p<0.05) provide support for ROS. These 
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results suggest that Hypothesis 3 is partially supported. 
Hypothesis 4 
As shown in Table 5.23, no support is found for ROA. Only marginally 
significant support was found for ROS (-1.71, p<0.10) and Tobin‘s q for (-3.02, p<0.05). 
These results suggest that Hypothesis 4 is partially supported. 
Hypothesis 5 
As shown in Table 5.23, because no support for the relationship between 
international diversification and Tobin‘s q, as well as the relationship between state 
ownership and firm performance, the meditational effect of international diversification 
does not exist for Tobin‘s q.  
For ROA, we see marginally significant support for the international 
diversification-performance relationship and for the state ownership--performance 
relationship. When the meditational effect was tested, state squared loses its significance, 
while Breadth is significant (0.02, p<0.05).  
For ROS, the results are stronger. We see significant support for the international 
diversification-performance relationship and marginally significant support for the state-
ownership relationship. When the meditational effect is tested, state squared loses its 
significance, while both Breadth is significant (0.02, p<0.05) and Depth is significant 
(0.03, p<0.05). These results suggested that Hypothesis 5 is partially supported. 
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Table 5.23 Results for Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 (seven-year sample) 
 Controls and first order H3 H4 H5 
 Tobin‘s q ROA ROS Tobin‘s q ROA ROS Tobin‘s q ROA ROS Tobin‘s q ROA ROS 
Fixed effects:             
Constant  2.70 
(3.04) 
0.33* 
(0.15) 
0.59* 
(0.28) 
2.08 
(2.89) 
0.86 
(0.53) 
0.56 
(0.34) 
2.77 
(3.16) 
0.33* 
(0.15) 
0.59 
(0.28) 
2.14 
(2.68) 
0.37 
(0.37) 
0.57＋ 
(0.30) 
CR -0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Leverage -0.15 
(0.47) 
-0.17** 
(0.05) 
-0.36** 
(0.10) 
-0.57 
(0.49) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.22** 
(0.07) 
-0.12 
(0.38) 
-0.17** 
(0.05) 
-0.37** 
(0.11) 
-0.58 
(0.54) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.22** 
(0.07) 
Size  -0.07 
(0.07) 
0.01** 
(0.00) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01＋ 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01＋ 
(0.00) 
Age  -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
GDP -0.24＋ 
(0.14) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.17 
(0.16) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.24 
(0.15) 
-0.02＋ 
(0.01) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.17 
(0.14) 
-0.03＋ 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
GDP/capita 0.17 
(0.24) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
OFDI/GDP -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
SO -0.37 
(0.59) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.28 
(0.36) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.13** 
(0.05) 
2.86* 
(1.28) 
-0.22 
(0.35) 
0.71 
(0.83) 
-0.28 
(0.47) 
-0.13 
(0.17) 
-0.22* 
(0.11) 
IO 1.08＋ 
(0.59) 
0.05＋ 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.78* 
(0.36) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
2.29** 
(0.68) 
0.05＋ 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.74* 
(0.37) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
SO2       -3.02* 
(1.48) 
-0.45 
(0.74) 
-1.71＋ 
(0.93) 
-0.53 
(0.63) 
0.11 
(0.22) 
0.12 
(0.14) 
Breadth    0.13* 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
   0.13* 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
Depth    0.06 
(0.11) 
0.03＋ 
(0.02) 
0.02＋ 
(0.01) 
   0.06 
(0.12) 
0.03＋ 
(0.02) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
Industry dummy included 
Random 
effects: 
            
Sd(country)  0.05*** 0.06***  0.07** 0.04*  0.05*** 0.06**  0.08*** 0.04* 
Sd(firm) 2.18*** 0.04*** 0.13*** 5.07*** 0.04* 0.08*** 2.20*** 0.04*** 0.14*** 1.40*** 0.04* 0.08*** 
Sd(residual) 1.59*** 0.13*** 0.22*** 2.11*** 0.20*** 0.08*** 1.59*** 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.71*** 0.20*** 0.09*** 
Wald Chi-
square 
37.96** 58.33*** 75.46** 34.36** 35.45** 62.04*** 41.83*** 59.86*** 76.80** 25.93* 33.87*** 62.69*** 
LR 748.45*** 67.36*** 182.36*** 211.32*** 68.51*** 80.92*** 749.42*** 75.00*** 178.51*** 311.85*** 80.71*** 78.95*** 
 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
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For ROS, the meditational effect is significant for the breadth. For the breadth, 
Z=2.05, suggesting a significance at p<0.05. In terms of magnitude, an effect ratio of 
0.04 by Breadth for ROS suggests a partial mediational relationship. For Tobin‘s q, the 
meditational effect is marginally significant for the breadth. For Breadth, Z=1.77, 
suggesting a significance at p<0.10. In terms of magnitude, an effect ratio of 0.14 by 
Breadth for Tobin‘s q suggests a partial mediational relationship. 
 
Results Comparison of the Three-year and Seven-year Samples 
Table 5.24 
Summary of Results (HLM Models)*  
 
 Three-Year Sample Seven-Year Sample 
Hypotheses Depth  Breadth  Tobin‘s q ROA Depth  Breadth  Tobin‘s 
q 
ROA 
1a SO--ID Marginally  
Supported 
Supported   Not 
Supported 
Supported   
1b 
Developed 
on H1 
Supported Supported    Not  
supported 
Supported    
2a IO Not 
Supported 
Supported   Supported Supported   
2b  
Developed 
on H2 
Supported Marginally  
Supported  
  Supported Not  
Supported 
  
3ID--
Performance 
  Not 
Supported 
Partially & 
Marginally  
Supported 
  Partially 
Supported 
Partially & 
Marginally  
Supported 
4 SO-- 
Performance 
  Not 
Supported 
Marginally 
Supported 
  Supported Not 
Supported 
5 Mediation 
of ID 
  Not 
Supported 
Partially 
Supported 
  Partially  
Supported 
Not 
Supported 
*Differences between the three-year sample and the seven-year sample are highlighted in the three-year sample results 
Based on the comparison of results (Table 5.24), I compare the results of the 
three-year sample with those of the seven-year sample and identify differences in results 
for most hypotheses. More specifically, first, we see relatively stronger relationship 
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between state ownership and international diversification (H1 and H2) in the three-year 
sample than that in the seven-year sample. institutional environments. Second, for the 
three-year sample, we see the negative sign, though not significant, for the moderation 
effect of institutional environment for SMNEs in developing and emerging countries, 
which may provide evidence that in developing countries, due to the existence of 
institutional voids, institutional investors may negatively influence the function of state 
ownership on the SMNE‘s international diversification rather than positively, which is 
well acknowledged in the literature and supported by the subsample in developed 
countries.  
Third, for Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, in the seven-year sample, Tobin‘s q obtains 
support for proposed relationships, while in the three-year sample, no support at all for 
this measure of performance. Fourth, for Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, for ROS, consistent 
results are found on proposed relationships. Compared to ROA, ROS is a ratio with two 
―flow‖ measures, which reduces the influence of inflation and accounting standards 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009). 
I further discuss the insights from the results comparison in the next chapter. 
 
Robustness Tests 
        I run several additional analyses, not presented here for the sake of brevity, to 
check the consistency and robustness of my findings.  
First, I conduct GLS models to deal with cross-sectional time-series data, and 
results are briefly shown in Table 5.25.  
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Table 5.25 
Coefficients Comparison for H1b and H2b (GLS Models)a 
 
 Developed Developing & Emerging  
Three-Year 
Sample 
Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Z 
H1b       
Depth  -0.58 0.83 -3.47* 1.58 1.82
﹢
 
Breadth  -0.11 0.89 -3.13* 1.56 2.89* 
H2b      
Depth  4.56 3.42 3.56 3.08 0.83 
Breadth  1. 47 1.87 12.30*** 3.44 -2.25* 
Seven-Year 
Sample 
     
H1b       
Depth  -0.38 0.88 -1.06 0.95 0.77 
Breadth  -1.02 0.78 -1.67* 0.85 0.96 
H2b      
Depth  4.63* 2.34 3.51﹢ 1.96 1.39 
Breadth  2.68 1.75 5.48* 2.36 -1.85
﹢
 
a. Two-tail tests 
b. Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001 
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More results are shown in Table 5.26. Compared to the results of the HLM 
technique, for the first two sets of hypotheses, the results of the GLS technique provide 
weaker results. For instance, using the GLS model, no support at all is found on the 
differences of institutional environment in terms of the moderation effect of institutional 
ownership. In contrast, using the HLM model, we identify generally significant impact 
of home country institutional environment on the effect of institutional ownership. 
Further, using GLS model in both three-year and seven-year samples, I find significant 
impact of institutional ownership (H2b) in SMNEs in developing countries while not 
significant in SMNEs in developed countries, which is opposite to the findings in using 
HLM technique. 
For the relationships with performance, for the three-year sample, the results of 
two techniques are consistent in terms of the significance level. However, using the GLS 
model, for the seven-year sample, no support is found for the international 
diversification—Tobin‘s q relationship and for the state ownership— Tobin‘s q 
relationship, while support is found for the state ownership—ROA. The results are 
opposite from those using the HLM model. Given the advantages of the HLM technique 
and the characteristics of my data (multilevel), I may expect that the estimates using the 
HLM technique are more accurate and more preferable. 
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Table 5.26 
GLS Results (three-year sample) 
 
 H1a (Developed) 
H1b 
(Developing) 
H2a (Developed) 
H2b 
(Developing) 
H3 H4 H5 
 Breadth Depth  Depth  Depth  Breadth Depth Depth  Depth Tobin‘s 
q 
ROA ROS Tobin‘s 
q 
ROA ROS Tobin‘s 
q 
ROA ROS 
SO 1.56 
(0.96) 
-1.15 
(0.92) 
-0.54 
(1.41) 
1.91 
(1.30) 
1.78﹢ 
(1.05) 
-1.19 
(0.92) 
-0.85 
(1.26) 
-2.10 
(1.33) 
-0.72 
(0.51) 
-0.06 
(-.04) 
-0.10 
(0.23) 
-1.65 
(2.11) 
0.24 
(0.15) 
0.28 
(0.22) 
-2.01 
(1.92) 
-0.24 
(0.14) 
-0.21 
(0.20) 
IO 0.21 
(0.28) 
0.26 
(0.24) 
0.25 
(0.38) 
0.54
﹢ 
(0.32) 
1.44﹢ 
(0.82) 
0.76 
(0.69) 
0.43 
(0.65) 
0.47 
(0.34) 
2.99 
(2.08) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
1.07﹢ 
(0.62) 
-0.26 
(0.21) 
-0.13
﹢ 
(0.07) 
1.02 
(0.80) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
SO2 -3.44** 
(1.23) 
-1.82
＋ 
(0.97) 
-0.58 
(0.83) 
-
3.47* 
(1.67) 
-1.87** 
(0.55) 
-0.81 
(0.61) 
-0.64 
(0.77) 
-0.32 
(0.70) 
   -1.63 
(2.25) 
-
0.51* 
(0.25) 
-0.45
﹢ 
(0.26) 
-1.66 
(2.14) 
-0.25 
(0.18) 
-0.15 
(0.25) 
SO*IO     -1.01 
(1.68) 
-0.75 
(1.42) 
-0.13 
(0.74) 
-1.68 
(2.15) 
         
IO*SO2     4.53＋ 
(2.75) 
3.51 
(2.38) 
4.56 
(3.42) 
3.56 
(3.08) 
         
Depth         0.28 
(0.37) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02
﹢ 
(0.01) 
   0.12 
(0.21) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02
﹢ 
(0.01) 
Breadth         0.14 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
   0.67 
(0.39) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02
﹢ 
(0.01) 
R-
square 
0.37 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.38 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.19 0.18 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.09 0.27 0.18 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.27 
GLS Results (seven-year sample) 
 
 H1a (Developed) 
H1b 
(Developing) 
H2a (Developed) 
H2b 
(Developing) 
H3 H4 H5 
 Breadth Depth  Depth  Depth  Breadth Depth Depth  Depth Tobin‘s 
q 
ROA ROS Tobin‘s 
q 
ROA ROS Tobin‘s 
q 
ROA ROS 
SO 0.68 
(0.45) 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
0.79 
(0.67) 
0.63 
(0.72) 
0.71 
(0.55) 
3.07 
(5.28) 
0.87 
(0.84) 
-1.74* 
(0.78) 
-1.24 
(1.35) 
-
0.14* 
(0.06) 
-
0.16** 
(0.05) 
1.51 
(1.01) 
0.73 
(0.56) 
0.37* 
(0.17) 
-1.76 
(1.50) 
-0.27
﹢ 
(0.16) 
-
0.32* 
(0.12) 
IO -0.11 
(0.15) 
0.32 
(0.16) 
0.56* 
(0.27) 
0.22 
(0.19) 
0.81﹢ 
(0.47) 
1.01* 
(0.40) 
0.97 
(0.61) 
1.72** 
(0.66) 
0.07 
(1.01) 
-
0.13* 
(0.06) 
-
0.12** 
(0.04) 
1.85** 
(0.48) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.09
﹢ 
(0.05) 
0.32 
(1.04) 
-0.11
﹢ 
(0.06) 
-
0.11* 
(0.05) 
SO2 -1.41** 
(0.58) 
-0.51 
(0.65) 
-0.38 
(0.88) 
-1.06 
(0.95) 
-0.65* 
(0.26) 
-1.46 
(0.81) 
-1.34* 
(0.48) 
-0.29
﹢ 
(0.44) 
   -1.41 
(1.53) 
-
2.52* 
(1.28) 
-2.21
﹢ 
(1.26) 
-4.83 
(3.60) 
-0.17 
(0.20) 
-0.21 
(0.14) 
SO*IO     4.15﹢ 
(2.17) 
3.83* 
(1.80) 
-1.64 
(1.31) 
0.27 
(0.92) 
         
IO*SO2     2.97* 
(1.50) 
2.80* 
(1.33) 
4.63* 
(2.34) 
3.51﹢ 
(1.96) 
         
Depth         1.32* 
(0.61) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
   1.34* 
(0.66) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Breadth         0.18 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
   -0.17 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
R-square 0.27 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.25 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.27 
Note: ＋ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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More results are shown in Table 5.27. I also compare results of two samples in 
Table 5.28. 
 
Table 5.28 
Summary of Results (GLS Models)*   
 
 Three-year Sample Seven-year Sample 
Hypotheses Depth  Breadth  Tobin‘s q ROA Depth  Breadth  Tobin‘s q ROA 
1a SO--ID Marginally  
Supported 
Supported   Not 
Supported 
Not 
Supported 
  
1b 
Developed 
on H1 
Marginally 
Supported 
Supported    Not  
supported 
Not 
Supported  
  
2a IO Not 
Supported 
Marginally 
Supported 
  Supported Supported   
2b  
Developed 
on H2 
Not 
Supported 
Not 
Supported  
  Not 
Supported 
Not  
Supported 
  
3ID--
Performance 
  Not 
Supported 
Partially 
& 
Marginally  
Supported 
  Partially 
Supported 
Partially  
Supported 
4 SO-- 
Performance 
  Not 
Supported 
Marginally  
Supported 
  Not 
Supported 
Supported 
5 Mediation 
of ID 
  Partially 
& 
Marginally  
Supported 
Marginally  
Supported 
  Partially  
Supported 
Partially  
Supported 
*Differences between the three-year sample and the seven-year sample are highlighted in the three-year sample results 
Second, as discussed in Chapter IV, the HLM technique is able to deal with 
missing data easily (Schonfeld & Rindskopf, 2007). I re-conduct a full set of tests on 
Depth without the imputed foreign assets ratio data. Although coefficients had minor 
changes, the significance levels do not change for all my hypotheses, which provide 
strong support for the multiple imputation method to deal with missing data (Honaker & 
King, 2010). Moreover, I choose M=20 to re-impute my data on foreign assets. The 
results are consistent to my previous findings, which provide further support to the 
multiple imputation method to handle missing data. 
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Third, I study whether individual dimensions (FSTS, OSTS, and FATA) of Depth 
have differential influence on firm performance and were influenced by ownership 
structure. For the three-year sample, results of these partial analyses showed, first, that 
FATA is significantly influenced by state ownership, while OSTS and FSTS are not. 
Second, institutional ownership only significantly moderates the relationship between 
state ownership and OSTS. Third, the three dimensions have different influence on 
SMNEs‘ firm performance.  
For the seven-year sample, results of these partial analyses show, first, that FATA 
is marginally significantly influenced by state ownership, OSTS is significantly affected 
by state ownership, while FSTS is not. Second, institutional ownership moderates the 
relationship between state ownership and OSTS as well as the relationship between state 
ownership and FATA. Third, the three dimensions have different influence on three 
measures of SMNEs‘ firm performance. 
 
Summary 
 Overall, the results support most of the hypotheses. The combination of these 
results suggests that state ownership does influence SMNEs‘ international strategies. 
Moreover, these results demonstrate that state ownership affects firm performance 
somewhat differently, considering different perspectives of firm performance. Further, 
institutional environments really matter when examining the influence of state 
ownership on SMNEs‘ international diversification and firm performance. A further 
discussion of these empirical results is presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the propositions proposed in Chapter II and the results 
presented in the previous chapter. The first section discusses the unit of analysis --- the 
state multinational as a hybrid organizational form. The second section discusses the 
results regarding the impact of state ownership on international diversification, the 
moderator effect of institutional ownership as well as the influence of home country 
institutional environment. The third section discusses the results regarding the impact of 
state ownership and international diversification on the SMNE‘s performance before the 
summary. 
 
The State Multinational as a Hybrid Organizational Form 
       Chapter II clarifies key features of my unit of analysis—the state multinational. 
The state multinational has two parents—the SOE and the MNE. Literature has 
acknowledged that the SOE and the MNE has different key features as organizational 
forms as shown in the comparison in Chapter II. The state multinational has its own 
development path along several decades and experienced different economic and 
political periods. While previous studies investigated old-style SMNEs (e.g., 
Anastassopoulos et al., 1987; Mazzolini, 1980; Negandhi et al., 1986a), this present 
study examines new-styles SMNEs‘ development and evolution.  
       Compared to private MNEs, new-style SMNEs are less profit oriented (goals), 
confront a higher level of corporate governance complexity, have a lower level of 
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autonomy in establishing organizational structure, and experience a lower level of 
uncertainty. Moreover, because of the internal and external complexity, SMNEs have 
more difficulty in making strategic decisions on corporate strategies and organizational 
changes, leading less efficient outcomes. I conclude the state multinational as a hybrid 
organizational form, having key features different from both parents (the SOE and the 
MNE). Therefore, my propositions enrich organization theory by adding new content to 
organizational forms. 
 
The Impact of State Ownership on International Diversification 
Chapter III proposes that state ownership is non-linearly related to the state 
multinational‘s international diversification. The higher the state ownership in an SMNE, 
the higher the level of international diversification until a threshold, after which the 
increase in state ownership hinders the SMNE‘s international diversification. By 
examining the sample of listed SMNEs, these arguments receive overall support in the 
current study. My study shows that an SMNE can achieve a high level of international 
diversification at a moderate level of state ownership, but a higher control from the 
government may weaken the firm‘s internationalization. However, the results of the 
three-year sample are stronger than those of the seven-year sample. For the seven-year 
sample (2000-2007), state ownership only has significant impact on the breadth of 
international diversification, while for the three-year sample (2004-2007), state 
ownership significantly influences both dimensions (depth and breadth) of international 
diversification. Such difference may suggest that the SMNE has gradually changed its 
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goals to be more profit-oriented and thus invests in international expansion for 
profitability, which supports my arguments in terms of the influence of changes in the 
global environment on the development of the SMNE.  
Chapter III also proposes that institutional ownership moderates the state 
ownership-international diversification relationship in such a way that the higher the 
percentage of institutional ownership, the stronger the relationship between state 
ownership and the SMNE‘s international diversification. Data employed in this study 
(the three-year sample and the seven-year sample) provide strong support for these 
arguments. Institutional ownership is one of mechanisms to monitor and control 
managers for effective corporate governance according to the agency theory literature 
(Dalton et al., 2008). Because institutional investors pursue investment returns and 
encourage international expansion (Tihanyi et al., 2003), the involvement of institutional 
ownership may be able to mitigate the negative effect of state ownership on the SMNE‘s 
international diversification. The results of the seven-year sample (significant on both 
dimensions of international diversification) are stronger than those of the three-year 
sample (significant only on the breadth of international diversification). The difference 
suggests that institutional investors may have different orientations in the short term and 
in the long term to select their investment portfolio in terms of international expansion. I 
do not further identify different types of institutional investors and their interests in 
international expansion, but such results provide evidence to support the argument 
proposed by Tihanyi et al. (2003) that different types of institutional investors may have 
different purposes when investing in MNEs. Overall, my findings support my arguments 
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and the agency theory literature. Thus, this study introduces state ownership into the 
international context, contributing to the agency theory literature by making agency 
theory more generalizable to different types of investors and to different contextual 
situations. 
The influence of home country institutional environment is also considered when 
examining the above relationships. Chapter III proposes that the state ownership—
international diversification relationship will be stronger for SMNEs in developing and 
emerging countries than those in developed countries. Developed countries mainly have 
well-established institutions while institutional voids exist in developing and emerging 
countries, resulting in difference of SMNEs for government support and the substitution 
of institutions by government support. Data in the three-year sample provide stronger 
support (both dimensions of international diversification receives support) to the 
influence of home country institutional environment on the proposed relationship than 
data in the seven-year sample (only the breadth of international diversification receives 
support). Thus, we see the significant impact of institutional environment on the state 
ownership—international diversification relationship as well as improvement in the 
institutional environments during the dramatic changes in the global environment. 
Moreover, regarding the moderator effect of institutional ownership, the 
relationship is stronger in developed countries than in developing and emerging 
countries. Data employed in this study (the three-year sample and the seven-year sample) 
provide strong support for these arguments. Although for the seven year sample, the 
relationship is stronger only on the depth of international diversification, the moderation 
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effect of institutional ownership is significant on both subsamples. These findings give 
additional evidence on the function of institutional ownership as an effective mechanism 
to help improve the quality of corporate governance. Such findings also tell us that 
institutional investors can function better in a more established institutional environment 
than in a less established institutional environment.  
Consideration of home country institutional environments on the state 
ownership—international diversification relationship enriches our understanding of 
institutions. With different levels of institutional environment, both state ownership and 
institutional investors function differently to influence an SMNE‘s international 
strategies. My findings contributes to the literature on home country institutional 
analysis. 
 
The Impact of State Ownership and International Diversification on Firm 
Performance 
Further hypotheses are proposed on the relationship between state ownership and 
the SMNE‘s performance and the relationship between international diversification and 
the SMNE‘s performance. First, the relationship between state ownership and 
performance is non linear, considering both the positive effect of state ownership and the 
negative influence of state ownership on the SMNE‘s performance. By examining the 
sample on three measures of firm performance (Tobin‘s q, ROA and ROS), these 
arguments receive overall support in the present study. For ROS, the relationship is 
marginally significant. For ROA, the relationship is only marginally significant for the 
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three-year sample, and not supported at all for the seven-year sample. For Tobin‘s q, the 
relationship is not significant for the three-year sample, and supported for the seven-year 
sample.  
Second, I propose that the higher the level of international diversification, the 
higher the SMNE‘s performance. Data employed in the present study provide overall 
support. For the accounting-based measures, the proposed relationship receives support 
for both the three-year sample and the seven-year sample. However, for the three-year 
sample, the market-based measure does not receive support, while for the seven-year 
sample, only breadth of international diversification significantly influences the SMNE‘s 
Tobin‘s q. Compared to the state ownership-international diversification relationship, the 
weaker results on the relationship with the SMNE‘s performance provides evidence that 
the state may not pursue profits when it involves in the SMNE‘s corporate governance 
and operations. 
Lastly, the results of the mediation effect answers the question that how the state 
influences an SMNE‘s performance; that is, the state monitors and affects the 
management through concentrated ownership, and the management makes international 
strategies to affect firm performance. The results provide support for the traditional steps 
of testing the mediational relationship. Only if the three steps are satisfied, we can 
suggest the existence of the mediational relationship. For instance, for the three-year 
sample, because the relationship between international diversification and Tobin‘s q and 
that between state ownership and Tobin‘s q are not significant, I do not find significance 
on the mediation effect of international diversification on the state ownership—Tobin‘s q 
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relationship. For the seven-year sample, because the relationship between state 
ownership and ROA is not significant, I do not find significance on the mediation effect 
of international diversification on the state ownership—ROA relationship. Moreover, for 
ROS, the mediational relationship is supported for the three-year sample and the seven-
year sample. For ROA, partial support (Depth) is found in the three-year sample, while 
for Tobin‘s q, partial support (Breadth) is found in the seven-year sample. 
 The results of the mediation effect of international diversification on the state 
ownership — performance relationship suggest that international strategies act as 
mediators. In other words, the state monitors and controls top management team of 
SMNEs. Managers make strategic decisions on international expansion. Through such 
strategic implementation, the influence of state ownership on firm performance is 
realized. Therefore, my findings contribute to the agency theory literature by providing 
support on the input-process-outcome framework. 
 
Summary 
This chapter discusses the theoretical propositions regarding the key features of 
the SMNE as a hybrid organizational form and the empirical evidence regarding the 
impact of state ownership on the SMNE‘s international diversification and firm 
performance. Through the comparison of the SOE and the MNE as organizational forms, 
I identify the differences between these two and suggest that when compared to the 
MNE, the new-style SMNE has its own features as a hybrid organizational form that is 
different from its parents. 
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My empirical findings suggest that the existence of state ownership of SMNEs 
influences the level of international diversification and firm performance. Moreover, 
institutional ownership functions as an effective mechanism to improve the quality of 
corporate governance of SMNEs. In addition, home country institutional environment 
significantly moderates the relationship between state ownership and international 
diversification. 
Further, the results on the influence of state ownership on firm performance show 
that the relationships are not as strong as those on the influence of state ownership and 
the SMNE‘s international diversification. However, support is found on the state 
ownership—performance relationship as well as the international diversification—
performance relationship, thus providing evidence of a mediation effect of international 
strategies.   
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This concluding chapter summarizes the theoretical and empirical evidence of 
the present study, points out its implications for future research on SMNEs, and 
discusses limitations. I also discuss implications for managers to guide their practice as 
suggested by my findings. I conclude this chapter by presenting limitations of this study. 
 
Conclusions 
Great changes in the global economy such as globalization, collaboration, and 
changes in home country institutional environments have brought dramatic changes to 
the development of SMNEs.  
The state multinational in the current global environment still has characteristics 
derived from its parents (the SOE and the MNE). However, due to global environment 
changes, the state multinational has also changed in terms of its key features as a hybrid 
organizational form. My arguments suggest that, when generally compared with private 
MNEs, SMNEs confront a higher level of corporate governance complexity, have a 
lower level of autonomy in establishing their organizational structures, face a lower level 
of uncertainty, and have more difficulty in making strategies and organizational changes. 
One of the main worries in the early literature on this topic has been that state 
multinationals will have divided loyalties (profit maximization and state goals) and 
engage in activities that non-state-owned MNEs would not. Thus, this study is an 
attempt to examine how corporate governance of SMNEs affects international activities 
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and firm performance in the current global environment. In other words, I attempt to 
investigate how state ownership influences international diversification and firm 
performance of new-style SMNEs, using the theoretical perspective of corporate 
governance. 
My findings show a relationship between state ownership and an SMNE‘s 
international strategies, thereby extending agency theory through the incorporation of a 
new type of investor and complementing agency theory by introducing the concept of 
state ownership to an international context. Results of this study suggest that state 
shareholders will support the international expansion of SMNEs in terms of financing, 
personnel and policies. However, when state ownership surpasses a threshold (state 
ownership=26% for the three-year sample; 33% for the seven-year sample), agency costs 
become dominant and then negatively influence the SMNE‘s level of international 
expansion.  
Moreover, as one type of corporate governance mechanism, institutional 
ownership benefits corporate governance through more efficient control of management 
(Hitt et al., 2006). My findings suggest that different levels of institutional ownership 
have different degrees of influence on the relationship between state ownership and an 
SMNE‘s international strategies. When the percentage of institutional ownership is low, 
institutional investors may not function well as expected; thus, the influence of state 
ownership is weaker. In contrast, with a high level of institutional ownership, those 
investors have both the incentive and power to monitor management (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986), whatever its type (Tihanyi et al., 2003). Thus, the relationship between state 
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ownership and SMNEs‘ international diversification is stronger.  
Furthermore, our results suggest a positive relationship between the level of 
international diversification and firm performance, which provides support to the 
suggestion that the  international diversification—performance relationship is mixed and 
affected by the context based on the review on previous studies (Hitt et al., 2006). For 
SMNEs, on one hand, they enjoy the benefits of international diversification (Lu & 
Beamish, 2004). On the other hand, due to their new corporate structure in the new 
global environment, the negative influence of internationalization may not be prominent 
enough to significantly mitigate these benefits.  
In addition, the mediational effect of international diversification on the 
relationship between state ownership and firm performance strengthens my arguments 
on SMNE‘s corporate governance issue. The agency theory literature examines the 
impact of ownership structure on performance (e.g., Jensen &Meckling, 1976). However, 
such effects on performance are through the strategies made by the management team, 
since outsider ownership (such as state and institutional ownership) only controls 
management (Dalton et al., 2003). Thus, my results provide support to the mediational 
relationship that state ownership influences firm performance through SMNEs‘ 
international strategies. The meditational effect of international diversification suggests a 
way to open the ―black box‖ between equity ownership and firm performance, 
complementing agency theory on the equity-performance relationship. 
Finally, my findings give strong support to the influence of home country 
institutional environments on the proposed relationships in Chapter III. In developed 
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countries, the institutional environment is well established. In contrast, in developing 
and emerging countries, institutional voids exist, which makes state ownership substitute 
for needed institutions (Valeer & Schrage, 2009). Thus, the proposed relationships 
between state ownership and international diversification should and do differ in 
different institutional environments. My empirical results give strong support for the 
proposed hypotheses. 
Since my sample includes a variety of countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and 
America, I conclude that my results show significant commonality of the effects of state 
ownership as well as the moderating effects of institutional ownership on an SMNE‘s 
international strategies and firm performance. Therefore, my findings present some solid 
evidence on how new-style SMNEs around the world expand internationally. 
Overall, the findings from the present study conclude that (1) the new-style 
SMNE shares some characteristics from its parents (the SOE and the MNE), but has 
differences from both, which makes the new-style SMNE a unique and hybrid 
organizational form; (2) state ownership does influence the SMNE‘s international 
diversification and firm performance non linearly and the optimum level of state 
ownership exists; (3) institutional ownership is an effective mechanism to improve the 
quality of corporate governance of SMNEs; (4) institutional environment of the home 
country matters; i.e., the proposed relationships between state ownership and SMNEs‘ 
international diversification will be strengthened or weakened upon different levels of 
home country institutional environments. 
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Implications 
Implications for Managerial Practice 
This study has managerial implications for managers in SMNEs in order to be 
competent in international markets. First, in order to better manage the SMNE and then 
achieve a higher performance, the level of state ownership should be carefully controlled. 
Although the existence of such type of ownership can bring benefits for the development 
of SMNEs, its negative effects, especially on corporate governance, should not be 
ignored.  
Second, the positive monitoring effect of institutional investors should be 
acknowledged. Given the moderation influence of such type of ownership, managers of 
SMNEs should consider the involvement of institutional ownership based on the level of 
the firm‘s state ownership. Thus, I concluded that a balanced ownership structure can 
improve an SMNE‘s international expansion and firm performance. 
Third, managers of SMNEs should acknowledge the important influence of 
equity owners on international strategies and firm performance. Although owners may 
not directly interfere with management and influence strategic making and firm 
performance, they can exercise their voices through their concentrated ownership 
(Dalton et al., 2008).  
Fourth, managers of SMNEs should also consider their home country 
institutional environment when they make strategic decisions on international expansion. 
The institutional environment will influence the effect of state ownership on SMNEs‘ 
international strategies and firm performance. In developed countries, the institutional 
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environment is well established. Support from government in developed countries may 
not be as important as that in developing and emerging countries. Managers should 
realize the level of institutional environment of their home country and understand the 
influence of state ownership on corporate strategies and firm performance before making 
strategic decisions on international expansion. 
Implications for Future Research  
Given the interesting findings of this study and our specific sample (state 
multinationals; SMNEs), I acknowledge promising research directions to further 
complement the existing literature. First, the SMNE-state relationship in the 21st century 
may have changed greatly from that in the 20th century. Considering the effect of 
globalization and new forms of global competition, states would compete for wealth 
accordingly, and thus governments may negotiate with foreign MNEs for alliances and 
cooperation through SMNEs (Dunning, 1995). Previous research suggests that in order 
to increase its efficiency, the SMNE needs to have autonomy, keeping home 
governments from diverting the enterprise from its business purpose (e.g. Lamont, 1979). 
Meanwhile, the state needs to realize its national objectives through its control of those 
state multinationals (Stopford et al., 1991). Thus, there is always a potential control issue 
between the state and the SMNEs. 
The trade-off between opportunities to increase the performance of state 
enterprises and the need to control them is the most important decision that 
governments should make; that is, whether, when and how intervene (Stopford et al., 
1991). For instance, the less developed a national economy and the less extent to which 
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the economy is market oriented, the more likely the state will intervene in the 
operations of SMNEs through its shareholding in those firms (Anastassopoulos et al., 
1987). In the new global environment, whether SMNEs are able to succeed in the 
international markets depends on how they avoid tight government control and take 
advantage of government support while keeping autonomy to operate in foreign 
markets for profits. Therefore, it is worthwhile to further study the SMNE-state 
relationship in the new international environment and how such relationship influences 
the SMNE‘s international strategy and activities. 
Second, previous literature suggested that strategy analysis would help 
understand SOE performance in the global competition with private MNEs (Thomas, 
1986). For instance, to keep sustainable growth and improve their performance through 
international expansion, SMNEs should proactively participate in global competition, 
recognize their role in the global market and in achieving the national goals, and 
integrate localization with their global strategies (Stopford et al., 1991). Thus, when 
competing with private MNEs in the global markets, corporate strategies of SMNEs 
influence their performance. 
In the new international environment, questions remain whether SMNEs face 
similar situations with private MNEs when competing in the global markets, and how 
SMNEs will make different international strategies to cope with competitive situations. 
Thus, comparison of strategic differences between SMNEs and private MNEs will 
complement the literature on strategic management of MNEs by incorporating a unique 
ownership type — state ownership.  
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Third, organizational characteristics of SMNEs, such as organizational structure 
and corporate governance, affect SMNEs‘ competitiveness and performance. For 
instance, Anastassopoulos et al. (1987) argued that the traditional concentrated structure 
of an SOE is an obstacle to the implementation of its international strategies because of 
its internal bureaucratic behaviors and its national objectives and social responsibilities, 
while an SOE with a multinational oriented structure may help realize its international 
targets. Thus, when competing with private MNEs in the global markets, organizational 
characteristics of SMNEs influence their firm performance. 
In the new international environment, questions remain that how SMNEs shape 
organizational characteristics, such as how to adopt an organizational structure to cope 
with such competitive situations, since, organizational structure of SMNEs may affect 
strategic implications of their goals, both long term and short term.  Thus, organizational 
characteristics of SMNEs in order to succeed in the global competition should be studied. 
I have already proposed propositions on SMNEs‘ organizational characteristics based on 
the comparison between new-style SMNEs and private MNEs. Therefore, empirical tests 
(such as survey) of my propositions may be conducted and findings of such studies will 
further complement organization theory. 
Fourth, as explained in Chapter II, old-style SMNEs have characteristics that are 
close to SOEs, which are generally operating in domestic markets. However, in the new 
global environment, new-style SMNEs move towards MNEs in terms of key features of 
an organizational form. I expect the same trend for SMNEs in terms of their strategies 
and performance. I already suggest that I will conduct post-dissertation research on the 
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comparison between state controlled MNEs and non-MNEs. Therefore, future research 
can compare new-style SMNEs with domestic state owned or controlled enterprises in 
terms of their corporate strategies, organizational characteristics and firm performance.  
Fifth, as already discussed, home country and host country environments 
influence the development of MNEs (OECD, 2002; UNCTAD, 2007), including 
SMNEs. Previous research suggests that home and host country institutions have 
different impacts on SMNE development. For instance, in 1970s, regulations restricted 
both inward and outward FDI. Besides the examples discussed earlier about the 
restriction on outward FDI in Brazil and India (Wells, 1983), countries such as Mexico 
restricted inward FDI in material industries such as automobiles and petroleum (Eden, 
1996). 
In the new international environment, governments in either host or home 
countries endeavor to improve the country environment. For instance, recent research 
suggests improvement of the host country environment for regulation and legal systems, 
infrastructure, and market structure (e.g. Galan et al., 2007; Flores & Arguilera, 2007) 
attracts inward FDI and improve national competitive capabilities. My study has 
considered the influence of the home country environment. However, I did not go 
further and consider detailed aspects of home country environment, such as political 
stability and the degree of openness, and their impacts on SMNEs. Thus, further studies 
on the individual influence of different factors of home country institutional 
environments on SMNE strategies and performance would give high added value and 
insights to the understanding and insights on SMNEs.  
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Sixth, previous literature argues that subsidiaries of MNEs generally act as 
transferees, and as resource mobilizers, but they manifest themselves in different ways in 
advanced and less-developed countries (Vernon, 1971). Moreover, subsidiaries of SOEs 
confront more complex situations in host countries in terms of markets, capital and 
technology, due to the simultaneous economic and political choices (Aharoni & Seidler 
1986).  
In the changing world markets, subsidiaries may have more flexibility and 
autonomy to function differently from their parents (Roth & O‘Donnell, 1996). For 
instance, similar to the control between the state and the SMNE, the control of the 
subsidiaries by headquarters is critical to enable autonomy and avoid agency costs at the 
same time. Geringer and Hebert (1989) identify three dimensions of control: extent, 
focus and mechanisms (content-oriented, context-oriented, and process-oriented) in 
terms of joint venture management. These dimensions of control may also be applied to 
the management of subsidiaries when the top management term makes such strategic 
decisions. Therefore, there is great potential to examine the foreign subsidiaries of state 
multinationals in such perspectives as differences in strategies with parent firms, the 
headquarter-subsidiary agency relationships, and manifested control issues between 
headquarters and subsidiaries. 
Based on the above analysis on future research, I propose that (Figure 7.1) 
Performance=f (firm characteristics (e.g., relationship with states)+ home 
country environment+ host country environment+ strategies) 
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Figure 7.1.  
Future Research Directions 
 
 
In addition, there is a great potential to extend research on SMNEs in 
methodology. Previous studies have generally used case studies or descriptive 
examinations to explore divergent issues about SMNEs (e.g. Ramamurti, 1987; Vernon, 
1979; Zif, 1983). For instance, based on a longitudinal study of four high technology 
firms in India and Brazil, Ramamurti (1987) examined factors that shaped their strategic 
behavior and competitive capabilities in international markets. However, with the 
emergence of large databases on ownership, shareholder and subsidiary information (e.g., 
Bureau van Dijk‘s ORBIS), it is now possible to empirically test research questions such 
as whether ―divided loyalties‖ does lead to different decision-making in strategies, firm 
characteristics and firm performance, and their different impacts on home and host 
country environments.   
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Limitations 
I realize that this study has limitations. First, I focused on listed state 
multinationals due to the data availability of the BVD database. There are more SMNEs, 
which are not listed, especially from developing and emerging countries. However, the 
database does not have enough information on unlisted companies, which force me not 
to include SMNEs. On the one hand, a broader range of samples will give more insights 
to answer my research questions. On the other hand, if more firm level data on SMNEs 
in more countries are available, I can generalize my results to a broader range of SMNEs. 
Future research may consider reframing my research questions and more broadly 
exploring agency problems of SMNEs based on a larger sample.  
Second, because the format of financial information for companies in the 
banking industry is different from that for companies in other industries, I do not include 
SMNEs in the banking industry. However, the number of SMNEs in the industry is not 
small (over 100 in my case). Giving up those SMNEs may limit the generalizability of 
my results. Thus, future research should specifically conduct research on SMNEs in the 
banking industry. More interesting findings may come out by future research from this 
perspective.  
Third, I conducted a longitudinal analysis using a three-year sample and a seven-
year sample to explain my arguments since the database only contains comprehensive 
information of our interests after 2000. A longer time period will capture more 
characteristics of the SMNE during its several decades‘ development. For instance, if I 
had data with a longer time period, I may conduct a comparison between old-style and 
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new-style SMNEs to identify any differences between these two types of SMNEs. Future 
empirical research should endeavor to improve from this perspective if any database has 
firm-level data back to the 1990s, or even earlier.  
Lastly, I consider country-level institutional environments in this study. However, 
in some countries, more than one level of institutional environments may be considered, 
such as regional level or province level in countries like China. Future empirical 
research should engage in improving the empirical context and making the empirical 
context more generalizable. 
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APPENDIX A 
COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE 
Australia            
Austria         
Bahrain  
Belgium  
Brazil  
Canada  
China  
Czech  
Denmark  
Egypt  
Finland  
France  
Germany  
Greece  
India  
Indonesia  
Italy  
Japan  
Jordan  
Kuwait  
Luxembourg  
Malaysia  
Monaco  
Netherlands  
Norway  
Oman  
Philippine  
Poland  
Qatar  
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore  
South Africa 
Sweden  
Switzerland  
Taiwan  
Thailand  
The United Kingdom 
United Arab Emirate 
The United States 
Venezuela 
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